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NIXON V.
MOOT COURT
UNITED STATES
Lower Court Opinion
Article: The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and its
Alternatives, Michael J. Gerhardt
91-740 NIXON v. U.S.
Impeachment of federal judge-Trial before Sen-
ate committee.
Ruling below (CA DC, 938 F2d 239. 60 LW
2055):
Impeached federal judge's claim that U.S. Sen-
ate violated its constitutional duty to "try" his
impeachment by delegating evidence-gathering
function to special committee is not justiciable.
Questions presented: (1) Does refusal of court
of appeals to review claim that Senate committee
trial is unconstitutional contrary to holding in
Powell v.- McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
disrupt constitutional balance of powers, and
threaten judicial independence? (2) Does com-
mittee trial on perjury charges, in which 88
members of Senate are unable to evaluate witness
credibility, violate express constitutional com-
mand that Senate "try all Impeachments"?
Petition for certiorari filed 11/4/91, by David
Overlock Stewart, Peter M. Brody, Thomas B.
Smith, and Ropes & Gray, all of Washington.
D.C., and Boyce Holleman, and Michael B.
Holleman, both of Gulfport. Miss.
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11(d) (cautioning against manipulation of
footnotes to evade specified page limits).
At argument counsel acknowledged that he
himself had typed the briefs.
There is no excuse for counsel's flagrant
disregard of this court's rule and orders.
We waste precious time and resources
when compelled to measure margins and
typefaces in the work submitted to us and
to upbraid those lawyers who do not com-
ply with our rules or heed our orders. The
Seventh Circuit summed up the situation
quite well:
Lawyers must comply with the rules and
our orders rather than hope to put one
over on the court and to apologize when
caught. The penalty for a violation
should smart. Even if only negligence
was at work, counsel must- learn to be
alert. The offense here "multiplied the
proceedings" by requiring the judges and
counsel for the Board to examine two
sets of briefs for Westinghouse. We
accordingly use our power under 28
U.S.C. § 1927 and impose a penalty of
$1,000. Counsel may not pass this penal-
ty on to Westinghouse.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 809
F.2d 419, 425 (7th Cir.1987); see also EDC,
Inc. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 915
F.2d 1082 (7th Cir.1990). We agree with
the Seventh Circuit's approach. Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, we order Williams's
counsel personally to pay to the clerk of
this court a penalty in the amount of $500.
Williams's counsel is further instructed
that he is not to pass the penalty on to
Williams.
In conclusion, we affirm the district
court in all respects except its calculation
of the cost of capital award. We remand
for recalculation of that award and also
sanction Williams's lawyer for his repeated
failure to comply with our rule and orders.
It is so ordered.
(0 xEY NUMH R SYSTEM
v. U.S. 239
239 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
Walter L. NIXON, Jr., Appellant,
V.
UNITED STATES of America, et al.
No. 90-5246.
United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued March 14, 1991.
Decided July 9, 1991.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 6, 1991.
Former Chief Judge of United States
District Court was impeached in proceeding
during which Senate used committee to
take testimony and gather evidence. For-
mer judge sought declaratory judgment
that Senate's failure to give him full evi-
dentiary hearing before entire Senate vio-
lated its constitutional duty to "try" all
impeachments. The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, 744
F.Supp. 9, Louis F. Oberdorfer, J., granted
Government's motion to dismiss. Former
judge appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Stephen F. Williams, Circuit Judge, held
that whether Senate followed proper proce-
dures when it "tried" judge's impeachment
was nonjusticiable issue.
Affirmed.
Randolph, Circuit Judge, concurred
and filed opinion.
Harry T. Edwards, J., dissented in
part, concurred in judgment, and filed opin-
ion.
Constitutional Law E70.1(7)
Judges 0-11(5)
Claim that Senate's use of committee
to take testimony and gather evidence dur-
ing proceedings to impeach United States
District Court judge violated Senate's con-
stitutional duty to try all impeachments
was nonjusticiable; Senate had sole discre-
tion to choose its procedure. (Per
Williams, Circuit Judge, with one Circuit
Judge concurring in separate opinion.)
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1,- § 3, cl. 6. - -
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Appeal from the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia.
David 0. Stewart, with whom Peter M.
Brody was on the brief, Washington, D.C.,
for appellant.
Douglas Letter, Atty., Dept. of Justice,
with whom Stuart M. Gerson, Asst. Atty.
Gen., and Jay B. Stephens, U.S. Atty., were
on the brief, Washington, D.C., for appel-
lees.
Morgan J. Frankel, Asst. Senate Legal
Counsel, with whom Michael Davidson,
Senate Legal Counsel, and Ken U. Benja-
min, Jr., Deputy Senate Legal Counsel,
were on the brief, Washington, D.C., for
amicus curiae urging that the judgment of
the District Court be affirmed.
Before EDWARDS, WILLIAMS and
RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit
Judge STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS.
Concurring opinion filed by Circuit
Judge RANDOLPH.
Opinion dissenting in part and
concurring in the judgment filed by
Circuit Judge HARRY T. EDWARDS.
STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS, Circuit
Judge:
Walter L Nixon, Jr., formerly the Chief
Judge of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi, was im-
peached by the House of Representatives
and convicted by the Senate for giving
false testimony to a grand jury investigat-
ing allegations that he had been bribed.
Nixon seeks judicial review of the Senate's
procedures-in particular, its use of a com-
mittee to take testimony and gather other
evidence.
The Constitutional Convention, however,
gave the Senate "the sole Power to try all
Impeachments", Art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (emphasis
added). It not only rejected proposals to
assign the power to the federal courts, but
it did so for reasons that are almost impos-
sible to square with any judicial role in the
process. We find Nixon's claim nonjustici-
able.
After an investigation into reports that
Nixon had asked a local district attorney to
stop the prosecution of a man whose father
had enriched Nixon through an investment
scheme, a grand jury indicted Nixon on one
count of receiving an illegal gratuity and
three counts of perjury before the grand
jury. At trial, Nixon was convicted on two
counts of perjury and acquitted on the oth-
er two counts. He was sentenced to pris-
on, and his conviction was affirmed on ap-
peal. See United States v. Nixon, 816
F.2d 1022 (5th Cir.1987); see also United
States v. Nixon, 881 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1989) (affirming the denial of Nixon's mo-
tion for a new trial).
Even after this conviction, Walter Nixon
refused to resign from his office as a Unit-
ed States district judge, and while serving
time in prison he continued to draw his
judicial salary. See H.R.Rep. No. 36, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1989). The House of
Representatives began impeachment pro-
ceedings, see id., and on May 10, 1989, it
voted to impeach Nixon on three articles
charging him with giving false testimony
to the grand jury and bringing disrepute on
the federal judiciary. See 135 Cong.Rec.
H1811 (daily ed. May 10, 1989).
When these articles of impeachment
were presented to the Senate, it invoked its
own Impeachment Rule XI, under which
the presiding officer appoints a committee
of twelve senators "to receive evidence and
take testimony". S.Imp.R. XI, reprinted
in Senate Manual, S.Doc. No. 1, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 186 (1989); see S.Res. 128,
101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong.Rec. S5199
(daily ed. May 11, 1989). The committee
conducted four days of hearings, taking
live testimony from ten witnesses, includ-
ing Nixon himself. See S.Rep. No. 164,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1989). It then
transmitted to the full Senate a complete
record of the evidence and a report, sum-
marizing both the undisputed and disputed
facts of the case without resolving contest-
ed issues or recommending any particular
disposition of the charges. See id. at 3-4.
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After considering final briefs, hearing ar-
guments on the Senate floor from both the
impeachment managers and the defense,
including a personal appeal from Nixon
himself, and posing questions to the par-
ties, see 135 Cong.Rec. S14,493-517 (daily
ed. Nov. 1, 1989), the Senate voted by more
than the constitutionally prescribed two-
thirds majority to convict Nixon on two of
the three articles. 135 Cong.Rec. S14,635
(daily ed. Nov. 3, 1989); see Art. I, § 3, cl.
6. The presiding officer entered judgment
removing him from his office as a United
States district judge. 135 Cong.Rec. at
S14,636.
Nixon then sued in district court, argu-
ing that the Senate's failure to give him a
full evidentiary hearing before the entire
Senate violated its constitutional duty to
"try" all impeachments. See Art. I, § 3, cl.
6. He sought a declaratory judgment that
his conviction by the Senate was void and
that his judicial salary and privileges
should be reinstated from the date of his
conviction. The district court held that his
claim was nonjusticiable, see Nixon v.
United States, 744 F.Supp. 9 (D.D.C.1990),
and we agree.
"The House ... shall have the sole Pow-
er of Impeachment", Art. I, § 2, cl. 5, and
"The Senate shall have the sole Power to
try all Impeachments", Art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
Nowhere else does the Constitution explic-
itly confer on a body the "sole" power to do
anything. The only court to fully consider
the issue before this case gave "sole" its
full weight. It read the word to express an
"intention that no other tribunal should
have any jurisdiction of the cases tried
under the provisions with reference to im-
peachment." Ritter v. United States, 84
CLC1. 293, 296 (1936). The court went on:
The dictionary definition of the word
"sole" is "being or acting without anoth-
er" and we think it was intended that the
Senate should act without any other tri-
bunal having anything to do with the
case. This would be the ordinary signifi-
cation of the words and this construction
is supported by a consideration of the
Proceedings of the Constitutional Con-
N v. U.S. 241
239 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
vention and the uniform opinion of the
authorities which have considered this
matter.
Id. Indeed, the unanimous rejection of ju-
dicial review to which the court refers
seems not to have been breached until
Raoul Berger 20 years ago used a rather
casual reading of Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491
(1969), to claim the availability of judicial
review. See Raoul Berger, Impeachment:
The Constitutional Problems (1973); Staff
of Senate Comm. on Rules and Administra-
tion, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Impeachment:
Miscellaneous Documents 170-71 (1974)
("Committee Print") (memorandum on judi-
cial review of impeachment proceedings by
Stephen F. Goldstein).
The history of the Constitution's im-
peachment provisions bears out Ritter's
understanding. Both of the broad propos-
als that provided the foundation for the
Convention delegates' debates, Randolph's
"Virginia Plan" and Paterson's "New Jer-
sey Plan", gave the power to "hear and
determine" impeachments to the federal ju-
diciary. See 1 The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787, at 21-22 (Max Farrand
ed. 1966) (Virginia Plan); id. at 244 (New
Jersey Plan); see also P. Hoffer & N. Hull,
Impeachment in America, 1635-1805, at 97-
100 (1984). Madison supported this assign-
ment, specifically favoring the Supreme
Court, see 2 Farrand at 551, while Hamil-
ton proposed a special court composed of
the chief judge from each state's supreme
court, see 1 Farrand at 292-93. However,
once the Convention decided that a college
of electors, rather than the Senate, should
name the President, thereby eliminating a
potential conflict between the Senate's
roles as both selector and remover of the
President, it authorized the Senate to con-
duct impeachment trials and to render final
judgments by two-thirds vote. Hoffer &
Hull at 98-99; 2 Farrand at 500-01, 552-
53.
In the surviving scraps of Convention
debate on the issue, the focus was on presi-
dential impeachment. While both Madison
and Pinckney opposed use of the Senate, as
tending to increase executive dependence
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on the legislative branch, Gouverneur Mor-
ris responded that the Supreme Court was
"too few in number and might be warped
or corrupted", and Roger Sherman sug-
gested that the Court was an improper
forum to try the President "because the
Judges would be appointed by him." 2
Farrand at 551. These themes of conflict
of interest-so typical of the framers' con-
cern over checks and balances-persisted
into later discussions of applying the im-
peachment power to judges.
In The Federalist, Hamilton identified
the impeachment power as the basis for
constraining usurpation by judges. Thus,
in Federalist No. 79 he wrote:
The precautions for their responsibility
are comprised in the article respecting
impeachments. They are liable to be im-
peached for mal-conduct by the house of
representatives, and tried by the senate,
and if convicted, may be dismissed from
office and disqualified for holding any
other. This is the only provision on the
point, which is consistent with the neces-
sary independence of the judicial charac-
ter, and is the only one which we find in
our own constitution in respect to our
own judges.
The Federalist 532-33 (Jacob E. Cooke ed.
1961). A little later, though generally dis-
paraging the risk of judicial aggrandize-
ment as a mere "phantom", he went on
again to identify impeachment as "the im-
portant constitutional check" and to justify
the assignment to the Senate as a key
assurance of the remedy's adequacy:
And the inference [that usurpations were
improbable] is greatly fortified by the
consideration of the important constitu-
tional check, which the power of institut-
ing impeachments, in one part of the
legislative body, and of determining upon
them in the other, would give to that
body upon the members of the judicial
department. This is alone a complete
security. There never can be danger
that the judges, by a series of deliberate
usurpations on the authority of the legis-
lature, would hazard the united resent-
ment of the body entrusted with it, while
this body was possessed of the means of
punishing their presumption by degrad-
ing them from their stations. While this
ought to remove all apprehensions on the
subject, it affords at the same time a
cogent argument for constituting the
senate a court for the trial of impeach-
ments.
Federalist No. 81, Cooke ed. at 545-46.
Hamilton's emphatic language would have
fallen rather flat if-candor had compelled
him to add that, of course, the judges them-
selves would sit in final judgment over this
check on their excesses.
The framers invoked an additional kind
of conflict or bias to support use of the
Senate rather than the judiciary for im-
peachment trials-the bias caused by a per-
son's having played a role in a prior phase
of an extended process. Article I specifies
that a person convicted in impeachment
proceedings "shall nevertheless be liable
and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment
and Punishment, according to Law." Art.
I, § 3, cl. 7. Thus the Constitution explicit-
ly anticipates two sets of proceedings for
at least some officials who commit im-
peachable offenses-one in Congress and
one in the courts. The Framers separated
the two, trying to secure for the accused
the benefit of independent judgments.
Though Hamilton assumed (in line with
other delegates' comments) that impeach-
ment trials would precede criminal trials,
his insistence on the need for distinct, inde-
pendent forums is no less compelling when
the sequence is reversed, as was true of
Nixon:
Would it be proper that the persons, who
had disposed of his fame and his most
valuable rights as a citizen in one trial,
should in another trial, for the same of-
fence, be also the disposers of his life
and his fortune? Would there not be the
greatest reason to apprehend, that error
in the first sentence would be the parent
of error in the second sentence? That
the strong bias of one decision would be
apt to overrule the influence of any new
lights, which might be brought to vary
the complexion of another decision?
Federalist No. 65, Cooke ed. at 442.
The risks from' overlapping powers reach
their apogee in a presidential impeachment
242
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trial, for which the Chief Justice presides
over the Senate. Art. I, § 3, cl. 6. Wheth-
er the Chief Justice has clashed with the
Senate over trial procedures, as did Chief
Justice Chase during the trial of President
Andrew Johnson, see Berger at 268-69;
Committee Print at 6-8, or concurred all
the way, he would be seen as prejudiced in
review of the impeachment trial. That no
one recognized this conflict in the framing
and ratification debates argues the implau-
sibility of such review.
That the Convention intended the im-
peachment power to be qualified only by
political forces is also reflected in constitu-
tional language limiting the executive's au-
thority. Just as Hamilton viewed impeach-
ment as "the important constitutional
check" on the judiciary (Federalist No. 81),
he called the power "an' essential check in
the hands of [the legislative body] upon the
encroachments of the executive". Federal-
ist No. 66, Cooke ed. at 446; see also
Federalist No. 65, Cooke ed. at 441 (de-
scribing impeachments as "a bridle in the
hands of the legislative body upon the exec-
utive servants of the government"). The
delegates made sure that the executive
would have no power to undermine the
check when they expressly excepted im-
peachments from the President's pardon
power. Art. II, § 2, cl. 1. While the ab-
sence of any such express limitation on
judicial interference might support an "ex-
pressio unius" argument in favor of judi-
cial review, a more plausible reading is that
the framers simply assumed that courts
had nothing whatever to do with impeach-
ments.
If the Constitution's text, backed by the
historical evidence, prevents both the judi-
ciary and the executive from constraining
the legislative power of impeachment, did
the framers just slip up, leaving an un-
checked check? The answer can be found
ll Article I itself, which provides two safe-
guards within the legislative branch to
control unwarranted use of impeachments:
(1) the separation of impeachment powers
between the House and the Senate, seeArt. I, § 2, cl. 5; § 3, cl. 6, and (2) the
requirement of a two-thirds vote in theSenate to convict, see Art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
N v. U.S. 243
239 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
Hamilton's response to fears of abuse, in-
cluding concerns about mixing judicial and
legislative power in one body, tracked the
two limits found in Article I. First he
argued that the division of the impeach-
ment powers "guards against the danger
of persecution from the prevalency of a
factious spirit in either of [the tWo hous-
es]." Federalist No. 66, Cooke ed. at 446.
Then he concluded, "A's the concurrence of
two-thirds of the senate will be requisite to
a condemnation, the security to innocence,
from this additional circumstance, will be
as complete as itself can desire." Id.
For Hamilton, that was enough. He
made no reference to judicial review as a
check of the power, in sharp contrast with
his discussion of ordinary legislative pow-
ers. Compare Federalist No. 78, Cooke ed.
at 524-25 (judicial review as a check on
unconstitutional bills of attainder, ex post
facto laws, and statutes). In fact, the par-
ties have not identified a single statement
in either the framers' or ratifiers' debates
alluding even to the possibility of judicial
review, and Berger, its ardent proponent,
acknowledges the absence of any such
mention at the state conventions. See Ber-
ger at 116. To check the impeachment
power, the framers quite naturally relied
on the political accountability of members
of Congress. Thus judges, who on so
many issues have the last word, must rely
on the public as the ultimate check on
impeachment, itself the Constitution's ex-
plicit check on their own excesses.
The broad scope of the Senate's power is
further supported by the grant to each
house of the power to "determine the Rules
of its Proceedings". Art. I, § 5, cl. 2. This
clause gives the Senate independent discre-
tion to set procedural rules for impeach-
ment trials, including the rule challenged
by Nixon-Senate Impeachment Rule XI.
The Supreme Court hinted, in a case where
it refused to second-guess the House's rule
on establishing the presence of a quorum,
that congressional rules of procedure may
be judicially reviewable in some circum-
stances if they "ignore constitutional re-
straints", see United States v. Ballin, 144
U.S. 1, 5, 12 S.Ct. 507, 509, 36 L.Ed. 321
244 938 FEDERAL RE
(1892), but this court has refused (on pru-
dential grounds) to review the House of
Representative's rules allocating seats on
committees, despite a claim that those rules
violated the Fifth Amendment rights of
-members of the minority party in the
House. Vander Jagt v. ONeill, 699 F.2d
1166, 1173 (D.C.Cir.1983). The rules clause
provides at least indirect support for the
view that the Senate's "sole Power to try
all Impeachments" includes the sole power
to frame the rules it will follow in conduct-
ing such trials.
Constitutional exclusion of judicial re-
view of impeachments would seem to be
the end of the matter. But courts have
long analyzed the justiciability of issues
constitutionally committed to the other
branches as part of the "political question"
doctrine. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 164, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). If
the Constitution makes a "textually demon-
strable commitment" of any issue to "a
coordinate political department", see Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct 691,
710, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), it so commits the
conduct of impeachment trials to the Sen-
ate. It remains to consider whether Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.CL 1944,
23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969), and later cases, have
so shrunk the political question doctrine as
to permit courts to set the boundaries of
permissible impeachment trial procedure
despite such a textual commitment. A
careful reading of Powell, which explicitly
preserved the political question doctrine,
see id. at 518, 89 S.CL at 1962 ("It is well
established that the federal courts will not
adjudicate political questions"), suggests
the contrary.
Powell concerned the interplay between
three constitutional clauses: "Each House
shall be the Judge of the Elections, Re-
turns and Qualifications of its own Mem-
bers" (Art. I, § 5, cl. 1); the qualifications
for Representatives specified in Art. I, § 2,
cl. 2; and the expulsion clause (Art. I, § 5,
cl. 2). The Court embarked on its constitu-
tional analysis of justiciability with the
point that "[i]n order to determine whether
there has been a textual commitment to a
co-ordinate department of the Government,
we must interpret the Constitution." 395
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U.S. at 519, 89 S.Ct. at 1963. The Court
then examined the text and history of Art.
I, § 5 to determine whether the framers
limited the scope of the textual commit-
ment found in that clause by other consti-
tutional provisions. It found such limits in
Art. I, § 2's narrow list of qualifications
(age, period of citizenship of the United
States, and residence when elected). See
id. at 520-21, 89 S.Ct. at 1963-64. The
Court found its reading of the qualifica-
tions and exclusion clauses confirmed by
the expulsion clause's requirement of a
two-thirds vote, which would be wholly un-
dercut by giving an unrestricted meaning
to the exclusion clause. Id. at 547-48, 89
S.Ct. at 1977-78.
The Court's political question analysis in
Powell thus relies heavily on the ultimate
conclusion that it was the framers' inten-
tion "to deny either branch of Congress the
authority to add to or otherwise vary the
membership qualifications expressly set
forth in the Constitution." Id. at 532, 89
S.Ct. at 1969-70 (emphasis added); see also
id. at 540, 89 S.Ct. at 1973-74 ("The de-
bates at the state conventions also demon-
strate the Framers' understanding that the
qualifications for members of Congress
had been fixed in the Constitution.") (em-
phasis added). The Court emphasized as a
key piece of evidence this quotation from
Federalist No. 60: "The qualifications of
the persons who may choose or be chosen,
as has been remarked upon another occa-
sion, are defined and fixed in the constitu-
tion; and are unalterable by the legisla-
ture." Cooke ed. at 409 (emphasis added),
quoted in Powell, 395 U.S. at 539, 89 S.Ct.
at 1973. The Federalist yields no parallel
suggestion that the minimum procedures
for conducting an impeachment trial are
unalterable by the legislature and thus not
textually committed. Thus application of
Powell's method-an analysis of the rele-
vant constitutional text and history-leads
here to a conclusion of nonjusticiabilitY.
Later cases confirm this understanding
of Powell. In Roudebush v. Hartke, 405
U.S. 15, 92 S.Ct. 804, 31 L.Ed.2d 1-(1972),
the Supreme Court decided that a state's
recount of ballots in a senatorial election
NIXON
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did not infringe on the Senate's power to
"be the Judge of the Elections ... of its
own members", Art. I, § 5, cl. 1, as the
recount could "usurp" the Senate's func-
tion "only if it .frustrate[d] the Senate's
ability to make an independent final judg-
ment", 405 U.S. at 25, 92 S.Ct. at 810-11,
which it could not do, id. at 25-26, 92 S.CL
at 810-11. While the wording of the hold-
ing itself carries an implication of nonjusti-
ciability, the Court was more explicit in its
rejection of a claim that the candidate's
action had been mooted by the Senate's
decision to seat one of the candidates, sub-
ject to the outcome of the case before the
Court. It stated that it was "without pow-
er to alter the Senate's judgment", id. at
18-19, 92 S.Ct. at 807-08, I and that
"[w]hich candidate is entitled to be seated
in the Senate is, to be sure, a nonjusticiable
political question", id. at 19, 92 S.Ct. at
807-08 (citing Powell). The Court decided
that the case was not moot because the
Senate had seated the other candidate only
temporarily until the conclusion of the suit,
after which it would "be free to make an
unconditional and final judgment under
Art. 1, § 5." Id. (emphasis added). This
strong language indicates that the Court
would find nonjusticiable any challenge to
the Senate's "final" judgment in a disputed
election, even a procedural challenge that
alleged, for example, that the senators re-
fused to hear critical witnesses on the va-
lidity of disputed ballots.
Since Powell and Roudebush, this court
has refused to entertain objections not only
to the substance but also-to the procedures
used by the House of Representatives in
the exercise of its ballot-counting authority
under Art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (each house "shall be
the Judge of the Elections, Returns and
Qualifications of its own Members"). In
Morgan v. United States, 801 F.2d 445
(D.C.Cir.1986), a unanimous panel exam-
ined the text and history of the clause,
noting especially that although it was at-
tacked in the ratification debates, none of
L. The Court appended the following footnote:
6. See Reed v. County Comm'rs, 277 U.S.
376, 388, 48 S.Ct. 531, 532, 72 L.Ed. 924(1928): "[The Senate] is the judge of the elec-
tions, returns and qualifications of its mem-
V. U.S. 245
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its defenders "mention[ed] the safeguard
of judicial review. Such a safeguard was
evidently unthinkable, since the determina-
tion of the legislative House was itself
deemed to be a judicial one." 801 F.2d at
447 (emphasis in original). The point ap-
plies with equal force here. We concluded
that "[t]he exclusion of others-and in par-
ticular of others who-are judges-could not
be more evident." Id.; see also McIntyre
v. Fallahay, 766 F.2d 1078, 1081 (7th Cir.
1985) ("The House is not only 'Judge' but
also final arbiter. Its decisions about
which ballots count, and who won, are not
reviewable in any court. . . .").
In Morgan we quite literally underscored
that the elections clause makes each House
"the Judge" of elections. 801 F.2d at 447
(emphasis in original opinion). If language
making each house "the judge" of elections
gives that house exclusive discretion to de-
termine the procedures for making that
judgment, it seems a fortiori that a clause
granting the Senate "the sole Power to try
all Impeachments" gives it sole discretion
to choose its procedures. If the clause
made the Senate "the sole trier of impeach-
ments" the structure would be more paral-
lel but the grant of exclusive authority no
clearer.
Although the primary reason for invok-
ing the political question doctrine in our
case is the textual commitment of impeach-
ment trials to the Senate, the need for
finality also demands it. See Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. at 210, 82 S.Ct. at 706. In
the elections clause context, the Morgan
court emphasized the need for "quick, deci-
sive resolution of election controversies."
Morgan, 801 F.2d at 450. The need for
finality in impeachments is even more
acute. If claims such as Nixon's were jus-
ticiable, procedural appeals from every im-
peachment trial would become routine, as
the Court of Claims observed even in the
less litigious era of the Ritter decision.
See 84 Ct.C1. at 299. For the impeach-
bers. Art. I, § 5. It is fully empowered and
may determine such matters without the aid
of the House of Representatives or the Execu-
tive or Judicial Department."
Id. at 19 n. 6, 92 S.Ct. at 807 n. 6.
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ments that are anything but routine, those
of presidents and chief justices, the intru-
sion of the courts would expose the politi-
cal life of the country to months, or per-
haps years, of chaos. Even if the courts
qualified a finding of justiciability with a
rule against stays or specific relief of any
kind, their review would undermine the
new President's or Chief Justice's legitima-
cy for at least as long as the process took.
And a declaratory action without final re-
lief awarding the office to one person or
the other could confound matters indefi-
nitely.
If the political question doctrine has no
force where the Constitution has explicitly
committed a power to a coordinate branch
and where the need for finality is extreme,
then it is surely dead. But although the
Supreme Court has rarely applied the doc-
trine in recent years, see Dissent at 258
& n. 11, it has also declined the several
opportunities available to dispatch it. See
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct.
2440, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973); Roudebush v.
Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 19, 92 S.Ct. 804, 807-
08, 31 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972); Powell, 395 U.S. at
518, 89 S.Ct. at 1962. We honor the doc-
trine and apply it here.
It does not help establish justiciability to
pose hypotheticals of outrageous behavior
by a coordinate branch, such as that the
Senate might turn its impeachment trial
responsibilities over "to a randomly chosen
group of schoolchildren", Dissent at 259,
or even pass a rule "allowing conviction
and removal of impeached officers by a
majority vote", id. at 256. If the Senate
should ever be ready to abdicate its respon-
sibilities to schoolchildren, or, moved by
Caligula's appointment of his horse as sen-
ator, to an elephant from the National Zoo,
the republic will have sunk to depths from
which no court could rescue it. And if the
senators try to ignore the clear require-
2. Because the two-thirds vote requirement of
Art. I, § 3. cl. 6 is so concrete, the argument that
it serves as an unalterable limit on the textual
commitment of impeachments, with judicial re-
view available for at least some claims of Senate
disregard, is far more plausible under Powell
than Nixon's effort to find justiciable limits in
the word "try". However, we need not decide
ment of a two-thirds vote for conviction,
they will have to contend with public out-
rage that will ultimately impose its sanc-
tion at the ballot box.2  Absent judicial
review, the Senate takes sole responsibility
for its impeachment procedures as a full-
fledged constitutional actor; just as the
framers intended.
It would be peculiarly ironic for the judi-
ciary to take charge of defining the limits
of permissible procedure out of concern
over the Senate's possible excesses. The
exercise of any final power is by definition
open to monstrous hypothetical abuse.
But judges exercise such power daily, unre-
viewably imposing procedural and substan-
tive boundaries on almost every decision of
the political branches. In all this we are
free of political constraints, subject to cor-
rection solely by constitutional amendment
and to sanction solely by impeachment. If
the impeachment claims of a fellow judge
were justiciable, the circle would be
closed-the judiciary would have final, un-
reviewable power over the one procedure
established to restrain excesses in all its
other final and unreviewable powers:
checkmate.
Today we refuse to embark on setting
limits for the procedures the Senate may
choose for the trial of impeachments; the
Constitution excludes us. Walter Nixon's
claim is not justiciable.3
Affirmed.
RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
We are in agreement that, "political
question" or not, we must interpret the
clause giving the Senate the "sole Power to
try all Impeachments," U.S. CONST., art. I,
§ 3, cl. 6. My review of that clause leads
me to conclude that the Senate, and the
Senate alone, is to choose the method by
this issue, so we leave it for the unlikely day of
its arising.
3. Because Nixon's claim is nonjusticiable, we
need not address appellees' argument that Nix-
on should have sued in Claims Court rather
than district court.
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which it exercises its "sole Power." The
controlling question, it seems to me, is not
whether the Senate acted in conformity
with the historical understanding of the
word "try," or even whether the word has
a sufficiently concrete meaning to consti-
tute a limitation on the Senate's power. It
is whether the judiciary is to make those
judgments.
The "sole Power to try all Impeach-
ments" must include the sole power to set
the procedures for trial, as the Senate did
here. The Constitution names no other
body to perform that function. Apart from
the requirements that the Senators take an
oath, that the Chief Justice preside over
impeachments of Presidents, and that two
thirds of the Senators present must concur,
the Constitution is silent about other proce-
dural details. If the Senate did not have
the sole power to determine how to conduct
the proceedings, if the judiciary had the
final say on what procedures the Senate
must put in place, it is only a short step to
judicial review of the Senate's compliance
with those procedures. Once that dike
bursts, there can be no holding back the
flood of issues that inevitably will be
presented to the courts. One impeached
official will claim as fundamental to a "tri-
al" the right to an unbiased tribunal, free
of undue political influence. Another will
argue that notice was inadequate or that
his right to call witnesses was impaired.
Others will contend that their impeach-
ments must be set aside because they were
denied an adequate opportunity to cross-ex-
amine witnesses, or because improper evi-
dence was introduced against them, or be-
cause some Senator made a prejudicial re-
mark during the proceedings. "Procedur-
al" challenges of this sort fill the pages of
the federal reports. There is no reason to
doubt that impeached individuals would be
less vigorous litigators or that, over time,judicial review would lead to judicial con-
trol.' Yet as Judge Williams ably demon-
strates, the Framers did not intend thejudiciary to perform such a reviewing func-
tion in impeachment trials. The Constitu-
tional Convention removed impeachment
from the Supreme Court's original jurisdic-
tion and transferred the power to try im-
v. U.S. 247
L39 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
peachments to the Senate. 2 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
186, 473, 493, 552-53, 592, 600-01 (M. Far-
rand ed. 1966). Both the Virginia and the
New Jersey plans proposed entrusting
judges with the power of impeachment, but
the Framers considered it wiser to assign
this function to the Senate. See 1 Farrand
at 21-22, 244; 2 Farrand at 500-01 & 552-
53; P. HOFFER & N. Hu, IMPEACHMENT IN
AMERICA, 1635-1805, at 97-100 (1984). Al-
though Madison favored giving the Su-
preme Court the power of impeachment,
the Convention delegates rejected the idea.
See 2 Farrand at 551. Whatever the pre-
cise rationale for this, concerns about the
allocation of power were undoubtedly at
work. Alexander Hamilton noted that the
possibility of judicial usurpation of legisla-
tive power "affords ... a cogent argument
for constituting the Senate a court for the
trial of impeachments." THE FEDERALIST
No. 81, at 546 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed.).
I hesitate to frame my conclusion that
the Senate alone is to decide how to con-
duct impeachment trials in terms of the
"political question" doctrine. I might have
no difficulty doing so if the phrase simply
meant that "the Constitution has commit-
ted the determination of the issue to anoth-
er agency of government than the courts"
(Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.L.REV. 1, 9
(1959)). Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 518, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1962, 23 L.Ed.2d
491 (1969), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 710, 7 L.Ed.2d 663
(1962), do begin by asking whether there
has been a "textually demonstrable consti-
tutional commitment of the issue to a coor-
dinate branch of government." But in
Powell, 395 U.S. at 521, 89 S.Ct. at 1963-
64, the Court proceeded to answer a quite
different question-"whether the 'qualifi-
cations' which Article I, Section 5 autho-
rized the House to 'judge' were only those
specified in Article I, Section 2 (and per-
haps elsewhere in the Constitution)." San-
dalow, Comments on Powell v. McCor-
mack, 17 UCLA L. REV. 164, 172-73 (1969).
Judge Edwards follows an analogous
route. He believes that because the Sen-
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ate's power is to "try" impeachments, the
judiciary must first give content to the
word "try" and then decide whether the
Senate has exceeded that power. His ap-
proach ultimately leads to conferring on
the courts a rather large role in impeach-
ments although the Framers intentionally
excluded the judiciary. As I have stated, I
view the controlling question as whether
the judiciary can pass upon the validity of
the Senate's procedural decisions. My con-
clusion that the courts have no such role to
play in the impeachment process ultimately
rests on my interpretation of the Constitu-
tion. Perhaps the case qualifies as one
presenting a "political question" within
Powell's meaning, perhaps not. It surely
differs from Powell in one respect. In
Powell, at least, another provision of the
Constitution defined "Qualifications"; the
same cannot be said for the word "try."
At all events, I see no need to rely on the
somewhat "amorphous" doctrine of "politi-
cal question[s]." Morgan v. United
States, 801 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C.Cir.1986)
(Scalia, J.), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 911, 107
S.Ct. 1359, 94 L.Ed.2d 529 (1987).
HARRY T. EDWARDS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part and concurring in the
judgment:
In this case, Walter L. Nixon, Jr., a for-
mer United States District Judge, chal-
lenges the constitutionality of his convic-
tion by the United States Senate on two
articles of impeachment and his subsequent
removal from the bench. Nixon contends
that the Senate violated its express consti-
tutional duty to "try" his impeachment by
delegating most of the actual trial work to
a special committee of 12 senators. The
District Court found that Nixon had
presented a significant constitutional ques-
tion but that it was nonjusticiable under
the political question doctrine. See Nixon
v. United States, 744 F.Supp. 9, 13 (D.D.C.
1990).
I find that Nixon's claim is justiciable.
Because Nixon alleges that the Senate vio-
lated an express textual limitation on its
constitutional authority-that is, convicted
him on articles of impeachment without
first "try[ing]" him within the constitution-
al meaning of that term-the courts are
not only competent, but duty-bound, to in-
terpret the text and decide the constitution-
al question. See Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491
(1969). Reaching the merits, however, I
conclude that the Senate's use of a special
committee to hear witnesses and gather
evidence did not deprive Nixon of any con-
stitutionally protected right. I would
therefore affirm the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court, albeit on different grounds
than those enunciated by the trial court or
by the majority today.
I. BACKGROUND
In early 1984, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI"), acting on tips, com-
menced an investigation of Walter L. Nix-
on, Jr., who was then Chief Judge of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Mississippi. The FBI was given
reason to believe that, in consideration of
certain financial inducements, Nixon had
communicated with a local prosecutor on
behalf of a friend's son who was facing
possible drug charges. Following the FBI
investigation, the case was presented to a
grand jury, before whom Nixon testified.
In his testimony to the grand jury, Nixon
falsely denied ever having spoken with the
local prosecutor about the drug prosecu-
tion. The grand jury then returned an
indictment charging Nixon with one count
of bribery and three counts of perjury. In
1986, although acquitted on the underlying
bribery charge, Nixon was convicted of per-
jury based on his grand jury testimony,
and his conviction was subsequently af-
firmed. See United States v. Nixon, 816
F.2d 1022 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1026, 108 S.Ct. 749, 98 L.Ed.2d 762
(1988).
In May 1989, the House of Representa-
tives voted to impeach Nixon on three arti-
cles relating to his perjury. See 135
CONG. REC. H1811 (daily ed. May 10,
1989). The first two articles charged Nix-
on with giving false testimony to the grand
jury and the last charged him with bring-
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ing disrepute to the federal judiciary by
way of his actions. See id. at H1802-03.
When these articles came before the Sen-
ate for trial, the Senate voted to empanel a
special committee of 12 senators to hear
witnesses and gather evidence. See S.Res.
128, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG.
REC. S5199 (daily ed. May 11, 1989). This
committee was established pursuant to
Senate Impeachment Rule XI, an internal
rule adopted in 1935 and first invoked in
1986 during the impeachment trial of for-
mer U.S. District Judge Harry Claiborne.
Under Rule XI, the Senate may elect to
delegate certain evidence-gathering respon-
sibilities associated with an impeachment
trial to a special 12-member committee, in
lieu of conducting a full evidentiary hear-
ing on the Senate floor. Although the rule
does not prohibit it, in practice the commit-
tee has not been empowered to pass judg-
ment on contested issues of fact or make
any recommendations concerning the reso-
lution of the impeachment charges. See
S.Res. 128, supra, § 5. The committee is,
however, fully authorized to hear witness-
es, permit cross-examination and compile a
record upon which the full Senate may act.'
Under established procedures, all mem-
bers of the Senate are kept fully apprised
of the committee's proceedings. The pro-
ceedings are broadcast live to all Senate
offices and are also recorded on videotape
which is made available to all senators.
The committee also prepares a report sum-
marizing both the undisputed facts of the
case and the evidence relating to those
which are contested. This report, along
I. Rule XI provides:
[I1n the trial of any impeachment the Pre-
siding Officer of the Senate, upon the order of
the Senate, shall appoint a committee of
twelve Senators to receive evidence and take
testimony at such times and places as the
committee may determine, and for such pur-
pose the committee so appointed and the
chairman thereof, to be elected by the com-
mittee, shall (unless otherwise ordered by the
Senate) exercise all the powers and functions
conferred upon the Senate and the Presiding
Officer of the Senate, respectively, under the
rules of procedure and practice in the Senate
when sitting on impeachment trials.
Unless otherwise ordered by the Senate, the
rules of procedure and practice in the Senate
when sitting on impeachment trials shall gov-
v. U.S. 249
39 (D.C.Cir. 1991)
with a transcript of the committee's pro-
ceedings, is then passed along to the full
Senate. Rule XI does not preclude the
Senate from calling witnesses before the
full body or from conducting further factu-
al inquiries on the Senate floor. Prior to a
final vote, the parties are permitted to
make arguments before the full assembly.
Nixon protested the use of an evidentiary
committee in his case and twice unsuccess-
fully asked the Senate to conduct all evi-
dentiary proceedings on the Senate floor.
The committee appointed to inquire into
Nixon's case conducted four days of hear-
ings in September 1989 and heard from 10
witnesses, including five defense witnesses
and Nixon himself. See REPORT OF THE
IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMMITTEE ON THE ART-
CLEs AGAINST JUDGE WALTER L. NixoN, JR..
S.REP. No. 164, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1989). On October 16, 1989, the committee
submitted its report to the full Senate, see
id., and the parties submitted final briefs
shortly thereafter.
For three consecutive days, beginning
November 1, 1989, the full Senate con-
sidered the question of Nixon's impeach-
ment. On November 1, Nixon and the
House impeachment managers were each
allowed 90 minutes to present closing argu-
ments on the Senate floor. See 135 CONG.
REC. S14,494 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1989). Nix-
on himself used some of that time to offer
a personal appeal to the senators. See id.
at S14,502-04. Following these argu-
ments, the senators posed a number of
written questions to the parties. See id. at
ern the procedure and practice of the commit-
tee so appointed. The committee so appoint-
ed shall report to the Senate in writing a
certified copy of the transcript of the proceed-
ings and testimony had and given before such
committee, and such report shall be received
by the Senate and the evidence so received
and the testimony so taken shall be con-
sidered to all intents and purposes, subject to
the right of the Senate to determine compe-
tency, relevancy, and materiality, as having
been received and taken before the Senate.
but nothing herein shall prevent the Senate
from sending for any witness and hearing his
testimony in open Senate, or -by order of the
Senate having the entire trial in open Senate.
S.Im.R. XI, reprinted in SENATE MANUAl., S.Doc.
No. 1. 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 174 (1984).
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S14,513-16. On November 2, the full Sen-
ate deliberated on Nixon's guilt for six
hours in closed session. On the final day,
the Senate voted by the necessary two-
thirds majority to convict Nixon on two of
the three articles of impeachment.
Nixon now challenges the constitutionali-
ty of the procedure used by the Senate in
considering his impeachment. His argu-
ment is that the Constitution obligates "the
Senate" to "try" impeachments and that
this language entitles him to a full eviden-
tiary hearing on the floor of the Senate.
The Senate's use of a committee to gather
evidence and hear witnesses, Nixon argues,
fundamentally prejudiced his case and
stripped the Senate's later deliberations of
the judicial character required by the Con-
stitution. In particular, Nixon contends
that, although issues of credibility were
central to the Senate's ultimate disposition
of his case, only the 12 senators who
served on the committee actually heard the
witnesses testify in person. As evidence of
the prejudice he suffered, Nixon offers an
analysis of the final vote in his case which
shows that senators who did not serve on
the committee (and thus did not hear the
witness testimony first-hand) were more
likely to vote to convict than those senators
who sat on the committee.'
Nixon first brought this challenge before
the District Court in June 1989, when he
intervened in a law suit brought by then-
Judge Alcee Hastings, who was also facing
impeachment proceedings. In that case,
the District Court held Nixon's claim to be
a nonjusticiable political question; this
court affirmed the trial court's dismissal,
2. The Senate voted 89-to-8 to convict Nixon on
Article I and 78-to-19 to convict on Article II.
See 135 CoNGREc. S14,635 (daily ed. Nov. 3,
1989). Fifty-seven senators also voted to con-
vict Nixon on Article III, see id. at S14,636,
although this fell short of the two-thirds majori-
ty required by the Constitution, see U.S. CONsT.
art. I. § 3, cl. 6.
3. On Article I, nine out of the 12 senators who
served on the impeachment committee (75%)
voted to convict, while fully 94% of senators off
the committee favored conviction. On Article
II, 58% of the committee members voted for
conviction, compared to 84% of the remaining
senators. On Article III, 42% of committee
but on the grounds that the claims were
then premature in light of the fact that
neither plaintiff had yet been convicted by
the Senate. See Hastings v. United States
Senate, 716 F.Supp. 38, 40 (D.D.C.), aff'd
mem. on other grounds, 887 F.2d 332
(D.C.Cir.1989) (text of unpublished memo-
randum decision available on Westlaw).
Following the Senate's vote, Nixon re-
newed his constitutional challenge, seeking
a declaration that his conviction by the
Senate and subsequent removal were un-
constitutional. In reply, the Government
mounted a two-prong attack on the court's
authority to hear Nixon's challenge. First,
the Government renewed its insistence that
the claim was a nonjusticiable political
question. Second, it asserted that, even if
the claim were justiciable, it could be heard
only in the United States Claims Court, the
exclusive forum in which the United States
has waived its sovereign immunity to suits
for large money damages. Because a find-
ing in Nixon's favor on the merits might
entitle him to back pay in excess of $10,-
000, the Government reasoned, Nixon's suit
was essentially one for money damages
over which the Claims Court would have
exclusive jurisdiction.
The District Court held that it had proper
subject-matter jurisdiction over Nixon's
suit but concluded, once again, that his
claim was nonjusticiable under the political
question doctrine. See Nion v. United
States, 744 F.Supp. 9, 13-14 (D.D.C.1990).
In the District Court's view, the Senate's
use of an evidentiary committee simply did
not "result( ] in the dimension of departure
from the Constitution's textual commit-
members, and 61% of the remaining senators,
voted to convict. See Joint Appendix Tab 4.
This voting pattern has occurred in all three
impeachments in which the Senate has used a
committee to gather evidence-the impeach-
ments of U.S. District Judges Claiborne, Alcee L.
Hastings and Nixon. Aggregating all votes, sen-
ators who did not sit on the evidentiary commit-
tee favored conviction by almost a three-to-one
margin, while those who served on the commit-
tee favored conviction by only a bare majority.
See Brief of Appellant, Table 1, at 16 (senators
not on the committee voted 71% of the time to
convict; senators on the committee voted 53%
of the time to convict). -
250
NIXON
Cite as 938 F.2d 23
ment to the Senate of the 'sole Power to
try all Impeachments' as to make this con-
troversy justiciable and the claim meritori-
ous." Id. at 14.
Nixon now appeals the District Court's
judgment.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Before reaching the more difficult issues
presented by Nixon's case, it is necessary
to.dispose of a claim by the appellees that
the District Court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction. The appellees argue that Nix-
on's suit is essentially one for money dam-
ages in the form of back pay. See Brief
for Appellees and Amicus Curiae United
States Senate ("Appellees Br.") at 37. Be-
cause that back pay would now amount to
more than $10,000, the appellees argue,
exclusive jurisdiction lies under the Tucker
Act in the Claims Court, the only forum in
which the United States has waived its
sovereign immunity to such suits. See 28
U.S.C. § 1491 (1988). The appellees are
mistaken.
Nixon relies upon the waiver of sover-
eign immunity found in the Administrative
Procedure Act. That Act waives sovereign
immunity for actions "seeking relief other
than money damages" that allege illegal
action by a federal agency or officer. See
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). Nixon's suit clearly
alleges illegal action by a federal agency or
officer, namely, actions taken by federal
officials to effectuate his removal from ju-
dicial office following his impeachment and
assertedly unconstitutional conviction by
the Senate.
Nixon's suit also qualifies as one "seek-
ing relief other than money damages."
4. Moreover, in the wake of the Supreme Court's
decision in Bowen, it would appear that even
had Nixon sought back pay in this action, his
suit would still not be one for "money damages"
within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 702. In Bow-
en, the Court explained:
Our cases have long recognized the distinc-
tion between an action at law for damages-
which are intended to provide a victim with
monetary compensation for an injury to his
person, property, or reputation-and an eq.
uitable action for specific relief-which may
v. U.S. 251
39 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
Nixon seeks only a declaration of the con-
stitutional infirmity of his removal and of
his entitlement to the pay and benefits of
his former office; Nixon does not seek a
judgment ordering the payment of any sum
of money. Thus, "insofar as the complaint
sought [only] declaratory ... relief, it was
certainly not an action for money dam-
ages." Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S.
879, 893, 108 S.Ct. 2722, 2731, 101 L.Ed.2d
749 (1988); see also Dronenburg v. Zech,
741 F.2d 1388, 1389-90 (D.C.Cir.1984);
Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 107-08
(D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948,
102 S.Ct. 1448, 71 L.Ed.2d 661 (1982).4
Even if Nixon's suit might later give rise
to some claim to monetary compensation,
this fact would not render his instant suit
one for "money damages." As this court
has previously explained,
even if a declaration by the district court
could later be used as the basis for mone-
tary relief, that possibility does not de-
prive the district court of authority to
grant the requested relief. Declaratory
relief is improper only if the plaintiffs'
action is a mere pretext to avoid the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Claims
Court.
Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745
F.2d 1500, 1533 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc)
(footnotes omitted), vacated on other
grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86
L.Ed.2d 255 (1985); see also Laguna Her-
mosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379
(9th Cir.1981). There is surely no basis on
the record in this case for us to conclude
that Nixon framed his complaint as one for
declaratory relief merely as a pretext to
avoid the Claims Court.
The appellees are correct in asserting
that Nixon may not rely on the waiver of
include an order providing for the reinstate-
ment of an employee with back pay....
487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (emphasis
added); see also DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-
Silas Mason Co., 911 F.2d 1377, 1381 n. 3 (10th
Cir.1990) (citing Bowen for the proposition that
"the bar on recovery of 'money damages' con-
tained in 5 U.S.C. section 702 does not include
equitable back[ ]pay, which is a form of eq-
uitable relief, not monetary damages"), cert. de-
nied, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 799,112-L.Ed.2d
860 (1991).
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sovereign immunity contained in the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act if he could ob-
tain adequate relief in the Claims Court
under the Tucker Act. See 5 U.S.C.
H§ 702, 704 (1988); see also 14 C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3659 (2d ed. 1985 & Supp.
1991). But relief in that forum is limited
largely to the awarding of monetary com-
pensation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) & (2)
(1988); see also Bowen v. Massachusetts,
487 U.S. at 914-15, 108 S.Ct. at 2742-43
(Scalia, J., dissenting); McEniry v. United
States, 7 CL.CL 622, 625 ("It is clear that a
plaintiffs primary claim must be one for
monetary relief before this court can assert
jurisdiction over the claim.") (emphasis add-
ed), affd mem., 785 F.2d 323 (Fed.Cir.
1985). And, in this case, I am in total
disagreement with the appellees' sugges-
tion that a money judgment for back pay
and benefits is all that Nixon seeks or all
that he needs to cure his asserted constitu-
tional injury. The injury Nixon alleges as
a result of his removal goes far beyond the
loss of his salary. It includes not only
removal from the federal bench, but perma-
nent disqualification from holding Govern-
ment office. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl.
7 (officers removed upon impeachment suf-
fer "disqualification to hold and enjoy any
Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the
United States"). Given the nature of Nix-
on's injury, it appears obvious that "the
doubtful and limited relief available in the
Claims Court is not an adequate substitute
for review in the District Court," Bowen v.
Massachusetts, 487 U.S. at 901, 108 S.Ct. at
2736; see also id. at 904, 108 S.Ct. at 2737,
and that Nixon therefore properly relied on
the waiver of sovereign immunity found in
5 U.S.C. § 702.
Thus, I find that the District Court cor-
rectly asserted subject-matter jurisdiction
over Nixon's claim and now turn to the
appellees' invocation of the political ques-
tion doctrine.
B. Justiciability
The District Court found that, "[d]espite
textual and historical indicators that the
word 'try' carries with it some duty for
Senators to sit as judge and jury, . . . plain-
tiff has not established the kind of clear
violation of a specific constitutional re-
quirement which would trigger judicial au-
thority to review a solemn and serious Sen-
ate action." Nixon, 744 F.Supp. at 13.
The District Court thus accepted the appel-
lees' argument that, "[e]ven though plain-
tiff's challenge to the constitutionality of
Rule XI raises a serious question," the
matter cannot be considered on the merits
because Nixon has raised a nonjusticiable
"political question." Id. I disagree.
It is, of course, not enough to avoid
judicial review for the Government to point
out that this is a "political" case, in the
sense that the judiciary is asked to declare
invalid action by a coordinate branch of
Government in performing one of its core
"political" functions. As the Supreme
Court has reminded us time and again, "the
presence of constitutional issues with sig-
nificant political overtones does not auto-
matically invoke the political question doc-
trine," INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942-
43, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2779-80, 77 L.Ed.2d 317
(1983), and "courts cannot reject as 'no law
suit' a bona fide controversy as to whether
some action denominated 'political' exceeds
constitutional authority," Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 710, 7
L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). Rather, what is re-
quired is a more "discriminating inquiry
into the precise facts and posture of the
particular case," id., in an effort to deter-
mine whether the courts are genuinely in-
competent to decide the matter.
Under the Supreme Court's landmark de-
cision in Baker v. Carr, the political ques-
tion doctrine comes into play only when,
[p]rominent on the surface of a[ ] case
... is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or a
lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it;
or the impossibility of .deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking in-
dependent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government- or an unusual
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need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from mul-
tifarious pronouncements by various de-
partments on one question.
Id. "Unless one of these formulations is
inextricable from the case at bar," the
Court concluded, "there should be no dis-
missal for nonjusticiability on the ground
of a political question's presence." Id.
Thus, the political question doctrine is nar-
rowly confined; and, as history has shown,
it is a rarely invoked limitation on judicial
authority.
The appellees argue that Nixon's claim
should be dismissed as nonjusticiable be-
cause of (i) a "textually demonstrable com-
mitment" of impeachment questions to a
coordinate branch, and (ii) the impossibility
of deciding the case without expressing
disrespect for the Senate. See Appellees
Br. at 25-26. I reject both contentions.
1. "A Textually Demonstrable Commit-
ment"
Article I, § 3, cl. 6, of the Constitution
provides:
The Senate shall have the sole Power
to try all Impeachments. When sitting
for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath
or Affirmation. When the President of
the United States is tried, the Chief Jus-
tice shall preside: And no Person shall
be convicted without the Concurrence of
two thirds of the Members present.
The District Court held that this provision
is a "textually demonstrable commitment"
5. The District Court's view finds support in a
1936 decision of the Court of Claims, which
held that the courts are without power to review
any aspect of Senate action in trying and remov-
ing a federal official. See Ritter v. United
States, 84 Ct.CI. 293 (1936), cert. denied. 300 U.S.
668, 57 S.Ct. 513, 81 L.Ed. 875 (1937). There is
also support for this view among commentators,
some of whom have suggested broadly, along
the lines of the Ritter opinion, that any chal-
lenge to congressional handling of an impeach-
ment would be precluded by the Constitution's
absolute textual assignment of that power to the
legislative branch. See, e.g., C. BLACK. IMPI ACH-
MENT: A HANDBOOK 63 (1974) ("the courts have .c..
no part at all to play" in reviewing Senate im-
peachment trials); J. NOWAK. R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG. CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 2.15, at 109 (3d ed.
v. U.S. 253
9 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
of impeachment questions to a coordinate
branch of Government. Thus, because the
Constitution expressly delegates to the
Senate "the sole Power" to try impeach-
ments, and because the Senate gave Nixon
some "semblance of a trial," Nixon, 744
F.Supp. at 14, the trial court ruled that it
was without authority to dictate more pre-
cisely "the type of trial to be accorded," id.
(emphasis in original); accord Hastings,
716 F.Supp. at 40-41.k
This sweeping view of nonjusticiability
cannot be squared, however, with the Su-
preme Court's decisions in Powell v.
McCornack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23
L.Ed.2d 491 (1969), and other more recent
cases giving definition to the political ques-
tion doctrine. A careful review of those
cases is essential to a disposition of Nixon's
claim.
Where the Constitution expressly assigns
absolute discretion in a matter to the legis-
lative or executive branch, the courts have
no role to play in reviewing the exercise of
that discretion. But, as the Court made
clear in Baker v. Carr, not every constitu-
tional assignment of power constitutes a
"textually demonstrable constitutional com-
mitment" within the contemplation of the
political question doctrine. There are
many broad delegations of authority to co-
ordinate branches of Government that do
not result in nonjusticiable questions mere-
ly by virtue of the breadth of the assigned
authority. For example, the Constitution
assigns to Congress the "Power ... To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the
1986); C. Wuri. TitE LAw oF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 14, at 81 (4th ed. 1983) ("Most commentators
... have adhered to the orthodox view that the
courts have no role to play with regard to im-
peachment.") (footnote omitted); Rotunda, An
Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of Feder-
al Impeachment, 76 KY.LJ. 707, 728-32 (1987-
1988); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HAny.L.REV 1, 8 (1959).
These commentators argue that senators will be
made sufficiently attentive to their constitution-
al duty by their accountability to the voters and
that the courts should leave it to the political
process to discipline any arguable abridgements
of the Constitution. See Rotunda, supra, at 730;
Tushnet, Principles, Politics, and Constitutional
Law, 88 Mtcn.L.Rev. 49, 57-58 (1989).
938 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES
Indian Tribes," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3,
and yet no one reasonably would suggest
that it is beyond the authority of the courts
to review congressional enactments regu-
lating interstate commerce. Cf County of
Oneida, N. Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of
N. Y State, 470 U.S. 226, 249, 105 S.Ct.
1245, 1259, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985) ("Con-
gress' plenary power in Indian affairs un-
der Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, does not mean that
litigation involving such matters necessar-
ily entails nonjusticiable political ques-
tions"). Rather, what makes a "textually
demonstrable commitment" is not merely a
textual assignment of power, but a textual
assignment of absolute discretion in a par-
ticular matter to a coordinate branch.
The distinction at times may seem elu-
sive, but it is usefully illuminated by com-
paring two lines of cases interpreting the
same clause of the Constitution. Article I
provides that "Each House shall be the
Judge of the Elections, Returns and Quali-
fications of its own Members." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 5, cl. 1. Because this clause un-
equivocally states that each house of Con-
gress-rather than the courts-shall be
"the Judge" of these matters, it has been
held that courts may not consider a claim
that the House or Senate seated the wrong
candidate following a contested congres-
sional election. There being no dispute in
these cases that the Senate or House has in
fact "judged" the election returns, but only
that it got the factual result wrong, there
can be no dispute that the final word on the
counting of ballots has been assigned out-
side the judiciary. See Roudebush v.
Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 19, 92 S.Ct. 804, 807-
08, 31 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972) (dicta); Webster v.
Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 612, 108 S.Ct. 2047,
2058, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Morgan v. United States, 801
F.2d 445, 447 (D.C.Cir.1986) (Scalia, J.),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 911, 107 S.Ct. 1359,
94 L.Ed.2d 529 (1987); McIntyre v. Falla-
hay, 766 F.2d 1078, 1081 (7th Cir.1985). If
courts were permitted to review a congres-
sional decision to seat a particular candi-
date by recounting the ballots or scrutiniz-
ing other findings of fact, the judiciary,
and not the Congress, would in the last
analysis be "the Judge" of election returns.
The Supreme Court considered a some-
what different claim grounded in the same
clause, however, in Powell v. McCormack,
and there found the issue justiciable. In
that case, Congressman Adam Clayton
Powell, Jr., challenged a House of Repre-
sentatives' decision barring Powell from
taking his seat. The House, citing alleged
financial misconduct, contended that it had
"judged" Powell unqualified to serve as a
member. Powell argued that "Qualifica-
tions" under article I, section 5, must be
construed to include only the standing re-
quirements expressly listed in the Constitu-
tion itself (i.e., age, citizenship and residen-
cy), while the House insisted that the Con-
stitution assigned nonreviewable discretion
to the Congress to define and judge those
"Qualifications" for itself.
The Supreme Court held that Powell's
challenge did not present a nonjusticiable
political question. The Court began its
analysis by observing the paradox that an
assessment of whether a constitutional
claim is reviewable unavoidably requires
that judges initially review the relevant
constitutional language and give it content.
"In order to determine whether there has
been a textual commitment to a co-ordinate
department of the Government," the Court
wrote, "we must interpret the Constitu-
tion." 395 U.S. at 519, 89 S.Ct. at 1963.
Accordingly, the Court undertook an exten-
sive review of the text and historical prac-
tice concerning legislative qualification and
exclusions and concluded that the framers
intended the term "Qualifications" to in-
clude only those standing requirements list-
ed in article I, section 2, of the Constitu-
tion:
In short, both the intention of the Fram-
ers, to the extent it can be determined,
and an examination of the basic princi-
ples of our democratic system persuade
us that the Constitution does not vest in
the Congress a discretionary power to
deny membership by -a majority vote.
Id. at 548, 89 S.Ct. at 1978. Consequently,
the Court held that Congress' textual au-
thority to be "the Judge" of the "Qualifica-
tions" of its members did not empower
Congress to be "the Judge" of what the
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Constitution means by "Qualifications";
that task remained with the courts. Rath-
er, "Art. I, § 5, is at most a 'textually
demonstrable commitment' to Congress to
judge only the qualifications expressly set
forth in the Constitution." Id. While chal-
lenges to Congress' factual rulings on age,
citizenship and residency might be nonjusti-
ciable, the Court held, a claim that Con-
gress had exceeded the textual bounds of
its authority by excluding a member on
grounds other than his constitutional
"Qualifications". is amenable to judicial re-
view. See id. at 520-22 & n. 42, 89 S.Ct. at
1963-64 & n. 42.
It is clear from the Supreme Court's
rulings in Powell and Roudebush, then,
that while the courts may well be barred
from second-guessing Congress' fact-find-
ing and policy judgments within the zones
of discretion assigned it by the Constitu-
tion, the courts may review claims that
Congress has exceeded an explicit textual
limitation on its powers.
The justiciability of Nixon's claim is di-
rectly controlled by Powell. I recognize
that a challenge to the factual findings
underlying the Senate's conviction, e.g., a
claim that the party convicted had not actu-
6. The majority emphasizes that the Senate en-
joys not merely the constitutional power of try-
ing impeachments, but the "sole Power" of try-
ing impeachments. But the presence of the
word "sole" does not answer the question
presented in this case. That the framers intend-
ed that the Senate, and no one else, would "try
all Impeachments" does not tell us what the
framers would have intended in the situation
presented here, where the Senate has assertedly
abdicated the power assigned it by removing
Nixon without trial. Accordingly, historical evi-
dence that the framers decided against permit-
ting courts to try impeachments is simply not
dispositive of the justiciability of Nixon's claim.
We are not called upon today to "try" Nixon's
impeachment, but merely to determine whether
the Senate did so.
It is for this same reason that the majority's
reliance on Roudebush is inapt. Although the
Court there suggested that courts have no power
to review the Senate's performance of its consti-
tutional role of "judging" election contests, it
did not address whether courts also would be
powerless to intercede where the Senate had
re/used to carry out that constitutional function.
As one commentator explained:
The lesson of Powell is that the Supreme
Court may use judicial review to determine
whether Congress followed the proper proce-
v. U.S. 255
9 (D.C. C... 1991)
ally committed the misconduct of which he
was accused, would almost certainly be
nonjusticiable-just as Powell suggested
that a fact-based challenge to the exclusion
of a member for failing to satisfy the
standing requirements of age, citizenship
or residency might be, see 395 U.S. at 521
n. 42, 89 S.Ct. at 1963 n. 42, and as Roude-
bush and Morgan suggested that a claim
that the Senate or House had misjudged
the returns in a close election would be. A
claim, however, that the Senate exceeded
the textual bounds of its authority by con-
victing a judge on articles of impeachment
without first "try[ing]" him within the con-
stitutional meaning of that term-as Nixon
claims in this case-is justiciable. Unlike
the plaintiff in Morgan, who effectively
asked this court to supplant the House as
"the Judge" of an election, Nixon does not
ask us to supplant the Senate as the
"tr[ier]" of his impeachment; he asks only
that we review the Senate's conduct to
ensure that it in fact tried him as required
by the Constitution. It is the courts' task
to interpret and give content to the word
"try," just as it was the Court's job in
Powell to give meaning to the word "Quali-
fications." I
dure for making the political decision com-
mitted to it by the Constitution. Powell does
not allow overly intrusive judicial review, but
rather allows review solely to ensure that
Congress made the particular kind of political
decision entrusted to it by the Constitution.
Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeach-
ment and Its Alternatives, 68 TEx.L.REv. 1, 99-
100 (1989); accord R. BERGER. IMPEACHMENT: TilE
CONsTrnoNAL PROBLEMS 116-19 (1973); Henkin,
Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YAL
L. 597, 605 n. 26 (1976) ("Even the unique
(textual] instance, '[t]he Senate shall have the
sole Power to try all Impeachments,' does not
necessarily preclude the argument that while
the Senate alone is to be the judge in impeach-
ment proceedings, the courts can review how it
does it, at least for constitutional excesses or
infirmities.") (emphasis in original); Tushnet,
supra note 5, at 57 (agreeing that Powell com-
pels the conclusion that such questions are justi-
ciable); cf. Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 614-
15 (D.C.Cir.1973) (Wyzanski, J., by designation)
(political question doctrine would not bar court
from deciding "whether the hostilities in Indo-
China constitute in the Constitutional sense a
'war'" within the meaning of art. I, § 8, cl. II,
but "we deem it a political question ... for
Congress to decide in which form, if any, it will
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The District Court also suggested that
judicial review of Nixon's claim might be
foreclosed by the Constitution's textually
demonstrable assignment to the Senate of
the power to "determine the Rules of its
Proceedings." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 2;
see Nixon, 744 F.Supp. at 13, 14. But this
assignment of power, like the assignment
of power to Congress to regulate interstate
commerce or to provide for the general
welfare, may be exercised only within the
constraints of other constitutional provi-
sions.7 The Senate could not, for example,
constitutionally pass a "rule" allowing con-
viction and removal of impeached officers
by a majority vote,' and the fact that the
Senate's action had been taken pursuant to
its "rulemaking" authority would provide
no shield against judicial invalidation. As
this court has previously explained, "Art.
I[, § 5, cl. 2,] simply means that neither we
nor the Executive Branch may tell Con-
gress what rules it must adopt. Article I
does not alter our judicial responsibility to
say what rules Congress may not adopt
because of constitutional infirmity." Van-
der Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1173
(D.C.Cir.), cert denied. 464 U.S. 823, 104
S.Ct. 91, 78 L.Ed.2d 98 (1983).9 Here, Nix-
on alleges that the Senate, by way of Rule
XI, has violated an explicit textual limita-
tion on its powers by removing him without
first "try[ing]" him. We may well dis-
give its consent to the continuation of a war
already begun by a President acting alone").
7. Nearly a century ago, the Supreme Court ob-
served:
The Constitution empowers each house to de-
termine its rules of proceedings. It may not
by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or
violate fundamental rights, and there should
be a reasonable relation between the mode or
method of proceeding established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be attained.
But within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of the
house, and it is no impeachment of the rule to
say that some other way would be better,
more accurate or even more just.... [This
rulemaking power] is[,] ... within the limita-
tions suggested, absolute and beyond the chal-
lenge of any other body or tribunal.
United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1. 5, 12 S.Ct.
507, 509, 36 L.Ed. 321 (1892) (emphasis added).
8. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3. cl. 6 ("And no
Person shall be convicted without the Concur-
rence of two thirds of the Members present.").
agree with Nixon on the merits, but that
disagreement is not grounds for finding his
claim nonjusticiable.
The District Court in this case went as-
tray by taking essentially the opposite ap-
proach-first finding that the Senate had
not committed a clear constitutional viola-
tion and then finding that its action was
somehow consequently beyond judicial re-
view. See Nixon, 744 F.Supp. at 13
("[P]laintiff has not established the kind of
clear violation of a specific constitutional
requirement which would trigger judicial
authority to review a solemn and serious
Senate action."). It appears that, for the
District Court, "[t]he issue on justiciability
turns ultimately" upon the merits of Nix-
on's claim, i.e., "on the narrow question of
whether the Senate's specific denial of this
plaintiffs motions for leave to take testi-
mony before the open Senate denied him
the kind of trial clearly guaranteed to him
by the Constitution." Id. By this ap-
proach, however, the finding of nonjusticia-
bility becomes largely a shorthand label for
the court's ultimate conclusion that there
has been no constitutional violation, or, to
put it more precisely, that the governmen-
tal defendant did not exceed the bounds of
the discretionary authority assigned it by
the Constitution. See generally Henkin,
supra note 6, at 601, 605-06.1o It is mis-
9. In Vander Jagt, 14 Republican congressmen
sued the Democratic leadership of the House of
Representatives, alleging that the Democrats
were allocating disproportionately few seats on
key committees to the minority party, in viola-
tion of the Republicans' Fifth Amendment
rights. The District Court found the matter
nonjusticiable under the political question doc-
trine, in part because article I, section 5, of the
Constitution assigns to the House the power to
"determine the Rules of its Proceedings." Van-
der Jagt v. O'Neill, 524 F.Supp. 519, 521 (D.D.C.
1981). On review, this court reversed the trial
court's justiciability ruling. Although the court
went on, for prudential reasons, to decline to
exercise its discretionary remedial authority, it
made clear that the political question doctrine
presented no bar to the court's ieview. See 699
F.2d at 1173-74, 1177.
10. Professor Henkin argues that this approach
characterizes virtually all of the cases in which
courts have claimed to find nonjusticiable "po-
litical questions":
The cases which are supposed to have estab-
lished the political question doctrine required
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leading, however, to suggest in such an
instance that the court has declined to en-
gage in judicial review. If the political
question doctrine is to have any integrity
as a constraint upon judicial review, its
invocation must arise from an analysis of
the Constitution that stands apart from any
conclusion on the merits of the particular
claim presented.
Consequently, adhering to the Supreme
Court's guidance in Powell, I reject the
argument that Nixon's challenge is non-
reviewable because of a "textually demon-
strable commitment" of the issue to a coor-
dinate branch.
2. Disrespect to the Senate
Alternatively, the appellees argue that
Nixon's claim should be held nonjusticiable
because of "the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution with-
out expressing lack of the respect due coor-
dinate branches of government." Baker,
369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710; see Appel-
lees Br. at 28-29. Judicial review of the
Senate's decision to employ a committee in
trying impeachments would be particularly
insulting, the Government argues, because
the record reveals that the Senate gave
thoughtful and careful consideration to the
constitutionality of its decision. See Appel-
lees Br. at 28, 49-50.
This claim, too, however, must be reject-
ed in light of the Supreme Court's holdings
in Powell and subsequent cases. In Pow-
ell, the Court rejected the notion that its
ruling invalidating the House of Represent-
atives' exclusion of Powell would express
disrespect for the House. The Court stat-
ed summarily:
Our system of government requires that
federal courts on occasion interpret the
Constitution in a manner at variance with
no such extra-ordinary abstention from judi-
cial review; they called only for the ordinary
respect by the courts for the political domain.
Having reviewed, the Court refused to invali-
date the challenged actions because they were
within the constitutional authority of Presi-
dent or Congress. In no case did the Court
have to use the phrase "political question,"
and when it did, it was using it in a different
sense, saying in effect: "We have reviewed
your claims and we find that the action com-
v. U.S. 257
39 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
the construction given the document by
another branch. The alleged conflict
that such an adjudication may cause can-
not justify the courts' avoiding their con-
stitutional responsibility.
Powell, 395 U.S. at 549, 89 S.Ct. at 1978
(footnote omitted); accord United States v.
Munoz-Flores, - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct.
1964, 1968-69, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990);
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1001,
100 S.Ct. 533, 536, 62 .L.Ed.2d 428 (1979)
(Powell, J., concurring in the judgment)
("Interpretation of the Constitution does
not imply lack of respect for a coordinate
branch."). If the Court may respectfully
inform the House that it has unconstitu-
tionally excluded one of its own members,
it surely may respectfully inform the Sen-
ate that it has unconstitutionally convicted
a judge without "try(ing]" him in an im-
peachment. Indeed, were we to accept the
Government's view of what constitutes
"disrespect" to a coordinate branch, "every
judicial resolution of a constitutional chal-
lenge to a congressional [action] ... would
be impermissible." Munoz-Flores, 110
S.Ct. at 1968 (emphasis in original).
The fact that the Senate vigorously de-
bated the constitutionality of its actions
likewise fails to render Nixon's claim non-
justiciable. The Supreme Court pointedly
rejected this suggestion only last year:
Congress often explicitly considers
whether bills violate constitutional provi-
sions. Because Congress is bound by the
Constitution, its enactment of any law is
predicated at least implicitly on a judg-
ment that the law is constitutional....
Yet such congressional consideration of
constitutional questions does not fore-
close subsequent judicial scrutiny of the
laws' constitutionality. On the contrary,
this Court has the duty to review the
plained of involves a political question, and is
within the powers granted by the Constitution
to the political branches. The act complained
of violates no constitutional limitation on that
power, either because the Constitution impos-
es no relevant limitations, or because the ac-
tion is amply within the limits prescribed.
We give effect to what the political branches
have done because they had political authori-
ty under the Constitution to do it."
Henkin, supra note 6, at 601 (footnote omitted).
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constitutionality of congressional enact-
ments.
Id. at 1968-69 (citations omitted).
In light of these admonitions from the
Supreme Court, we cannot agree with the
appellees that judicial review of Nixon's
claim is foreclosed because it might ex-
press disrespect for the Senate.
3. Conclusion on Justiciability
This court has previously acknowledged
that "[t]he political question doctrine is a
tempting refuge from the adjudication of
difficult constitutional claims." Ramirez
de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500,
1514 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc), vacated on
other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct.
2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985). And, yet,
cognizant that "courts cannot reject as 'no
law suit' a bona fide controversy as to
whether some action denominated 'political'
exceeds constitutional authority," Baker v.
11. See United States v. Munoz-Flores. - U.S.
-, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 1968-71, 109 L.Ed.2d 384
(1990); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 102, 109
S.Ct. 2324, 2329, 105 L.Ed.2d 74 (1989); Japan
Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478
U.S. 221, 229-30, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 2865-66, 92
L.Ed.2d 166 (1986); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S.
109, 118-27, 106 S.Ct. 2797, 2802-08, 92 L.Ed.2d
85 (1986); County of Oneida, N.Y. v. Oneida
Indian Nation of N.Y. State, 470 U.S. 226, 248-
50, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 1258-60, 84 LEd.2d 169
(1985); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-43,
103 S.Ct. 2764, 2778-80, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983);
Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S.
73, 83-84, 97 S.Ct. 911, 918-19, 51 L.Ed.2d 173
(1977); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 351-53, 96
S.Ct. 2673, 2678-80, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (plu-
rality opinion); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7,
11, 95 S.Ct. 1373, 1376, 43 L.Ed.2d 688 (1975);
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-97, 94
S.Ct. 3090, 3099-03, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 516-49
(1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 28, 89
S.Ct. 5, 9, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1392, 12
L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1, 5-7, 84 S.Ct. 526, 528-30, 11 L.Ed.2d 481
(1964).
In other cases, the Court has narrowly con-
strued the doctrine without expressly ruling on
its application. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442
U.S. 228, 235 n. 11, 99 S.Ct. 2264. 2272, 60
LEd.2d 846 (1979). In still others, the Court,
without addressing the question of justiciability.
"has passed on a variety of issues that previous-
ly would have been thought not to- be justicia-
ble." C. WRIGHT. supra note 5, § 14. at 77.
Carr, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710, and
that the "shifting contours and uncertain
underpinnings [of the political question doc-
trine] make it susceptible to indiscriminate
and overbroad application to claims proper-
ly before the federal courts," Ramirez de
Arellano, 745 F.2d at 1514, we have been
diligent in resisting the temptation.
The narrow scope of the political ques-
tion doctrine is evident from the Supreme
Court's treatment of the issue in recent
cases. In the nearly 30 years since Baker
v. Carr, the Supreme Court has turned
aside assertions of nonjusticiability under
the doctrine in more than a dozen cases."
In only one, Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S.
1, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973), has
the Court held that a case presented a
nonjusticiable political question, and it is
plain that Gilligan's holding does not ex-
tend far beyond the unique facts of that
case.12
12. The Court's finding of nonjusticiability in Gil-
ligan was dictated more by the extraordinary
remedy sought than by the legal or constitution-
al questions presented. The plaintiffs in that
case had brought a challenge under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, in the wake of the 1970 Kent State
tragedy, to the way in which Ohio trained and
supervised its National Guard. As relief, the
plaintiffs did not seek damages but rather an
injunction against future constitutional viola-
tions and, specifically, court supervision of fu-
ture Guard policies and activities. See Gilligan,
413 U.S. at 5-6. 93 S.Ct. at 2443-44. Six Justices
(Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Black-
mun & Powell, JJ.) considered the plaintiffs'
core claims to have been mooted by subsequent
voluntary efforts by Ohio to reform its Guard,
including the institution of new training pro-
grams. See id at 12, 93 S.Ct. at 2446-47 (Doug-
las, Brennan, Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissent-
ing); id. at 13, 93 S.Ct. at 2447 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). A majority of the Court also held
that to the extent the plaintiffs sought continu-
ing judicial supervision against possible future
Guard abuses, they had presented a nonjusticia-
ble political question. See id. at 7-8, 10, 93 S.Ct.
at 2444-45, 2445-46. As Justice Blackmun ex-
plained in his concurring opinion:
This case relates to prospective relief in the
form of judicial surveillance of highly subjec-
tive and technical matters involving military
training and command. As such, it presents
an "[inappropriate] ... subject matter for ju-
dicial consideration," for respondents are ask-
ing the District Court, in fashioning that pro-
spective relief, "to enter upon policy determi-
nations for which judicially manageable stan-
dards are lacking."
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It is against this backdrop that we must
consider Nixon's case. Because Nixon has
alleged that the Senate exceeded an explicit
textual limitation on its authority by con-
victing him without first "try[ing]" him in
the sense required by the Constitution, I
conclude that the courts are competent to
hear his claim. At oral argument, counsel
for the Government implicitly conceded this
court's authority to review Nixon's claim
by agreeing that this court could review a
claim that the Senate had unconstitutional-
ly delegated its authority to try impeach-
ments to a randomly chosen group of
schoolchildren, reserving to itself only the
task of formally approving whatever result
that group recommended. In both this
case and that hypothetical, however, the
basis for the constitutional claim is identi-
cal: that the Senate has not "tried" the
accused within the meaning of the Consti-
tution. If the court is competent to hear
one claim, it must be competent to hear the
other.
Because I find this case squarely con-
trolled by Powell v. McCormack, I con-
clude that Nixon's claim is justiciable.
C. The Merits
Resolution of the merits of Nixon's claim
requires an exploration of the text of the
Constitution and the history of its framing
in an effort to determine what is meant by
the constitutional requirement that the Sen-
ate "try" impeachments.13 To that end, I
look first to the words used by the framers,
both in the text of the Constitution and in
other documents reflective of their under-
Id at 14, 93 S.Ct. at 2448 (Blackmun, J., concur-
* ring) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 198.
226, 82 S.Ct. at 699-700, 715: bracketed materi-
al in original); see aLso Henkin, supra note 6, at
619-22 (noting the aberrational posture of the
Gilligan case and concluding: "It was something
closer to denying an equitable remedy, than to
abstaining from judicial review and dismissing
for 'nonjusticiability, that the Supreme Court
may have been (and should have been) about"
in Gilligan).
13. Although the District Court did not purport
to reach the merits of Nixon's claim, we would
not be required to remand to the trial court for
initial review of the merits. Because the factual
record was fully developed below and because
the merits were fully briefed and argued both in
standing, and then to historical practice,
both in America and in England. These
inquiries lead me to conclude that the Sen-
ate's use of a committee to gather evidence
and hear witnesses relating to the charges
against Nixon did not deprive Nixon of any
constitutionally protected right.
1. Theoretical Framework
It is plain enough that the framers, by
assigning to the Senate the task of
"try[ing] all Impeachments," intended that
senators would act in a quasi-judicial capac-
ity in convicting and removing high federal
officials. By using a word used elsewhere
in the Constitution to refer to judicial pro-
ceedings, the framers appeared to reveal
an intention that Senate impeachment "tri-
als" would bear some rough likeness to the
sort of "trials" carried out in criminal
courtrooms. In providing for criminal jury
trials, for example, the framers were care-
ful to except impeachment trials. See U.S.
CoNsr. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all
Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by jury.. .. "). While this express
exception suggests that the framers did
not intend to require the Senate to observe
all procedural incidents of criminal trials, it
also suggests that the framers may have
thought of an impeachment trial as a type
of criminal trial. Consequently, the Consti-
tution's use of the word "try" to describe
the Senate's function in rendering impeach-
ment judgments implies a duty to accord at
least the rudimentary hallmarks of judicial
fact-finding, including the receipt of evi-
dence, the examination of witnesses, right
this court and in the trial court, appellate re-
view would cause no "undue surprise or preju-
dice." Grace v. Burger, 665 F.2d 1193, 1197 n. 9
(D.C.Cir. 1981), aff'd in part & vacated in part on
other grounds sub nom. United States v. Grace,
461 U.S. 171, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736
(1983). Indeed, to the contrary, "a remand to
the District Court, which inevitably would result
in a future appeal to this court, 'would be a
waste of judicial resources.'" Id. (quoting Unit-
ed States v. Aulet, 618 F.2d 182, 186 (2d Cir.
1980)); see also Powell, 395 U.S. at 550 (no
remand necessary following Court's reversal of
lower court's finding of nonjusticiability where
only facts essential to disposition were already
conclusively established). . -
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to counsel and a chance for hearing by the
accused.
The inference that the framers intended
impeachment trials to be roughly akin to
criminal trials is reinforced by seemingly
unrefuted statements made by Alexander
*Hamilton during the ratification debates.
In The Federalist No. 65, for example,
Hamilton wrote that the Senate, in trying
impeachments, would act in a "judicial
character as a court." THE FEDERALIST No.
65, at 439 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Hamilton described the purpose of im-
peachment as a "NATIONAL INQUEST into the
conduct of public men" in which the ulti-
mate aim of the trial was a "real demon-
stration[] of innocence or guilt." Id. at
440.
The framers' determination that the Sen-
ate should have the sole authority to try
impeachment cases reflected their desire to
harness the forces of partisanship in such
matters and to elevate the influence of
reason, objectivity and fairness. See id. at
440-42."4 As Hamilton noted, the Senate
14. See R. BERGER. supra note 6, at 79 n. 130
(quoting Jefferson as warning: "history shows,
that in England, impeachment has been an en-
gine more of passion than of justice"). The
framers intended that impeachment serve as a
check against abuses of power by the judiciary
or the executive, and yet they were also alert to
the danger that impeachment itself might be
abused as a crude bludgeon against political
opponents. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra, at
444 (urging that prompt Senate trial might be
needed to check "persecution ... [by] an intem-
perate or designing majority in the House of
Representatives"); see also P. HOFFER & N. HULL
IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA. 1635-1805, at 99 (1984).
This concern is also reflected in the require-
ment that conviction be voted by a two-thirds.
rather than a simple, majority-
(Impeachment decisions] should not be "pop-
ular." The Constitution assigned this labor to
the Senate because the delegates expected the
upper house to rely upon its own wisdom,
information, stability, and even temper.
There was no occasion, Hamilton opined,
upon which the Senate should be more deli-
berative and shielded from popular clamors
than when it sat to hear impeachments.
Id. at 106; see also id. at 99 ("Later [after the
Constitutional Convention], both James McHen-
ry and Luther Martin of Maryland recalled that
the Senate seemed to be the only body likely to
view impeachments in a cool and dispassionate
manner.") (footnote omitted); Address of James
McHenry before the Maryland House of Del-
was seen to "possess the degree of credit
and authority, which might, on certain oc-
casions, be indispensable, towards reconcil-
ing the people to a decision, that should
happen to clash with an accusation brought
by their immediate representatives." Id. at
441. Hamilton also recognized that there
were advantages to be gained in trying
impeachments in a "tribunal more numer-
ous than would consist with a reasonable
attention to economy," as with a judicial
tribunal. Id.
In further explaining why impeachment
trials were assigned to the Senate rather
than to a court, however, Hamilton wrote:
[Impeachment proceedings] can never be
tied down by such strict rules, either in
the delineation of the offence by the
prosecutors, or in the construction of it
by the Judges, as in common cases serve
to limit the discretion of courts in favor
of personal security.
Id. Instead, it was unavoidable, Hamilton
wrote, that a court of impeachment, sitting
in judgment of officials charged with es-
egates (Nov. 29, 1787) ("[T]he power of trying
impeachments was lodged with this Body [the
Senate] as more likely to be governed by cool
and candid investigation, than by those heats
that too often inflame and influence more popu-
lous Assemblys."), reprinted in III THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 144, 148 (M.
Farrand rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter M. FARRAND];
Remarks of Luther Martin upon the Impeach-
ment Trial of Justice Chase (Feb. 23, 1804),
reprinted in III M. FARRAND. supra, at 406. In
this regard, the framers may well have drawn
upon lessons from English history, in which the
House of Lords stood as a steadying check
against the House of Commons' willingness to
impeach, on the basis of political disagreement,
officials who had committed no conduct that
could be considered treasonous or otherwise
unlawful. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL supra, at
5-6; Roberts, The Law of Impeachment in
Stuart England: A Reply to Raoul Berger, 84
YALE LJ. 1419 (1975).
Consequently, the framers "designed a delib.
erately cumbersome removal mechanism ... to
provide additional protection of the judiciary
against congressional politics." Edwards, Regu-
lating Judicial Misconduct and Divining "Good
Behavior" for Federal Judges, 87 Micti.L.REv. 765,
767 (1989); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 533
(A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (constitution-
al impeachment mechanism "is the only provi-
sion on the point[ I which is consistent with the
necessary independence of the juaicial charac-
ter").
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sentially "political" offenses, id. at 439
(original capitalization omitted), would be
left to exercise an "awful discretion" in
carrying out its task, id. at 441. The Sen-
ate was best fitted to serve in this capacity,
the framers reasoned, because its relative
insulation from the electorate would give it
the necessary independence of judgment
and its paramount prestige would give that
judgment the credibility and authority that
might be required to command adherence
from an "agitate[d]" and "divide[d]" peo-
ple. See id. at 439, 441.
From all of these statements, it can be
reasonably inferred that the framers in-
tended that the Senate would approach its
duty of trying impeachments with the so-
lemnity and impartiality befitting judicial
action but with greater procedural flexibili-
ty than attends ordinary criminal trials.
See Gerhardt, supra note 6, at 89-91.1s
2. Historical Practice
From the beginning, historical practice
confirmed the framers' understanding that
impeachment trials would occupy a middle
ground between the free-wheeling partisan-
ship of legislative decisionmaking and the
rigid procedural formalities of judicial crim-
inal trials. From the earliest state and
federal impeachments, it was agreed that
"[s]trict adherence to criminal procedure
would hamstring the jurisdiction of the up-
per house, for the senators were not jurors,
and the offenses need not be crimes." P.
HOFFER & N. HULL. supra note 14, at 125.
"At the same time, the defendant was al-
lowed many of the protections guaranteed
in a criminal trial." Id.16
15. 1 have already noted that the Constitution
itself was careful to except impeachment trials
from the obligation to try criminal cases before
a jury. See U.S. CONsT. art. 1ll, § 2, cl. 3. In
addition, the Constitution expressly limits the
penalties that may be imposed upon conviction
on impeachment to removal from office and
future disqualification, see U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3,
cl. 7, reserving more serious penal conse-
quences, such as incarceration, for criminal
conviction.
16. "Ihis understanding," hammered out in early
impeachment trials of state officials by state
legislatures, "was reiterated at the [federal] im-
peachment trials of ex-senator William Blount,
federal judge John Pickering, and Supreme
v. U.S. 261
9 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
The question remains, despite the con-
sensus that an "[ijmpeachment trial was to
be distinguished from regular trials at
law," id., whether the use of special com-
mittees to receive evidence is consistent
with the framers' theoretical framework,
i.e., whether the greater procedural flexi-
bility accorded the Senate in "try[ing]" im-
peachments is broad enough to permit the
use of evidentiary.committees. American
historical practice on this point arguably is
weighted toward trial by the full Senate,
for the Senate employed an impeachment
trial committee for the first time only in
1986. But see Part II.C.2.b infra. There
is precedent from England, however, sup-
porting the use of committees, and this
English practice may be read to suggest
that the framers did not intend to foreclose
the possibility in American constitutional
practice.
a. English Practice
The constitutional framework for im-
peachments was modeled after the English
experience of bringing impeachments in the
House of Commons followed by trial before
the House of Lords. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 65, supra, at 440. Although it is prob-
ably an overstatement to say that "almost
the entire process [of American impeach-
ments] was lifted bodily from English prac-
tice," see R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 179
(footnote omitted), there is no doubting the
significant influence that English impeach-
ment practice had on impeachment theory
and practice under the American constitu-
tion.'7
Court Justice Samuel Chase. though the extent
of allowable deviation from criminal procedure
was subject to controversy." P. HOFFER & N.
HULL supra note 14, at 125 (footnote omitted).
17. The chief scholarly controversy appears to
center upon whether the Constitution's im-
peachment provisions were more directly influ-
enced by English impeachment practice or by
the early colonial experiments with impeach-
ment. Compare R. BERGER. supra note 6. at
54-55 & n. 9, 76, 84-85, 90. 171 & n. 217 (em-
phasizing English influence) with P. HOFFER & N.
Hu.L supra note 14, at xii, 96-97, 268 (emphasiz-
ing influence of state and colonial impeachment
practices and criticizing Berger's reliance on
English precedent) and Gerhardt,-supra note 6,
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Although the House of Lords did not
adhere strictly to any single procedure for
trying impeachments in the years leading
up to the American Constitutional Conven-
tion, the Lords were careful, at least as of
the early 1600s, to afford the accused cer-
tain procedural safeguards, such as the
right to counsel and a limited right to dis-
covery. ' See P. HOFFER & N. HULL supra
note 14, at 5; Williams, The Historical and
Constitutional Bases for the Senate's
Power To Use Masters or Committees To
Receive Evidence in Impeachment Trials,
50 N.Y.U.L.REv. 512, 523-25 (1975). Over
these years, "the English trial process was
in a state of evolutionary flux," and "[t]he
American Founding Fathers were well
aware of the unsettled character of English
impeachment proceedings." Williams, su-
pra, at 523.
In English practice, most impeachment
trials were conducted before the full as-
sembly of the House of Lords, just as
American impeachments were customarily
tried in their entirety before the full Sen-
ate. There were, however, exceptions in
which the House of Lords employed special
committees to receive evidence in advance
of final consideration and a vote by the full
body. A review of English impeachment
precedent
shows beyond doubt that the House of
Lords used committees to hear evidence
during impeachment trials in the early
17th Century. It is difficult to determine
definitively whether this practice contin-
ued, as no direct reference to the use of
committees during later impeachment tri-
als has been discovered. It is clear, how-
ever, that, unlike other practices which
were outlawed by affirmative action of
at 22 (same). At bottom, however, there is no
dispute that English practice, with certain ex-
plicit exceptions, served as the foundational
model for the American constitutional provi-
sions. As one commentator recently summa-
rized:
The impeachment procedure set forth in the
United States Constitution has its origin in the
states' experiences with impeachment prior to
the Constitutional Convention. These state
procedures were in turn influenced by the
English experience with impeachment from
the thirteenth through the eighteenth centu-
ries.
the House of Lords, the use of commit-
tees to take evidence and examine wit-
nesses has never been banned or disa-
vowed as precedent-as were other im-
peachment procedures considered to have
been wrongly invoked.
Id. at 531-32 (footnotes omitted). Thus,
the English notion of an impeachment "tri-
al," upon which American theory was ulti-
mately modeled, allows for the use of spe-
cial committees to gather evidence and
hear witnesses in advance of final delibera-
tions before the full body designated to
decide the question.
b. American Practice
During the first 199 years of American
constitutional history, there is no doc-
umented record of any use by the Senate of
an evidentiary committee in an impeach-
ment proceeding. But the uniformity of
hearings before the full Senate, at a time
when impeachments were rare and the Sen-
ate was smaller, does not necessarily mean
that the framers intended that committees
could never be used as a tool in impeach-
ment trials. There is simply no basis in the
historical record to believe that the Sen-
ate's failure to employ a committee during
its early impeachment trials reflected any
considered judgment that such an alterna-
tive was beyond its constitutional authori-
ty. Rather, all we know is that, for many
years, the Senate apparently found it un-
necessary even to consider using evidentia-
ry committees in impeachment proceedings,
and none was used; but when circum-
stances were perceived to be different in
1935, the Senate adopted Rule XI allowing
for the use of such committees. See
Williams, supra, at 540.18
Gerhardt, supra note 6. at 10 (footnotes omit-
ted).
18. In the years since the Constitution's rat-
ification, the Senate has grown from 26 to 100
members and the federal judiciary has grown
more than forty-fold. The pace of impeach-
ments also appears to have increased. From
the nation's founding until 1985, there were II
impeachment trials in the Senate, roughly one
every generation, see Feerick, Impeaching Feder-
al Judges: A Study of the Constitutional Provi-
sions, 39 FORDHAm L. REV. 1. 25 (1970); Williams,
supra, at 540; since 1985. there have been three.
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The origin of Rule XI confirms that its
adoption was motivated by evolving circum-
stances in which full evidentiary hearings
on the Senate floor were becoming increas-
ingly unwieldy and, in all probability, preju-
dicial to the interests of the accused. The
idea of establishing evidentiary committees
in connection with impeachment trials was
first proposed in 1904, when "Senators,
aware of the growth in the Senate's size
and of the accelerating development of its
legislative function, beg[a]n to voice con-
cern about the onerousness of their im-
peachment duties." Id. That early propos-
al languished in the Senate Rules Commit-
tee but was revived 30 years later after
poor attendance by senators at subsequent
impeachment trials proved an institutional
embarrassment. See id. at 541-42.
At the 1913 trial of Circuit Judge Robert
Archbald, for example, at a time when the
Senate was composed of 94 members,
Judge Archbald's counsel, Alexander
Simpson, was distressed to find that the
trial proceedings rarely attracted the at-
tention of more than 20 Senators and
that even the composition of the group
attending was constantly changing: fol-
lowing their normal routines, the Sena-
tors, far from behaving like judges and
jurors during a trial, wandered in and
out of the Senate chamber at will, often
gathering only in response to a quorum
call.
Id. at 541 (footnote omitted). Attendance
was even smaller at the 1933 trial of Dis-
trict Judge Harold Louderback. Repre-
sentative Hatton Sumners, one of the
House impeachment managers, complained
to Time magazine that "[a]t one time only
three senators were present and for ten
days we presented evidence to what was
practically an empty chamber." Id. at 542
n. 160 (quoting TIME. Mar. 13, 1936, at 18).
Concerns over the Senate's handling of
these trials led directly to the adoption of
Rule XI.
Given the foregoing history, I do not
view the Senate's earlier experience in con-
ducting full evidentiary proceedings on the
Senate floor as revelatory of any constitu-
tional commandment. Moreover, there is
v. U.S. 263
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at least one express acknowledgment in
early American writings that the Senate
might employ evidentiary committees in
trying impeachments. While he was serv-
ing as vice president of the United States
and president of the Senate, Thomas Jef-
ferson drafted what is still regarded as the
most authoritative manual on the rules of
the Senate. In it, he noted that the Sen-
ate's rules are in part derived from English
parliamentary practice and that English
practice permitted the use of evidentiary
committees in conducting impeachment tri-
als. In the House of Lords, Jefferson ob-
served with apparent approval,
(t]he practice is to swear the witnesses in
open House, and then examine them
there; or a committee may be named,
who shall examine them in committee,
either on interrogatories agreed on in the
House, or such as the committee in their
discretion shall demand.
T. JEFFERSON, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL OF PARLI-
AMENTARY PRACTICE, reprinted in H.Doc.
No. 277, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 109, 296
(1985) (emphasis added). This suggests
that, at least in Jefferson's view, no consti-
tutional impediment existed to the Senate's
use of committees in trying impeachments.
As one scholar has noted, although Jeffer-
son was not himself a member of the Con-
stitutional Convention, "[s]ince the Man-
ual's publication followed close on the
heels of the Constitution's ratification, we
may assume that its conclusions are not at
odds with the intentions of the framers."
Williams, supra, at 539. In any event,
while Jefferson's views are not dispositive,
they do give further evidence of the rele-
vance of the English tradition.
I recognize that the occasional English
use of committees in trying impeachments
is not a conclusive answer to the question
regarding the intentions of the Constitu-
tion's framers. There were, after all, ele-
ments of English impeachment practice-
such as the imposition of .criminal and even
capital punishment upon conviction and the
allowance for conviction by vote of a simple
majority-that the framers affirmatively
sought to disavow or recast in the Ameri-
can system. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL..
supra note 14, at 97; Gerhardt, supra note
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6, at 16-17, 23 & n. 116. Building upon a
base of English precedent, the framers un-
deniably effected an "Americanization of
impeachment-fitting it to American needs,
making it republican, defining its limits,
[and] experimenting with constitutional for-
mulations." P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra
note 14, at xiii. Yet, the existence of this
precedent, and the absence of any affirma-
tive rejection of it by the American fram-
ers, effectively refutes the suggestion that
the use of committees in impeachment tri-
als would have been alien or repulsive to
those who designed the Constitution. As
Professor Williams has concluded:
At the very least, the lack of recorded
controversy over impeachment proce-
dures-in contrast to the belabored de-
bates over the substantive law of im-
peachment and its place in the American
constitutional scheme-suggests that the
framers did not feel any need to depart
sharply from English procedural prac-
tice, even though they deviated from the
English impeachment model in other re-
spects.
Williams, supra, at 520 (footnote omitted);
see also id. at 537-38, 543-44.
I conclude that the practice of using spe-
cial impeachment committees to collect evi-
dence in advance of final consideration by
the full Senate can be accommodated with-
in the parameters of the Constitution's text
and the other historical indicia of the fram-
ers' intent. It cannot be said, given the
history of English impeachment practice
and the framers' own statements, that the
framers intended to require that the re-
ceipt of evidence and the examination of
witnesses in impeachment trials always
19. Nixon also argues that the Senate's use of a
12-member evidentiary committee effectively
defeats one of the framers' reasons for choosing
the Senate over the Supreme Court as the most
appropriate forum for impeachment trials.
Nixon points out that the framers preferred the
Senate as a court of impeachment over the
Supreme Court in part because the Senate, then
comprised of 26 members, was larger. See TiE
FEDERALisT No. 65, supra, at 441-42. The framers
believed that placing the power to remove high
federal officials in the more "numerous" Senate
would help to ensure the independence and
integrity of the decisionmaking. See id.; Notes
of James Madison (Sept. 8, 1787) ("Mr Govr
take place in their entirety before the full
Senate. Consequently, I would find that
the Senate's limited use of an evidentiary
committee in connection with Nixon's case
did not deprive him of the sort of "trial" to
which he was constitutionally entitled.
Nixon objects that the deliberations by
the full Senate in his case, based' as they
were on final arguments by the parties and
the committee's report on the evidence,
cannot be considered a "trial" in the sense
that Americans have always understood
that word." This is all the more true,
Nixon contends, because credibility deter-
minations were crucial to the ultimate as-
sessment of his guilt or innocence and yet
88 of 100 senators did not see the witnesses
testify in person and thus had no opportu-
nity to draw their own inferences about the
witnesses' veracity.
If Nixon's were an ordinary criminal tri-
al, I would readily agree. But, as already
noted, history makes clear that the framers
never intended impeachment trials to mir-
ror criminal trials; nor was it ever sup-
posed that the Senate would be trans-
formed into an Article III court when it
took up the task of trying an impeachment.
By the framers' design, "impeachment
hearings were not trials in which the sena-
tors were jurors, despite the fact that they
sat upon oath or affirmation, so much as
deliberative sessions, when they decided
whether an official had betrayed his public
trust." P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note
14, at 106; accord Williams, supra, at 576-
77. Thus, what the Constitution requires
of the Senate in conducting impeachment
trials is not rigid adherence to criminal
procedure but a solemn attention to fair-
Morris thought no other tribunal than the Sen-
ate could be trusted [with the task of trying
impeachments]. The Supreme Court were too
few in number and might be warped or corrupt-
ed."), reprinted in II M. FARRAND. supra note 14,
at 551. Yet, it is far from clear what this should
suggest about the constitutionality of the Sen-
ate's use of an evidentiary committee in Nixon's
case. Whatever the committee's role in gather-
ing evidence, the final deliberations and deci-
sionmaking concerning Nixon's guilt were con-
ducted by the full Senate, fulfilling the framers'
intention that conviction or acquittal be decided
by a more "numerous" body.
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ness guided by whatever procedures the
Senate reasonably finds fitted to that end.
Simply put, the fact that the framers "de-
signed a deliberately cumbersome removal
mechanism," see Edwards, supra note 14,
at 767, does not mean that the Constitution
must be interpreted to command the most
cumbersome procedures imaginable.
The notion that senators might make
credibility determinations without having
scrutinized the witnesses in person is not,
contrary to Nixon's assertions, alien to ac-
cepted standards of procedural fairness in
this country. Administrative tribunals, for
instance, are thought fit to make decisions,
including judgments on credibility, based
on a record compiled elsewhere by a hear-
ing examiner and that these judgments
may be upheld even though contrary to
those reached by the examiner who actual-
ly heard the witnesses testify. See, e.g.,
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474, 494-96, 71 S.Ct. 456, 467-69, 95
L.Ed. 456 (1951) (examiner's factual find-
ings, particularly as to witness credibility,
are probative and entitled to weight, but
Board may reach contrary conclusions).
See generally Williams, supra, at 590-606.
I do not mean, of course, to equate the
Senate's role in trying an impeachment
with an agency's in conducting an adjudica-
tion; the Senate's responsibility is often far
more grave and the implications of its deci-
sion far more significant in the life of the
nation. At the same time, the experience
of these tribunals establishes that, while
Nixon's notion of a "trial" is one that is
recognized as the appropriate model for an
Article III court, it is not the exclusive
notion of a fair trial. Given that the Sen-
ate is not an Article III court, and is not
expected to become one for purposes of
trying impeachments, there is no reason to
bind it to every procedure thought apt in a
traditional judicial forum. See Gerhardt,
supra note 6, at 94 (examining the Senate's
use of evidentiary committees in the Nixon
and Hastings impeachment trials and con-
cluding that "[tjhere is little doubt such a
20. As I have already suggested, history has
shown that this hypothetical is not entirely out-
v. U.S. 265
39 (D.C.Cir. 1991)
procedure is constitutional"); Williams, su-
pra, at 619-20.
This conclusion seems especially clear in
light of the concession by Nixon's counsel
at oral argument that the Constitution does
not require the attendance of all senators,
or even most senators, at an impeachment
"trial." The Senate could constitutionally
"try" Nixon even with fewer than 12 sena-
tors present, Nixon's counsel argued, so
long as it was dohe on the Senate floor. 20
But the constitutional significance of the
difference between that scenario and the
sort of evidentiary proceeding provided
Nixon eludes me. To the contrary, I be-
lieve that the procedure employed by the
Senate in this case-a prolonged evidentia-
ry hearing before a special committee fol-
lowed by review, argument and delibera-
tion by the full Senate-is far better calcu-
lated to achieve the ends intended by the
framers, i.e., that the ultimate decision be
grounded in evidence rather than partisan
passion, that it be arrived at by a "numer-
ous" body and that the fact-finding upon
which it is based be conducted with a sol-
emn attention to fairness such as would
command the respect and adherence of a
potentially divided nation.
Consequently, I would find that the Sen-
ate acted within the bounds of its constitu-
tional authority when it convicted Nixon
based partly on evidence gathered by a
special impeachment trial committee.
III. CoNcLusioN
For the foregoing reasons, I would find
that Nixon has presented a justiciable con-
troversy. On the merits, however, I would
find that the Senate did in fact "try" Nixon
within the meaning of the Constitution and
that Nixon was therefore constitutionally
deprived of his office. I would affirm the
judgment of the District Court on these
grounds.
landish.
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[I]mpeachment will be nearly the equivalent to a displacement, andwill render the Executive dependent on those who are to impeach.
-Gouveneur Morris'
What was the practice before this in cases where the chief Magis-trate rendered himself obnoxious? Why recourse was had to assas-sination in [which] he was not only deprived of his life but of theopportunity of vindicating his character. It [would) be the bestway therefore to provide in the Constitution for the regular punish-ment of the Executive when his misconduct should deserve it, andfor his honorable acquittal when he should be unjustly accused.
-Dr. Benjamin Franklin2
1. Introduction
Debates about impeachment' in the United States are older than the
i. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 64-65 (M. Farrand ed. 1966)[hereinafter CONVENTION RECORDS].
2. Id. at.65.
3. In the literature, impeachment has two meanings. First, impeachmen refers to the particu-Tar process by which the United States House of Representatives may investigate, formulate, anddirect charges os wrongdoing against ceyain officials of the federal government. Second, impeach-ment may be used as a shorthand reference to the general removal power of Congress, including theHouse's ability to charge an official wish wrongdoing and the Senate's ability to remove and disqual-ify ihat official from holding any other office of the United States. Five constitutional provisionsrelate in some way to impeachment:
The House of Representatives shall . .. have the sole Power of Impeachent.
The Senate shall have the sole Power so try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Pur-pose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States istried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Con-currence of two thirds of he Members present.
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office,
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Constitution itself. Prior to the drafting and adoption of the Constitu-
tion, there were vast differences in state constitutional provisions regard-
ing the officials subject to, the timing of, the grounds for, and even the
bodies empowered to conduct impeachments.4 These differences carried
over into the Constitutional Convention, where the debates primarily fo-
cused on whether granting Congress the impeachment power would
make the President too dependent upon the legislature, whether Con-
gress or the federal judiciary was better suited to conduct impeachment
hearings and trials,6 and whether nonindictable offenses should be in-
cluded among impeachable offenses.7 Delegates also argued about what
the proper vote for removal should be.8
In the years after the Constitutional Convention, the debates on im-
peachment continued to focus on these same issues. In addition, there
have been numerous calls, most recently by Senator Howell Heflin,9 to
amend the Constitution's impeachment procedure to make it more effi-
cient and effective.' 0 Recent congressional attempts to impeach three
and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor. Trust, or Profit under the
United Stales; but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indict-
ment, Trial, Judgment, and Punishment, according to Law.
The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed
from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors.
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2. cl. 5: id. art. I. 43. cl. 6; id. art. I, 1 3, cl. 7; id. art. II, § 4; id. art. III, 41.
4. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERIcA, 1635-1805. at 68-77 (1984) (sur.
veying the drafting and testing of various impeachment provisions from state constitutions).
S. See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS. supra note 1, at 53-54, 64-69, 551, 612.
6. See id. at 159, 232, 238, 500, 551.
7. See id. at 337, 550-52.
8. See id. at 438, 493, 552.
9. See Heflin. The Impeachment Proces* Modernizing an Archaic System, 71 JUDICATURE
123, 123-25 (1987).
10. See. e.g., Havighurst, Doing Away with Presidential Impeachment: The Advantages of Par.
liamentary Government, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 223, 224-29, 233-36 (suggesting that impeachment with
its emphasis on politics and criminality is unworkable and that the United States should attempt
instead a parliamentary style of government); Heflin, supra note 9 (calling for a constitutional
amendment to allow Congress to create a Judicial Inquiry Commission to investigate charges against
federal judges and a special Court of the Judiciary to try the impeachment); Linde, Replacing a
President: Rx for a 21st Century Watergate, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 384. 402 (1975) (suggesting as
an alternative to the existing impeachment procedure a joint resolution of Congress declaring failure
to execute the office of the President or abuse of presidential power as a prerequisite to removal and
a new election); Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment Supervision, and Removal-Some Possibili-
ties Under the Constitution. 28 MICH. L. REV. 870. 898 (1930) (asserting that the Constitution sets
no limits on the ability of judges to remove other judges); Note, Removal of Federal Judges-New
Alternatives to an Old Problem: Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 13 UCLA L. REV.
1385, 1390 (1966) (claiming that impeachment is ineffective and inefficient and citing the federal
bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), and the then-proposed Judicial Disability
3
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federal district judges, Harry Claiborne, Walter Nixon, and Alcee Has-
tings, have also reinvigorated debate over whether impeachment is the
exclusive means for removing federal judges. These impeachment at-
tempts also raise the additional questions whether indictment, prosecu-
tion, or imprisonment pf federal judges should be prohibited prior to an
impeachment, because these measures are tantamount to removal and to
what extent should conviction for a criminal offense satisfy the burden of
the prosecution in an impeachment proceeding."
Given all the attention and importance attached to the impeachment
process from the inception of our Republic to the present, it is surprising
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 372(b) (1982), as methods other than impeachment for the removal of federaljudges); Comment, The Limitations of Article III on the Proposed Judicial Removal Machinery: S1506. I18 U. PA. L. REV. 1064, 1067-70 (1970) (arguing that judges have the power to remove otherJudges because the power is inherent in the theory of separation of powers and that congressionalauthority over jurisdiction of the federal courts gives it the power to create machinery to allowjudicial removal of judges).
II. The three most recent impeachment attempts have been against federal district judgesHarry Claiborne, Walter Nixon. and Alcee Hastings. Judge Claiborne was convicted of income taxevasion in federal court and imprisoned prior to the House's vote to impeach on July 22. 1986, andthe Senate's vote to remove and disqualify him from office on October 6, 1986. 132 CoNG. REC.S15759-62 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986).
Judge Alcce Hastings was acquitted in a federal trial charging him with having taken a bribe ofS150,000. See Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 829 F.2d 91, 95 (D.C. Cir.1987) (giving factual background of Judge Hastings' impeachment, including his acquittal of crimi-nal charges on February 4, 1983). On August 3, 1988, however, the House voted 413-3 to impeachJudge Hastings for using his office for personal gain and for committing perjury during his criminaltrial. See H.R. Res. 499. 100th Cong.. 2d Sess.. 134 CONG. REc. H6179-93 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1988).Throughout his removal proceedings in the Senate. Judge Hastings vigorously argued. inter alia. thatthe impeachment proceedings against him had been racially motivated and that the Senate's decisionto give him a trial in front of a special committee of Senators instead of the full Senate violatedfundamental requirements of due process. See Impeaching Federal Judges: Where Are We andWhere Are We Going?. 72 JUDICATURE 359, 362-64 (1989) (hereinafter Symposium) (comments ofMichael Davidson in the edited transcript of a panel discussion at the American Judicature Societymeeting on February 4,); MacKenzie. The Virtue of impeachment, N.Y. Times. July 28, 1988, atA26, col. I (suggesting that a unanimous vote to impeach by a subcommittee headed by Representa.tive John Conyers, a civil rights champion, effectively answers Judge Hastings' allegations of polit-ical and racial persecution). Nevertheless. the special twelve-member committee of the Senate
completed receiving testimony regarding Judge Hastings' removal in August 1989 and printed therecord of its hearings in September. The full Senate was scheduled to hear closing arguments inOctober 1989.
Judge Walter Nixon was convicted of perjury in federal court. See United States v. Nixon, 816F.2d 1022, 1022 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 749 (1988). After the Supreme Court deniedreview of his conviction for perjury, he announced that he would not resign. See Shenon, Impeach.
ment of Judges: A "Cumbersome Tool." N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1986, at A16. col. 3 (quoting JudgeNixon's lawyer as saying that Nixon would not consider resignation). Nevertheless, the Housemoved forward with impeachment proceedings against Judge Nixon. See H.R. Res. 87. 101st Cong..Ist Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H1802 (daily ed. May 10, 1989) (approval of articles of impeachment).Although he has been impeached and is currently imprisoned, awaiting trial in the Senate. he hasargued that Congress should allow him to challenge his federal conviction in the impeachment pro.ceedings because he has alleged he has evidence that one of the principal witnesses against him attrial perjured himself. See Hastings v. United States Senate, No. 89-1602, slip op. (D.D.C. July 5,1989); see also Nixon v. United States. 703 F. Supp, 538. 560 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (rejecting Nixon'smotion to vacate the conviction on the grounds that, inter alia. there was no reasonable likelihoodthat the witness's testimony, even if deemed false, could have affected the judgment of the jury).
4
that the literature on impeachment-split primarily between the formal-
ist and informalist approaches' 2-is, with few exceptions," unenlighten-
ing and unimpressive."4 Scholarship on impeachment inevitably
degenerates into political commentary, but scholars generally fail to ex-
plain or justify this result. In addition, scholarship on impeachment
either inexplicably ignores relevant historical evidence or fails to explain
its reliance on an incomplete or unclear historical record.
Commentators fail to understand that the impeachment clauses"
virtually defy systematic analysis precisely because impeachment is by
nature, structure, and design an essentially political process. James Wil-
son, a Constitutional Convention delegate, Supreme Court Justice, and
constitutional scholar, explained that impeachments are "proceedings of
a political nature . . . confined to political characters," charging only
"political crimes and misdemeanors," and culminating only in "political
punishments."' 6 Consequently, legal scholarship at best may only illu-
minate the contours of the various political questions that the Constitu-
tion entrusts to Congress through the impeachment process.' 7
12. See infra subparts IIl (A), (B). Two student commentators also classify the literature on
impeachment into two categories. See Note. Constitutional Judicial Tenure Legislationt-The Words
May Be New. but the Song Sounds the Same, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 843, 854-60 (1981) (hereinaf-
ter Note, Constitutional Judicial Tenure Legislation?] (observing that exclusivists favor impeachment
as the sole means for removing federal judges and nonexclusivists favor removal or federal judges
through impeachment and other less formal proceedings); Note, In Defense of the Constitutions
Judicial Impeachment Standard, 86 MicH. L. REV. 420, 434-38. 446.54 (1987) (hereinafter Note, In
Defense of Standard) (arguing that-the literature on the exclusivity of impeachment as a means for
removing federal judges splits between those who follow original intent and those arguing from
expediency or necessity).
13. See C. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 2-4 (1974); L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTI*
TUTIONAL LAw 289-96 (2d ed. 1988); Bestor, Impeachment (Book Review), 49 WASH. L. REV. 255,
259, 261.64. 266, 271. 281 (1973); Rotunda. An Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of Federal
Impeachment. 76 Ky. L.i. 707, 716, 720 (1987). Even these studies are not without problems. See
C. BLACK, supra, at 3.4, 16, 19. 21, 32-33. 43 (ending each section of his impeachment study with
the observations that no solution to the constitutional problem is readily apparent and that reason-
able minds might disagree); L. TRIE, supra. at 290 (merely asserting that members of Congress arc
not impeachable officials); Rotunda. supra. at 716, 720 (asserting with minimal support or explana-
tion that legislators are impeachable and that judges are removable from office only through
impeachment).
14. Other commentators have made this same observation. See. e.g., R. BERGER, IMPEACH-
MENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMs 5 (1973) (observing that "impeachlmentl raises impor-
tant questions ... yet to receive satisfactory resolution*'); Kurland. The Constitution and the Tenure
of Federal ludges: Some Notes from History, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 668 (1969) (commenting that
"there is more literature than learning" regarding the removal of federal judges under the Constitu-
tion); Stolz. Disciplining Federal Judges- Is Impeachment Hopeless?, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 659, 660
(1969) (referring to the "distinguished though partisan scholarship of about thirty years ago").
IS. This Article refers to the five constitutional provisions relating in some way to the impeach.
ment process as the impeachment clauses. See supra note 3.
16. I J. WILSON, WORKS 426 (0. McClaskey ed. 1967) (quoted in Bestor, supra note 13, at
266).
17. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186. 217 (1962) (characterizing political questions as involving
(1) "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment . . . to a coordinate political department";
5
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Schilars may be reluctant to acknowledge the political nature of im-
peachment and to defer troublesome impeachment questions to the polit-
ical branches of government because politics today may not be perceived
as the noble and ennobling endeavor envisioned by the framers.ts Rely-
ing in part on the republican conception of meaningful citizen participa-
tion in governmental or political decision making,' 9 the framers crafted
the Constitution to provide a political process in which the various
branches of the federal and state governments as well as the citizenry
could engage in dialogues on the critical political issues common to dem-
ocratic societies. 20
Many modern commentators, however, mistakenly allow their dis-
trust of and disrespect for politics to govern their interpretations of the
Constitution. Politics is at times unseemly, vicious, and even dishonest,
but the Constitution remains a political document, and politics is not, as
many modern commentators seem to believe, the equivalent of illegiti-
macy. These commentators appear motivated by their unstated belief
that constitutional law does not transcend politics. Constitutional law is
(2) "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it"; (3) "the impossibil-
ity of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion";
(4) -the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government"; (5) "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made"; or (6) "the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question"); see also infra note 462 and accompany.
ing text.
18. Many of the delegates viewed participation in the political process as an ennobling experi.
ence. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), reprinted in THE
Pos rAat THOMAS JEFFERSON 557-58 (M. Peterson ed. 1975); see also M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE.
AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYsIs OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11-12 (1988) (noting particularly
Madison's belief in the benelits emanating from citizens' participation in local government);
Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13 CREIGHToN L.
REv. 487, 509 (1979) (regarding politics as an indispensable process by which social beings choose
the terms of coexistence-both the rules of social cooperation and the "moral ambience" of the
social wory). Many commentators today, however, are more skeptical of the noble and ennobling
nature of politics. See, e.g., M. TUSHNET, Supra, at 314. (expressing concern that changes in the
political structure will come only after "long and difficult periods of political organizing" and that
these changes may not be beneficial once they are made).
19. See. e.g., M. TUSHNET, supra note 18, at 11-12 (noting that republicans desired citizens to
become civic minded by participating in local government); Michelman, The Supreme Court. 1985
Term-Foreword Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REV. 4, 18-19 (1986) (noting that re-
publicanism emphasized direct citizen involvement in politics); Tushnet. Federalism and the Tradi-
tions of American Political Theory, 19 GA. L. REV. 981, 982-83 (1985). (noting that the civic
republican tradition emphasized the social nature of human beings).
20. See, e.g., Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables. 93 YALE L.J. 455, 456
(1984) (arguing that the legitimacy of the Supreme Court's adjudication ultimately depends on an
underlying communal alliance between opponents); Coffin. Judicial Balancing. The Protean Scales
of Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 16, 24-25. 40-42 (1988) (arguing that narrow judicial decision making
that balances competing concerns promotes dialogue within the legal community); Fiss, The
Supreme Court. 1978 Term-Foreword The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. I. 10-15 (1978)
(construing the judicial function as the attempt to reveal or elaborate the meaning of constitutional
values through the dialogue of adjudication).
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by its nature, structure, and inception a peculiar form of politics, how-
ever, and there is no more vivid illustration of this proposition than the
impeachment clauses. The challenge for modern commentators is, there-
fore, to acknowledge and to justify the political elements influencing
their constitutional interpretations. In this way, they can avoid trans-
forming the political issues entrusted by the Constitution to the political
branches into mandates reflecting their own particular views and prefer-
ences regarding lawmaking and the Constitution.
Many modern commentators, however, are reluctant or unable to
incorporate, or acknowledge the incorporation of, politics into their con-
stitutional interpretations. Thus, not surprisingly, both of the dominant
approaches to impeachment fail to adequately account for the fundamen-
tally political nature of impeachment. Both the formalists and the in-
formalists vainly try to apply to the impeachment clauses theories of
constitutional interpretation that simply do not fit the nature of the im-
peachment process. First, the formalists, trying to interpret the impeach-
ment clauses based on original intent, adhere to strict separation of
powers and are reluctant to presume the constitutionality of alternatives
to or deviations from the allocation of powers as explicitly spelled out in
the Constitution.2 Formalists cannot evade or ignore the problems with
21. See. e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 14. at 5 (criticizing "assumptions that are at war with the
intention of the Framers" and advocating instead "resort to the historical sources"); Corwin, Tenure
of Qfice and the Removal Power Under the Constitution, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 354. 
398-99
(1927) (criticizing the Supreme Court's opinion in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (sug-
gests that the President's power to remove executive officers is "not constitutionally susceptible 
of
restraint by Congress," as an unwarranted intrusion by the Court into a purely political 
issue);
Ervin, Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoas. 108, 122 
(1970)
(assailing prdposed legislation intended to limit the nonjudicial activities of federal judges or to disci-
pline federal judges as "a direct assault upon the principle of judicial independence"); Kurland,
supro note 14. at 668 (asserting that the Constitution's framers intended to make impeachment the
sole means of removing federal judicial officers and criticizing the idea that legislation might provide
an alternative means); Note, In Defense of Standard, supra note 12, at 423 (arguing that the framers
intended the impeachment provisions to be cumbersome and that the recent practice 
of criminal
prosecution of judges before impeachment disregards the constitutional goal of judicial indepen-
dence); Note. Unnecessary and Improper: The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980. 91 YALE L.J. 1117. II 18 (1985) (hereinafter Note, Unnecessary and Improper)
(arguing that the Act violates the Constitution's allocation of powers by requiring federal judges to
exercise a power of scrutiny over their colleagues that the Constitution grants solely to Congress).
One commentator observes that:
the last few years have seen a sharp rise of constitutional "formalism" in cases involving
the separation of powers. Formalist decisions are premised on the beliefs that the text 
of
the Constitution and the intent of its drafters are controlling and sometimes dispositive,
that changed circumstances are irrelevant to constitutional outcomes. and that broader
"policy" concerns should not play a role In legal decisions..But the federal government
and the executive branch in particular have changed so dramatically since the founding
that "framers' intent" cannot be mechanically applied as if it settles the matter.... 
The
modern presidency is so different from the entity contemplated by the framers that 
it is
unrealistic simply to "apply" their choices to the present situation. At its inception, the
American presidency was by modem standards weak, especially in domestic affairs. Its
regulatory role was minimal.
7
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constitutional historiography in general or with original intent in particu-
lar. The formalist approach fails to acknowledge that history is fre-
quently susceptible to more than one interpretation. In addition, this
approach fails to account for important changes in the institutions that
are central to the impeachment process. Informalists, on the other hand,
typically use ad hoc analysis to interpret the impeachment clauses.22
They rarely articulate or follow any guiding principle of constitutional
interpretation-with the possible exceptions of convenience and effi-
ciency, which are not determinative of constitutionality. Informalists do
not recognize the usefulness of conventional tools of constitutional inter-
pretation (such as history) for analyzing particular constitutional provi-
sions, including the impeachment clauses. Furthermore, they do not
justify, or even acknowledge, their abandonment of almost all systematic
analysis of the impeachment clauses. Without explanation, they give dif-
ferent weight to different evidence or adopt congressional interpretation
of the impeachment clauses as definitive.23 Informalists also frequently
ignore relevant historical and structural contexts. They fail to articulate
fixed notions regarding the allocation of powers within the Constitution,
fail to explain why deviations from the Constitution's explicit structure
should be treated with a presumption of constitutionality, and fail to ac-
knowledge the problems with using efficiency and convenience as start-
ing points for constitutional analysis of the impeachment process.
Finally, informalists, though possibly aware of the great changes in the
Sunstein. Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REv. 421, 493.94 (1987). But see
Schauer, Formalism. 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) (suggesting that the concept "formalism" is
susceptible to so many conflicting meanings that its use in place of more concrete ideas obscures the
debate over the proper restraints to be followed in constitutional interpretation); Weinrib, Legal
Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality ofLaw. 97 YALE LJ. 949, 954 (1988) (rejecting the argu-
ment that law is essentially political and defending formalism as offering law an " 'immanent moral
rationality' ").
22. See. e.g., 1. BRANT, IMPEACHMENT: TRIALS AND ERoutS 3-23 (1972) (arguing that the
numerous references to crime and punishment in the Constitution represent an attempt, in light of
the excesses that had marked the use of the impeachment power in England, to restrict the bases for
impeachment to criminal offenses and thus prevent misuse of the power); Firmage & Mangrum.
Removabof the President: Resignation and the Procedural Law of Impeachment, 1974 DuKE L.J.
1023. 1030 (This study is the soundest of the informalist studies because of its far-reaching research,
but it fails to support its own use of different kinds of authority to explain different aspects of
impeachment.); Franklin, Romanist Infamy and the American Constitutional Conception of Impeach-
ment, 23 3urFALo L. REV. 313, 341 (integrating into contemporary thought omissions from the
constitutional conception of impeachment) (1974); Havighurst. supra note 10, at 223-24 (comparing
the English and American political systems and suggesting that the United States should adopt some
parliamentary procedures for removing officials from office); Linde. supra note 10, at 385-89 (calling
the constitutional form of impeachment "anachronistic"); Comment, supra note 10. at 1065-66 (ex-
amining the constitutional powers of Congress to create judicial machinery for the removal of
judges).
23. See. e.g. Thompson & Pollit. Impeachment of Federal Judges: An Historical Overview. 49
N C.L. REV. 87, 118-21 (1970) (suggesting, without explanation. that "impeachable offenses" should
mean offenses that Congress has accepted as impeachable).
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institutions established by the Constitution, fail to explain how, if at all,
these changes may affect or threaten the principles or values these insti-
tutions were established to protect.
Unfortunately, few commentators acknowledge that the scholarship
on impeachment tells us little about impeachment that is definitive, but a
great deal about the problems of interpreting the Constitution in general
and the impeachment clauses in particular. Accordingly, this Article
seeks not only to clarify the law on impeachment but also to draw some
general lessons on constitutional interpretation from an analysis of the
scholarship on impeachment. Part II traces the origins of the Constitu-
tion's impeachment procedure, with particular attention to the persistent
problems of impeachment.
Part III focuses on alternative methocologies for interpreting the
impeachment procedure set forth in the Constitution, including a cri-
tique of the two general approaches-the formalist and the informalist-
dominating the literature on impeachment. Part III also offers a more
sound, intellectually honest approach to impeachment than that offered
by either the formalists or informalists. This approach recognizes the
limitations of the two dominant approaches to interpretation, but ac-
knowledges the necessity of examining the historical and structural con-
text of a particular constitutional provision before superimposing upon it
a "grand" theory of constitutional interpretation.
24 In addition, this ap-
proach posits that very few constitutional provisions are self-explanatory
and that the degree to which constitutional language, history, and struc-
ture aid constitutional interpretation varies among constitutional
provisions.
Part IV provides a detailed analysis of each of the major issues aris-
ing under the impeachment clauses, focusing on the peculiar nature of.
the impeachment process itself. Although this process is thoroughly
political, it is also a component of the Constitution's system of checks
and balances. Insights into the meaning and purpose of the system's
other components, therefore, may be helpful in interpreting the impeach-
ment clauses. Checks and balances cases frequently trigger dialogues
among the three branches regarding constitutional interpretation. There
is such a dialogue in the area of impeachment, but for the most part it
excludes the judiciary.
Part IV also addresses the constitutionality of congressional innova-
24. Professor Mark Tushnct refers to theories of constitutional law as "grand" if they 
are uni-
tary in nature, that is systematic or formal analyses of constitutional law dominated 
by some over-
arching principle or set of principles from which conclusions flow logically. See M. TUSINEr, 
supra
note 18, at 181. See also id. at 179-87 (criticizing "grand" theories of constitutional law).
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tions in the impeachment process, including the Judicial Disability Act"
and the Independent Counsel Act. 26 This Part analyzes such innovations
on the basis of a presumption of constitutionality for congressionally en-
acted deviations from the Constitution's explicit structures. Such a pre-
sumption may not be* overcome unless the deviation from explicit
constitutional structure violates what the structure was erected to pro-
tect. Part IV concludes that such a presumption not only expresses ap-
propriate deference to a coordinate branch's constitutional interpretation
of the impeachment clauses, but also should be standardized in related
areas of constitutional law.
II. A Brief History of Impeachment
The impeachment procedure set forth in the United States Constitu-
tion has its origin in the states' experiences with impeachment prior to
the Constitutional Convention.17  These state procedures were in turn
influenced by the English experience with impeachment from the thir-
teenth through the eighteenth centuries.28 Since the ratification of the
('onstitution, there have been only seventeen federal impeachment at-
tempts-against thirteen federal judges,2 9 two Presidents,3 0 one United
States Senator, 3' and one cabinet officer 32-resulting in only five convic-
25. 28 U.S.C. §i 331, 332, 372, 604 (1982).
26. 28 U.S.C. §i 591-599 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
27. See P. HoFFER & N. HULL, supro note 4, at 68 (noting that "(diclegates to the federal
(constitutional] convention . .. supported by the voices and votes of other knowledgeable state lead-
ers, fashioned national impeachment provisions along lines laid down in the states' constitutions").
28 See R. BERGER. supra note 14. at 54. 87 n. 160, 143 n.97. 170. 171 n.217 (tracing the links
betwcin impeachment in uSe f deral constitution to the English experience with impeachment).
29. Impeachment attempts have been made against the following thirteen federal judges: Dis-
trict Judge John Pickering (1803) (drunkenness and blasphemy), Associate Justice Samuel Chase
(1804) (expression of political views to grand jury), District Judge James Peck (1830) (abusive treat-
ment pf counsel), District Judge West Humphreys (1862) (inciting revolt and rebellion against the
natio'n). District Judge Mark Delahay (1873) (bringing ridicule to Congress), District Judge Charles
Swayie (1903) (financial irregularities), Circuit Judge Robert Archbald (1912) (bribery), District
Judge George English (1925) (favoritism), District Judge Harold Louderback (1932) (favoritism).
District Judge Halsted Ritter (1936) (kickbacks and tax evasion), District Judge Harry Claiborne
(1986) (tax evasion). District Judge Walter Nixon (impeached in 1988 and involved in pending Sen-
ate trial in 1989) (perjury), District Judge Alcee Hastings (impeached in August 1988, completed
testimony before special Senate trial committee in August 1989, and scheduled for closing arguments
before the full Senate in October 1989) (corruption and giving false testimony). There was also an
investigation of impeachment charges against Justice William 0. Douglas in 1970, but the charges
were eventually dismissed by the House Judiciary Committce. See I. BRANT, supra note 22, at 201-
02; HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 31-44, 51-55, 64-104 (Funk & Wagnalls 1973).
30. Two Presidents have been the targets of impeachment attempts. In 1867, Andrew Johnson
was charged with issuing an order for the reshoval of Edwin Stanton as Secretary of War in violation
of a congressional act that regulated the tenure of certain offices. See I. BRANT, supra note 22, at
138. In 1973, Richard Nixon was charged with obstructing federal authorities and congressional
committees in their investigation of the Watergate break-in. See J. LABOVITZ, PRESIDENTIAL IM-
PEACHMENT 90, 99 (1978).
31. The only United States Senator against whom an impeachment attempt was made was
10 -
tions.n These experiences no doubt helped shape this Nation's under-
standing-if not the structure-of impeachment.
The traditional guides for understanding the impeachment clauses
are the language and history of the impeachment clauses themselves. Af-
ter exploring the language of a particular constitutional provision, com-
mentators logically turn to history as a guide to interpretation. As with
other parts of the Constitution, however, the historical background of the
impeachment clauses is not always clear.
34 In fact, the record is rela-
tively clear for only a handful of matters of current interest regarding
impeachment. For example, all the delegates principally involved in the
debates on impeachment at the Constitutional Convention were familiar
with the various states' impeachment procedures, and the most influen-
tial spokesmen all had significant experiences with impeachment in their
respective states." In addition, from the outset of the Convention, the
delegates agreed to deviate from the English impeachment procedure and
to follow many of the state constitutional provisions in structuring the
federal impeachment procedures.
6
Only four major areas of controversy regarding impeachment arose
at the Constitutional Convention. First, the delegates debated the proper
forum for impeachment trials. 3 7 This debate was a part of the more gen-
eral debate on the Virginia and New Jersey Plans." Edmund Randolph
made the first significant proposal regarding the proper court for im-
William Blount in 1797. Cf. R. BERGER, supro note 14, at 214-15 (noting that the Senate dismissed
the impeachment charges on the grounds that it "ought not to hold jurisdiction" and that this dis-
missal was subsequently construed by the Supreme Court to mean that a Senator is not an impeacha-
ble "civil officer").
32. Itn 1876, Secretary of War William Belknap resigned from office two hours before the
House voted to impeach him for bribery. Largely because many Senators believed Belknap's resig-
nation deprived the Senate of any jurisdiction to remove him from office, the final Senate vote fell
short of the two-thirds necessary for removal. See I. BRANT, supra note 22, at 155, 160.
33. The only people convicted and removed from office by the Senate have been John Picker-
ing, West Humphreys, Robert Archbald, Halsted Ritter, and Harry Claiborne. Interestingly, all five
were federal judges. See Thirteen Impeachments Resulted in Four Convictions, CONG. Q.. Mar. 1974,
at 8, 8.9 (reporting the convictions of Pickering, Humphreys, Archbald, and Ritter); Note, In De-
fense of Standard. supra note 12, at 421 (noting Judge Claiborne's conviction by the Senate on Octo-
ber 9, 1986). In addition, as of the date of this Article, two other federal district judges. Walter
Nixon and Alcee Hastings, have been impeached by the House and stand on the brink of conviction
and removal from office by the Senate. See supra note It.
34. See. e.g.. Rotunda, supra note 13, at 709 (noting that 'lilt may be helpful and useful to refer
to original intent ..-. when it is read in context"); Tushnet. Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REV. 781. 793 (1983) (noting the
difficulty that historical ambiguity poses to locating clear and definite answers).
35. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL. supra note 4, at 96.
36. See. e.g., P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 4, at 96 (discussing Edmund Randolph, James
Madison, George Mason, William Paterson, James Wilson, Hugh Williamson, Elbridge Gerry, Ru-
fus King, Gouverneur Morris, Alexander Hamilton, and Charles Pinckney).
37. See id. at 97-98.
38. See id.
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peachment trials by offering, as part of his Virginia Plan, the creation of
a natiohal judiciary with the power to impeach "[any national of-
ficers." 9 Throughout June 1787, Randolph and James Madison, the
Convention's reporter, both urged that the national judiciary have the
power of impeachment. 0 in the middle of June, William Paterson pro-
posed the alternative New Jersey Plan, which would have given the na-
tional judiciary "the authority to hear and determine in the first instance
on all impeachments of federal oficers."4 I This power was not intended
to be either the equivalent of nor the substitute for impeachment. The
New Jersey Plan also provided that the Congress could remove officers
only upon the application of a majority of the state governors, but it
could not impeach.4 2 Shortly after the introduction of the New Jersey
Plan, James Wilson contrasted the two plans' treatments of impeach-
ment.43 He noted that whereas the Virginia Plan provided for removal of
officersupon impeachment and conviction by the federal judiciary, the
New Jersey Plan neglected to include impeachment by the lower house,
instead providing for removal only through application of a majority of
the state governors."
On June 18, Alexander Hamilton entered the debate on the proper
forum for impeachments, proposing that, similar to the New York Con-
stitution, the Constitution should provide that
It]he Governour Senators and all officers of the United States
[were] to be liable to impeachment for mal- and corrupt conduct;
and upon conviction to be removed from office, [and] disqualified
for holding any place of trust or profit-all impeachments to be
tried by a Court to consist of the Chief or Judge of the Superior
Court of Law of each State, provided such Judge shall hold his
place during good behavior, and have a permanent salary. 45
While Madison still pushed for the national judiciary as the im-
peachment body, the Committee of Detail,46 responsible for putting all
39. I CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 1, at 22.
40. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 4, at 98; see also I CONVENTION RECORDS, Supra
note I, at 223-24 (adopting a resolution proposed on June 13, 1787, by Randolph and Madison, to
give the judiciary the power of impeachment).
41 Id at 244.
42 See P. HOFFER & N HULL, supra note 4. at 98.
43. See I CONVENTION RECORDS. supra note 1, at 252.
44 See id.
45 Id. at 292-93.
46. The Convention appointed the Committee of Detail on July 26, 1787, in George Washing-ions words, to "draw into method and form the several matters which had been agreed to by the
Convention as a Constitution for the United States." C. BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHI1LADELPHIA:
THE STORY Of THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, MAY To SErTEMBER 1787, at 192 (1986).
The Committee put "resol[utions), suggestions, amendments and propositions into workable ar-
rangement. Id The Committee's original members were Randolph of Virginia. Wilson of Penn-
sylvania, Gorham of Massachusetts, Ellsworth of Connecticut. and Rutledge of South Carolina. Id.
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resolutions and suggestions into draft form, proposed a compromise solu-
tion: trial "before the Senate and the. judges of the federal judicial
Court."4 7 The convention postponed discussion of this and other sugges-
tions regarding the proper trial body until September 4, at which time
another committee of detail proposed that "[the Senate of the United
States shall have power to try all impeachments, but no person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the Members pres-
ent."48 The Committee of Detail decided that the Senate should conduct
removal trials because it had previously agreed that the President would
be selected by a college of electors 49 rather than the Senate. The plan to
use electors removed what the Committee pe'rceived as the troublesome
conflict of having the same body conducting trials and making appoint-
ments.so The delegates overwhelmingly agreed that the Senate presented
the fewest problems of the various proposed trial courts." Only Penn-
sylvania and Virginia dissented from the vote to adopt the proposal mak-
ing the Senate the court for removal trials. 2
The second major impeachment controversy at the Convention con-
cerned the impeachability of the President. Even though several state
constitutions had provided for impeachment of governors, many dele-
gates were troubled with impeachment as a check on the President."
For example, on July 19, Gouveneur Morris warned that the prospect of
impeachment would make the President too dependent upon the legisla-
ture. The next day Charles Pinckney expressed agreement with Morris,
but George Mason, James Wilson, Elbridge Gerry, and Benjamin Frank-
lin argued in favor of presidential impeachment. Randolph and Madison
added that it was unclear how to stop a President's misuse of power if he
could not be impeached.54 Rufus King and Morris responded that the
problem would be finding the proper forum to try the President, but
Morris admitted that presidential impeachment was necessary to ensure
that the President would not be above the law.55 In the end, only South
47. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, Supra note I, at 136.
48. Id. at 493.
49. See id. at 494.
50. See id. at 500.
St. See id. at 500-01.
52. See id. at 552-53. Both James McHenry and Luther Martin of Maryland later recalled
"that the Senate seemed to be the only body likely to view impeachments in a cool and dispassionate
manner." P. HOFFER & N. HULL, Supra note 4, at 99. Similarly, Alexander Hamilton defended the
delegates' placement of the trial in the Senate. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 396-401 (A. Hamil-
ton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). By contrast, Madison voted against the provision because he opposed
the idea of trials in the Senate. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 4, at 100.
53. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL. supra note 4. at 100.
54. See id.
5S. See id.
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Carolina and Massachusetts voted against making the President
impeachable.ss
The third impeachment controversy at the Convention concerned
the definition of impeachable offenses. Early in the Convention the dele-gates agreed that officials of the new government would not have immu-
nity from prosecution for common-law crimes."' The delegates also
envisioned an overlapping, if not separate, body of offenses for which
certain federal officials might be impeached.8 In particular, they first
referred to mal- and corrupt administration, neglect of duty, and miscon-duct in office as the only impeachable offenses, believing that common-law crimes such as treason, bribery, and felony should be heard in the
courts of law.' 9 Delegates Paterson, Randolph, Wilson, and Mason ar-gued that impeachment should follow their respective state constitutions
by applying only to misuse of official power.W As late as August 20, theCommittee of Detail reported that federal officials "shall be liable to im-peachment and removal from office for neglect of duty, malversation, or
corruption." 6' Five years after the Convention, James Wilson explained
that the delegates believed that
[i]mpeachments, and offences and offenders impeachable, [do not]
come . . . within the sphere of ordinary jurisprudence. They arefounded on different principles; are governed by different maxims;
and are directed to different objects: for this reason, the trial andpunishment of an offence on an impeachment, is no bar to a trial
and punishment of the same offence at common law.62
Wilson characterized impeachable offenses as "political" because, as Al-
exander Hamilton later explained, they constituted a specific "abuse or
violation of some public trust."63
Nevertheless, on September 8, the delegates substituted "bribery"
and "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" for the existing formula."
Asserting that the new phrase was too limiting, Mason moved to reintro-duce "or maladministration" after "bribery" to permit impeachment
36. See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note i. at 69.
57. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supro note 4. at 101.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 101; see also 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 1, at 64-69 (debating whetherthe President should be subject to impeachment for malpractice or neglect of duty while in office).60. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 4, at 101.
61. 2 CONVENTION RECORDs, supra note 1, at 337.
62. Wilson, Lectures on the Law, No. II. Cdmparison of the Constitution of the United Statesoiih That of Great Britain, in I THE WORKS OF JAMES WtLSON 382. 408 (J. Andrews ed. 1896)quoted in P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 4, at 101.
63 P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 4, at 101; THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 396 (A. Hamil-ton) ((.. Rossiter ed. 1961).
64 See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 1, at 545.
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upon less conventionally defined common-law offenses. 6' Although
Gerry agreed with Mason, delegates Madison and Morris objected to the
new proposal as too vague and too political in nature. Madison warned
that under Mason's term the President would simply serve at the plea-
sure of the Senate. In compromise, Mason moved to substitute simply
"high Crimes and Misdemeanors," which passed the Convention by a
vote of eight to three."
The fourth debate over impeachment at the Convention focused on
the number of votes necessary to convict and remove. As it turned out,
this controversy was closely linked to the Copvention's decision regard-
ing the proper forum for impeachment trials. Resolving the fourth con-
troversy required the delegates to consider the special qualities of the
Senate, the Senate's special role in the impeachment process, and the
Senate's constitutional role generally.
One of the first references to the concept of the two-thirds vote was
on June 6, when North Carolina's Hugh Williamson urged the Conven-
tion to require that all congressional acts pass by a two-thirds vote of the
Senate.67 Shortly thereafter, the Committee of Detail restricted Senate
treaty ratification and confirmation of appointments to two-thirds vote.68
Williamso ins inclusion of impeachment in this category was significant
because the
restriction of certain legislative issues to two-thirds vote was with-
out parallel in pre-revolutionary constitutionalism. . . . Two-thirds
requirements emerged as part of the revolutionary republican com-
promise between representative assemblies and deliberative coun-
cils. The association of impeachment with the two-thirds rule
signified a final Americanization and republicanization of the im-
peachment process. 69
The importance of the two-thirds vote is directly traceable to the
Convention's special view of the Senate.70 The delegates saw the Senate
as composed of well-educated, wealthy, virtuous citizens who would be
sure to have the Nation's welfare at heart.7t The delegates viewed the
House as more subject to factions and more prone to hasty and intemper-
65. See id. at 550.
66. See id.
67. See I CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 1, at 140.
68. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 4, at 102.
69. Id. at 102-03.
70. See id. at 103-06. See generally Note. The Senate and the Constitution, 97 YALE L.J. Il 11,
I112 (1988) (discussing the Senate's role in legislation, impeachment, appointment and amendment).
71. See G. WOOD. THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 553-54
(1969).
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ate action than the Senate.72 The Senate was structured to counterbal-
ance the bad tendencies of the House and, when acting alone, to carefully
deliberate the most important political questions.73 The two-thirds vote
was designed to ensure -that the normally deliberati Senate would be
most careful when considering issues of critical importance.74 The Con-
vention's sentiment was that
[t]he Senate sat to hear treaty ratification, executive appointments,
and impeachment trials without the concurrence of the lowerhouse for the same reason that all three types of business requiredtwo-thirds votes. These issues should not be "popular." The Con-
stitution assigned this labor to the Senate because the delegates ex-pected the upper house (the Senate] to rely upon its own wisdom,information, stability, and even temper.75
With respect to the Senate's role in impeachment proceedings, Alexander
Hamilton later confirmed that
[t]here was no occasion ... upon which the Senate should be moredeliberative and shielded from popular clamors than when it sat tohear impeachments. 
. . . [I]mpeachment hearings were not trials in
which the senators were jurors, despite the fact that they sat upon
oath or affirmation, so much as deliberative sessions, when theydecided whether an official had betrayed his public trust. TheAmerican impeachment trial, with its two-thirds requirement, wasthus a hybrid of native origin, expressing truly republican
compromises.' 6
In short,
(the two-thirds requirement for conviction in the Senate was the
capstone in the republicanization of impeachment and trial proce-dure, It ensured that the Senate would be as thoughtful and delib-
erate in its hearing and determining of cases as the House of Lords,
without any of the aristocratic trappings of that English body. 7
Even though many of the delegates were familiar with the English
experience with impeachment, including the contemporary impeachment
of the former Governor-General of India, the delegates' deviation from
English impeachment is noteworthy because it signals that, from the out-
set of the Convention, the delegates put a uniquely American stamp on
the Constitution's impeachment clauses. For example, the delegates
strenuously debated the precise definition of impeachable offenses,
72. 1. SToRy, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 387, at 274(R. Rotunda & J. Nowak eds. 1987); G. WOOD, supra note 71, at 557.58.73. See G. Wooo, supra note 71.
74. See J. STORY, supra note 72, §§ 383-385, at 271-75.
75. P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 4, at 106.
76. Id. at 106. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 396-401 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossitered. 1961)
77. P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 4, at 106.
whereas Parliament had always refused to constrain its jurisdiction over
impeachments by restrictively defining impeachable offenses.78 The dele-
gates also agreed to limit impeachment to officeholders, but in England,
anyone, except members of the royal family, could be impeached.
79
Whereas the English House of Lords could convict upon a bare majority,
the American delegates required a two-thirds vote of the Senate members
present.80 In addition, although the House of Lords could order any
punishment upon conviction, the delegates limited the punishments in
the Constitution to those typically found in the state constitutions.'
Thus, contrary to the view of some historians,8 2 the Constitutional Con-
vention and ratification campaign confirm that the Constitution's im-
peachment process is, in important respects, uniquely American.
The debates over impeachment at the Constitutional Convention
must, however, be put into perspective. The delegates themselves recog-
nized that their views on the meaning of the Constitution mattered less
than the views of the ratifiers.83 The delegates understood that the Con-
stitution would have effect only if the people accepted it, and the people's
only opportunity to review and debate the Constitution took place during
the ratification campaign. Those considering whether to ratify the new
Constitution had no access to any of the notes on the Constitutional Con-
vention, which were not published until many years after the Convention
and the ratification campaign.8' The ratifiers' understandings of what
happened at the Constitutional Convention and of the meaning of partic-
ular constitutional language was limited to personal reports regarding
the Convention, pamphlets urging acceptance or rejection of the pro-
posed Constitution,"s and their own readings of the Constitution. Never-
theless, the few reports from the ratification campaign regarding
78. See id. at 97.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See. e.g., R. BEROER, Supra note 14, at 142 (arguing that old English procedures of removal
by courts for misbehavior defined the framers' intent); see also infra subpart III(A)(2) (Raoul Berger
asserts that the Constitution's impeachment procedures may be explained by examining the English
experience with impeachment.); subpart 111(8)(2) (Irving Brant summarily rejects the colonial ex-
periences with impeachment, the Constitutional Convention, and the ratification campaign.).
83. See Amar. Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281, 281
(1987) (emphasizing that the Constitution and its amendments became effective only through ratifi-
cation by "We the People of the United States" and that what the people considered and reviewed
during the ratification process is, therefore, critical for an understanding of the meaning and nature
of the Constitution itself); Rotunda, supra note 13, at 708-14 (emphasizing the importance of the
ratification process for constitutional interpretation).
84. See Rotunda, supra note 13, at 710 & n.13.
85. See generally THE FEDERALIST at viii (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("The Federalist is essentially
a collection of eighty-five letters to the public, over the pseudonym of Publius, that appeared at short
intervals in the newspapers of New York City beginning on October 27, 1787."); THE ESSENTIAL
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impeachment indicate that the ratifiers generally shared the delegates'
views 6n impeachment issues."6
Significantly, there were numerous questions that the delegates and
the ratifiers did not answer or even address. Although the delegates dis-
cussed the general need for judicial independence,87 they failed to con-
sider the exclusivity of impeachment as a means for removing federal
judges. After the Convention, however, Alexander Hamilton argued that
impeachment was the sole means for removing federal judges, thus pro-
tecting federal judges from rash or intemperate retaliation by the Presi-
dent or Congress for any controversial judicial actions. 8 Convention
delegates did discuss the appropriate forum for impeachment hearings
and trials,8' but neither the delegates nor the ratifiers focused on these
procedural concerns. In addition, neither the delegates nor the ratifiers
directly considered judicial review of impeachments.90 While the dele-
gates envisioned impeachment and criminal trials as separate, but not
mutually exclusive proceedings," they did not clearly voice any prefer-
ence regarding the order of these proceedings.' 2 Likewise, the delegates
intended to make the President and federal judges impeachable" but
never directly addressed whether members of Congress were also im-
peachable. Finally, the delegates expressed their intent to limit punish-
ments in the impeachment process to removal and disqualification from
office.' 4 They failed to discuss, however, whether the two punishments
could be imposed separately or whether impeachment could proceed
even though an official had resigned.
ANTI-FEDERALIST (W.B. Allen & G. Lloyd eds. 1985) (expressing reasons for refusing to support
the newly drafted Constitution).
86. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supro note 4, at 109; Rotunda, supra note 13. at 710.
87. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 153-55.
88. See THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 474 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); id. No. 78. at
469-70. Interestingly, Raoul Berger rejects Hamilton's understanding as controlling because Berger
regards Hamilton as having had only a marginal role in the Constitutional Convention. See R.
BERGER, supra note 14. at 137.
89. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL. supra note 4, at 97-100.
90. R. DERGER, supro note 14, at 112-14 (noting the scant remarks of the framers on the exclu-
sivity of the Senate as the trial court for impeachments).
91. See R. BERGER, supro note 14, at 78-85.
92. Professor Burbank argues that Hamilton's views in The Federalist No. 65 and the ratifica-
tion debates do not resolve this issue. He observes, for example, that Hamilton "contemplated re-
moval before criminal prosecution" but never indicated whether the Constitution mandated such an
order. See Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution: An Essay on the Removat of Federal Judges, 76
Ky. L.J. 643, 668 (1987).
93. See I CONVENTION RECORos, supro note 39, at 78, 236, 292; 2 id. as 52-53. 64-69.
94. See U.S. CoNsT. an. 1, J 3, cl. 7 ("Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend
further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor,
Trust, or Profit under the United States . . . .").
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III. Methodological Problems with Current Approaches to
Impeachment
Several issues arising under the impeachment clauses have persist-
ently divided scholars, including (1) is impeachment the only constitu-
tionally permissible means of removing federal judges; (2) for what
kinds of offenses may federal officials be impeached; (3) what is the
proper procedure for impeachment and trial of federal officials (includ-
ing the appropriate burden of proof for establishing an impeachable of-
fense, the applicability of presidential privilege to impeachment
proceedings, the governing rules of evidence, and the acceptability of the
Senate's use of special trial committees to receive evidence for removal
proceedings); (4) is it permissible to impeach someone who has already
resigned; and (5) is judicial review of impeachment permissible under
the Constitution. Unfortunately, these issues remain unresolved because
commentators insist on applying theories of constitutional law insuffi-
cient for resolving the unique problems raised by the impeachment
clauses.95
A. Problems with Constitutional Historiography
1. The General Problems with Original Intent.-Formalists tend to
use history and particularly original intent as their sole guide in inter-
preting the impeachment clauses.96 Yet there are unavoidably serious
problems with constitutional historiography in general and with follow-
ing original intent in particular as a theory of constitutional interpreta-
tion. Although the general problems with original intent have received
considerable attention in recent constitutional scholarship,7 the brief re-
view that follows provides a background for the discussion of the inade-
quacies of formalist scholarship in the context of impeachment.
Original intent is one of the two theories of constitutional interpreta-
tion that rely primarily on history as a guide to the meaning of constitu-
95. See. e.g.. Tushnet, Conservative Constitutional Theory. 59 TUL. L. REV. 910, 925 (1985)
(asserting that although conservative commentators criticize liberal judges' judicial activism, they
have been unable to develop an alternative theory of judicial review. possibly because no constitu-
tional theory can be coherent); Tushnet. supro note 19, at 993 (concluding that although the liberal
tradition "provides an unstable solution to the problem of securing ordered liberty," we cannot
simply return to the federalism of the framers, but must effect "substantial changes" in society to
revitalize federalism).
96. See inufr notes 108-40, 146.
97. See eg., M. TUSHNET. supra note 18, at 21-45 (criticizing originalists as too limited by
history and being unable to account for new developments In society); Powell, The Original Under-
standing of Original Intent. 98 HAnv. L. REV. 885, 886-88 (1985) (discussing the problems with
deciding constitutional questions based on the original Intent of the framers).
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tional provisions. 9' As with most theories of constitutional law, original
intent is designed to constrain illegitimate or unjustified judicial displace-
ment of majoritarian decisions-judicial tyranny.99 Original intent is
often equated with interpretivism, which asserts that judges "should con-
fine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implied in
the written Constitutitin."1oo "Such norms are found by interpreting the
text with recourse when necessary to the original intent of the fram-
ers."' 0 Interpretivism seeks to restrain both legislators and judges from
distorting or manipulating the Constitution by restricting them, as much
as possible, to the language, the structure, and the framers' original un-
derstanding of the Constitution. 0 2 Interpretivists claim that we may
avoid legislative and judicial tyranny only if we view the Constitution as
a contract defining the boundaries of majoritarian power.' 0
The major limitation of original intent is its primary reliance on his-
tory-some ill-defined notion of our collective past-as a clear guide to
constitutional interpretation. Interpretivists cannot elude the interre-
lated problems that the historical record may be cloudy or incomplete, ' 0
it may be impossible to understand or recreate accurately the framers'
world of experience, 0 and institutions may mean something different to
9)8 The other theory is neutral principles. Neutral principles provides that
lie main constitucnt of the judicial process is precisely that it must he genuinely principled,
resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and
reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved[.) . . - (resting) on grounds
of adequate neutrality and generality, tested not only by the instant application but by
others that the principles imply.
M. TusHNET, supra note 18, at 21-22 (quoting H. WECHSLER. PRINCIPLES, POLITICS. AND FUNDA-
MENIAL LAW 21 (1961)). Judges following neutral principles must be committed to the rule of law
and trained to identify and apply neutrally the principles in history, precedent, and the Constitution
by which decisions must be guided. No commentator has yet purported to follow neutral principles
in analyzing the impeachment clauses. perhaps becausc (1) judges rarely decide issues of impeach-
ment; (2) neutral principles cannot accommodate congressional practices as precedent because those
practices are politically charged or driven and, therefore, not neutral in character; and (3) history
and She Constitution offer little definitive (much less neutral) guidance on questions of impeachment.
-99. See M. TUsHNET, supra note 18, at 23-45 (identifying the primary aim of constitutional
theory as restraining judicial tyranny, the displacement of majoritarian decisions by an unelected
elite); see also id. at 10 (suggesting that the framers attempted to offset judicial tyranny with legisla-
tive power and legislative tyranny with judicial review).
100. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRusT: A THEORY Of JUDICIAL REVIEw I (1980).
101. M. TUsINET, supra note 18. at 22.
102. See id, at 23.
103. See id.
104. See M. TUSiNET, supra note 18, at 34-35. With respect to impeachment, history does not
definitively answer whether impeachment is the exclusive means of removing federal judges, whether
an official may be impeached even after resignation, what is the scope of impeachable offenses. or
what procedure should be followed in an impeachment hearing or removal trial.
105. See id. at 35. For example, the framers regarded impeachment as primarily political, but
politics to them suggested something noble. Today, however, politics frequently connotes something
unprincipled and untrustworthy. so that judges and commentators are reluctant to allow or at least
to acknowledge politics to be the driving force of something as momentous or complex as an
impeachment.
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us than they did to the framers.' 06 In addition, this approach is intrinsi-
cally flawed because the framers may have failed to follow any general or
specific theory of interpretivism or may have intended certain constitu-
tional provisions to be interpreted in a nonoriginalist manner.
07
2. Specific Problems with Original Intent in the Impeachment Con-
text.-The problems that plague constitutional historiography in general
also plague interpretative theories relying on history, including-original
intent. Indeed, prominent impeachment studies by Raoul Berger and
Philip Kurland illustrate these problems. Interestingly, although both
Berger and Kurland purport to be interpretivists applying original intent,
they reach different conclusions regarding several major issues arising
under the impeachment clauses. 08 A close examination of Berger's and
106. See id.; Sunstein, supra note 21, at 493-94. For example, each of the major institutions
involved in the impeachment process has changed in significant ways. First, the House is much
larger and busier than the framers anticipated. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention per-
ceived no problem in having the House conduct initial investigations into impeachments, but today
the House cannot expend the same effort investigating and conducting impeachment hearings as
could the original House. See Heflin, supra note 9, at 123-24. Similarly, the Senate is much larger
and busier than the original Senate. The ways in which public officials may commit impeachable
abuses against the state have increased since the days of the Constitutional Convention, and it is
unrealistic to assume that the Senate may delay its busy schedule to sit in its entirely as a body to
deliberate on an impeachment trial. Third, the President's office has also changed in certain dra-
matic ways from the days of the Constitution's founding. The President is more powerful and busier
than originally envisioned. As foreign affairs become more complicated and the stakes increase.
there is a strong reluctance on the part of Congress to distract a sitting President with an impeach-
ment proceeding unless the evidence is overwhelming. Fourth. more than any other branch. the
federal judiciary has been subjected to impeachment proceedings over the years. The federal judici-
ary's size and responsibility has also changed, requiring and complicating greater monitoring. Ac-
cordingly, the need to protect the independence of judges against each other and other branches has
increased. See Symposium. supra note II, at 359-60 (comments of Professor Ronald Rotunda).
107. See M. TUSHNET, supra note 18, at 25-26, 28-29 (arguing that the framers may have failed
to follow any theory of original intent, that they did not always understand the potentials within the
Constitution for legislative and judicial tyranny, and that there were times that the framers intended
terms to be interpreted in a nonorginalist context); see also J. ELY, supra note 100, at 22-30 (citing
the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment as a provision intended by its
drafters to be interpreted in a nonoriginalist manner); Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A
Theory of Judicial Review (Book Review), 59 TEXAS L. REV. 343, 349*53 (1981) (pointing to the
ninth amendment as an example of a constitutional provision licensing nonoriginalist interpretation).
Another problem with the theory of original intent is that the founders may not have addressed
certain problems. See M. TUSHNET, supra note IS, at 35-36. For example, in the area of impeach-
ment, they did not address (1) whether removal and disqualification may be imposed jointly or
separately; (2) the proper standard of proof in an impeachment proceeding; (3) the exclusivity of
impeachment as a means for removing federal judges; (4) whether there may be judicial review of
any aspect of an impeachment proceeding; and (5) the specifics of the proper procedure for impeach-
ment hearings and removal trials. Formalists become confused and uncertain when confronted by
the fact that the framers may have failed to address something. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 14,
at 100-01 (raising questions not answered by the framers because of their preoccupation with im-
peachment of the President).
108. Compare R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 70-72, 141-45, 103-21 (concluding that impeach-
ment is not the exclusive means for removing federal judges; that judicial review of impeachment is
constitutionally permissible, and that impeachable offenses can be easily categorized) with Kurland,
supra note 14, at 668, 697 (concluding that impeachment is the exclusive means of removing federal
21
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Kurland's studies also shows that history can confuse and divide analysis
on impeachment and that commentators can use the past to cloak their
own partisan views with historical legitimacy.
Berger's misuse of history is evident in his analysis of two issues
regarding impeachment: (1) what constitutes an impeachable offense
and (2) whether impeachment is the exclusive means of removing federal
judges. Berger's reading of "high crimes and misdemeanors" as referring
to seven specific categories of crimes against the state has two major
problems.t10 First, Berger's historical research is seriously incomplete.
Berger does not acknowledge or discuss certain aspects of the historical
record. Inexplicably, he relies on the English experience with impeach-
ment to define. "high crimes and misdemeanors" rather than on the ex-
tensive colonial experience.' 10 Contrary to Berger's assertion that the
Constitution's impeachment procedure may be explained by examining
the English experience with impeachment, " more recent studies on the
history of impeachment in the United States emphasize that the Consti-
tutional Convention delegates and the ratifiers consciously chose to put a
uniquely American stamp on impeachment and meant to deviate from
the English experience in significant ways.'' 2
Second, Berger's specific assertions regarding what constitutes im-
peachable offenses are frequently contradicted by the historical record,
including the actual English and colonial experiences with impeachment,
the debates at the Constitutional Convention, and the ratification cam-
paign." Berger argues that the delegates understood the constitutional
language "high crimes and misdemeanors" to refer to seven specific cate-
gories of crimes against the state in English impeachments."4 This argu-
ment, however, contradicts Berger's own historical commentary that
judges; that judicial review or impeachments is not authorized by the Constitution; and that the
scope of impeachable offenses cannot be clearly defined).
109. See R. BERGER, supra note 14. at 70-71 (listing "high crimes and misdemeanors" as "mis-
application of funds . . . , abuse of official power . . ., neglect of duty . . . , encroachment (upon] or
contempts of Parliament prerogativesf,] . . . 'corruption', . . . betrayal of trust. . . . [and) giving
pernicious advice to the Crown . . . .").
110. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 4, at 268 ("Berger has written a brief, not a history.
Missing from his work is an appreciation of American colonial and state precedents, the latter of
which were far more important in influencing federal law than English examples.").
11I. Berger cites English history and the common law to define "high crimes and misdemean.
ors," see R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 70-71; to define judicial good behavior, see id. at 125-35; and
to determine whether legislators could be impeached, see id. at 217-18.
112. See, e.g., P. HOFFER & N. HULL. supra note 4, at 268 (discussing the framers' "deliberate
divergence from English law"); Bestor. supra note 13, at 261 (claiming that Americans changed the
English meaning of treason and adopted only its most restrictive view).
113. See Bestor, supra note 13, at 262-66 (suggesting that Berger "glimpses ... but then shies
away from" the historically correct reading of "high crimes and misdemeanors" as political acts
injurious to the state or sovereign).
114. See supra note 109.
impeachments in England were essentially political proceedings and that
impeachment developed in England as a method of punishing those who
were too great and powerful to be brought to justice before the common-
law courts."'
Berger's exclusive reliance on English justifications for impeach-
ment to explain the impeachment procedure in the Constitution is mis-
placed, because the English categorizations of impeachable offenses are
only tenuously related to the colonial understanding of impeachable of-
fenses and because the Constitution changed much of the English im-
peachment practice.t t 6 As a general matter, Berger does not
satisfactorily explain how much the English experience with impeach-
ment actually influenced the understanding of impeachment in the colo-
nies prior to 1787, at the Constitutional Convention, or during the
ratification campaign-particularly in light of the significant differences
between the Constitution's and the English treatment of impeachment.
Berger also fails to support his assertion that the framers intended to
formalize impeachments by limiting impeachable offenses to the seven
categories in the English experience."' 7 Berger suggests that the framers
intended the President to be impeachable only for so-called "great" of-
fenses, which he construes as being narrower than the categories of Eng-
115. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 71-72.
116. On the one hand, "a categorization of the English precedents prior to 1787 is of limited
usefulness for defining the proper scope of impeachments today: the categories are simply tied too
closely to bygone times." Book Note, 25 STAN. L. REv. 908, 913 (1973) (reviewing R. BERGER,
IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMs (1973) and I. BRANT. IMPEACHMENT: TRIALS
AND ERRORS (1972)). On the other hand, the framers deviated from the English experience with
impeachment in at least seven ways: (1) in England anyone could be impeached, whereas the Consti-
tution limits impeachment to "civil officers;" (2) in England impeachment implied criminal proceed-
ings whereas the Constitution expressly separates impeachment from the traditional criminal
process; (3) in England the sanction for conviction would be loss of life or property or imprisonment,
whereas the Constitution limits the sanctions to removal from office and disqualification from future
office; (4) in England the King could pardon anyone convicted after impeachment, whereas the
Constitution expressly provides that the President can pardon for crimes, except for impeachments;
(5) although the King could not be impeached, the Constitution expressly provides that the Presi-
dent may be impeached; (6) in England officers and judges could be removed from office by means
other than impeachment, whereas the Constitution explicitly recognizes only one means for removal
of federal judges; and (7) the English system allowed the category of impeachable offenses to grow as
new cases were brought, whereas the Constitution limits the scope of impeachable offenses to "Trea-
son, Bribery, and other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." See Broderick, Citizens' Guide to Im-
peachment ofa President: Problem Areas, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 205, 217-18 (1973).
117. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 67-73 (providing a detailed categorization of impeachable
offenses in England. but failing to establish that the framers were familiar with or relied on them in
drafting the impeachment clauses). In an earlier article, Berger sought support for his view that
indictment and trial may precede removal by resorting to the English practice in which "loln several
occasions the Parliament preferred to refer the case to the courts." Berger. The President. Congress,
and the Courts. 83 YALE L.J. ItII. 1128 (1974). As Professor Burbank notes. however, this is not
helpful, because, as Berger recognizes, in English practice "criminal prosecution and removal were
wedded in one procecding. whereas the framers made an informed decision to divorce them." Id. at
1124, quoted in Burbank, supra note 92, at 667.
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lisa "political" offenses, as not including any misconduct outside office,
and as nfaking the President unimpeachable for some types of miscon-
duct that would expose lesser officials to impeachment proceedings." 8
But Berger fails to prescribe a method for determining which presidential
misconduct would or would not be a "great" offense and never justifies
making private conduct of the President unimpeachable. Finally, Berger
concludes that impeachable conduct must be "political,""' 9 so that the
actor and the forum are important detirminants of whether a specific
official may be impeached for a specific offense. Berger's attempts to
define "political," however, are inconsistent and lack any clear link to
the historical record.120
The underlying explanation for Berger's reading of "high crimes and
misdemeanors" is his partisan desire to protect the federal judiciary from
congressional overreaching as opposed to any search for an accurate un-
derstaning of the historical nature of impeachment. Although Berger
acknowledges that the impeachable offenses listed in the Constitution are
political crimes, he expresses disapproval of the Constitution's vesting of
any removal power over the judiciary in a political (or legislative) body.
Berger's disapproval is demonstrated by his repeated criticisms of then-
Congressman Gerald Ford's comment, during the attempted impeach-
ment of Justice Douglas, that an impeachable offense is whatever a ma-
jority of the House of Representatives may say it is.t7t However,
[t]his coldly cynical threat to the independence of the judiciary
seems to block off for Berger any further consideration of the pos-
sibility that the framers did in fact contemplate . . . "proceedings of
a political nature" if., . "confined to political characters," directed
against "political crimes and misdemeanors" and eventuating only
in "political punishments.""2
In the area of impeachment, the most that constitutional interpreta-
118. Se R. BERGER, supro note 14, at 88-93, 196-97.
119. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 62 n.32 (citing Blackstone for the claim that political
crimes were impeachable offenses and describing impeachment as a "political weapon" Parliament
used to make ministers accountable to it, where "political" was used by the English in conjunction
with crimes to distinguish impeachable conduct in office from criminal offenses).
120. For example, Berger first defines "political" offenses as misconduct in office. One sentence
later he expands this definition to include all acts "against the State." id. at 62 & n.32, and he notes
that several impeachments were directed against persons who held no office. See id. at 71 n.92. He
later includes conduct by officials in their private capacities, even if the conduct does not comprise
an act against the state. See id. at 195-96. It is diffcult to ascertain meaningful limits to "political"
as Berger has defined it; it has grown to inclqde all misconduct except acts not directed against the
state by those who do not hold offce.
121. See id. at 53. 86, 94, 103; see also id. at 96. 123. 155 n.1S6. 159, 298 (criticizing Ford for his
almost unabashed partisanship in invoking the impeachment process and for his assumption that the
implied constitutional power to remove judges for lack of good behavior was vested in Congress in
the form of the impeachment procedure).
122. Bestor, supra note 13. at 266 (quoting I J. WILSON, Supro note 16).
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tion can do is identify the purely political questions that Congress must
decide as part of the impeachment process. Attempts to influence those
political decisions through constitutional interpretation derive either
from a misunderstanding of the structure of the impeachment clauses or
from poorly veiled efforts to offer political judgments or preferences
under the guise of constitutional mandates. The colonial experience with
impeachment, the Constitutional Convention, and the ratification cam-
paign indicate that impeachment was designed primarily as a check on
the usurpations of executive officials, but Berger shies away from this
conclusion out of his respect for judicial independence and distrust of
political trials. 23
There are also problems with Berger's conclusion that judicial re-
view of impeachment is permissible. These problems derive from Ber-
ger's dominant desire to protect the judiciary from congressional
overreaching. First, Berger is fundamentally inconsistent in his ap-
proach. He accepts the assumption that during the last two centuries
congressional impeachment determinations have been final, but he ar-
gues that the framers must have wanted-as opposed to actually de-
sired-judicial review-of impeachments, because the framers sought to
prevent congressional excesses against the judiciary.'14
Second, there is no historical support for Berger's view that judicial
review of impeachment is constitutionally permissible. Berger's method-
ology on this point is mystifying: he acknowledges that there is little, if
any, historical evidence indicating the framers desired judicial review of
impeachments but then argues that the absence of any expressed desire
by the framers against judicial review should be construed as original
intent in favor of such review.'2 5 This argument is even more confusing
123. See id. at 267.
124. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 103 (observing that "[flrom Story onward it has been
thought that in the domain of impeachment the Senate has the last word; that even the issue whether
the charged misconduct constitutes an impeachable offense is unreviewable, because the trial of im-
peachments is confided to the Senate alone" (footnotes omitted)).
125. See id. at 112-13, 117-18. Berger's argument that the framers paid little attention to the
problem of removing federal judges undercuts his other argument that the framers intended to allow
judicial review of impeachments. Moreover, neither the discussions at the Constitutional Conven-
tion nor during the ratification campaign indicate any support for the view that there should be
judicial review of impeachments. Indeed, the most prominent commentary at the time rejected the
idea. See THE FEDERALIsT No. 79, at 474 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("(Impeachment] is
the only provision on the point which is consistent with the necessary independence of the judicial
character, and is the only one which we find in our own Constitution in respect to our own judges ");
see also Bettor, supra note 13, at 267 (arguing that Berger's view is "unhistorical and extraconstitu-
tional").
Berger also finds no historical support for the political question doctrine and, therefore, believes
in referring even the most difficult constitutional issues to the courts. See R. BERGER, Supra note 14.
at 108-09. Even if Berger is correct that there is no historical support for the political question
doctrine, there is no historical support for the opposite conclusion. The Supreme Court has for well
25
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because it is irreconcilable with Berger's later assertion that some of the
delegates' comments at the Constitutional Convention are consistent
with judicial review of impeachments. 2 6 For example, Berger asserts
that the framers considered Congress the most dangerous branch of gov-
ernment, and out of concern for the independence of the federal judici-
ary, the framers would (or must) have wanted to prevent any imbalance
between the respective powers of the Congress and the judiciary. Judi-
cial review of impeachments, therefore, must have been among the Con-
stitution's numerous checks and balances. t" This reading of history
makes little sense because it suggests that the framers sought to solve the
potential problem of an imbalance of power between the Congress and
the judiciary by creating just such an imbalance in favor of the judiciary.
Berger's view of judicial review of impeachments cannot be sensibly
squared with the considered judgment of the Constitutional Convention
and, the ratifiers when they excluded the judiciary from adjudicating im-
peachment matters to avoid the impropriety of the judiciary's reviewing
charges against either the President who appointed them or their fellow
judges. 128
Third, Berger misreads the relevant constitutional language as sup-
porting judicial review of impeachments. Berger's general argument is
that since the Constitution's language regarding the impeachment pro-
cess is ambiguous, the Constitution does not commit consideration of
this issue to only one branch. In the constitutional mandate-"The Sen-
ate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments" 29-Berger fo-
cuses on the word "try," which he asserts, was limited in eighteenth
century usage to the fact-finding stage of a judicial proceeding.o30 Berger
argues further that the word "try" normally implies an appeal to a re-
view process by a court of law. No doubt, the framers may have envi-
sioned a trial-like proceeding as the means by which the Senate would
effeft impeachments and removals, but this fact hardly justifies the infer-
over a century invoked the political question doctrine to avoid deciding questions that are either
clearly committed to the competence or discretion of another branch or that require the Court to
extend its own authority under article Ill. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973); Coleman
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). See generally L. TRIBE,
supra note 13, at 96-107 (discussing the confusion that surrounds the political question doctrine).
126. See R. BERGER, Supra note 14, at 118 (citing the framers' rejection of "unfettered removal
by Address" and of removal for "maladministration" as evidence of a strong desire to limit the
impeachment power and arguing that it is therefore unlikely that the framers intended to rely on the
Senate's self-restraint in exercising this'power).
127. See R. BERoER, supro note 14, at 111-19.
128 See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 1, at 551; see also THE FEDERALIST No. SI, at
321 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("(The permanent tenure by which the (judiciall appoint-
ments are held . . . must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.").
129. U.S. CONsT. art. 1. * 3. cl. 6.
130 See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at t11-12.
ence of an appeal to a court of law, particularly because the Constitution
explicitly directs the Chief Justice to preside over presidential impeach-
ments and because the framers specifically rejected having judges serve
as the impeachment or removal tribunal.' 3'
Fourth, Berger confuses constitutionality determination with judi-
cial reviewability of an action. Specifically, Berger argues that the fifth
amendment allows redress in courts for any due process violation, even
in an impeachment proceeding. 3 2 The problem with Berger's argument
is that it assumes the conclusion: the determination of constitutionality
is separate from the determination of reviewability. The fact that Con-
gress may do something unconstitutional as part of an impeachment pro-
ceeding does not mean that reviewability of that proceeding by the
federal judiciary is then automatic or permissible. Furthermore, Berger's
implicit assumption that all determinations of constitutionality must be
made by the federal judiciary is incorrect both as a historical matter and
as a jurisdictional principle.133
Professor Philip Kurland's study of impeachment does not purport
to be as wide ranging as-Berger's study, focusing primarily on how each
of the three branches of government has dealt with the question whether
the constitutional guarantee that federal judges may serve "during good
Behaviour" 34 provides a basis for removal of federal judges in addition
to the impeachable offenses listed elsewhere in the Constitution. Kur-
land spends little or no time discussing the original intent of the framers
regarding impeachment as the exclusive means of removing federal
judges, because he believes "it has been made pellucidly clear by Martha
Ziskind that the [framers'] intention was to make impeachment the sole
means of removal of federal (judges)." t" After reviewing the history of
impeachments through the late 1960s, Kurland concludes (1) "that it
would be unconstitutional for the Congress to attempt, by legislation, to
establish a fixed term of office for [federal] judges" because the constitu-
tional guarantee that federal judges may serve "during good Behaviour"
has been regarded by each branch as granting judges life tenure; (2) "that
131. See id. at 112.13; see also supra notes 4 1-52 and accompanying text (discussing the Conven-
tion's choice of the Senate as the impeachment trial body).
132. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 80-81, 120.
133. See P. BREST & S. LEVINSON. PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING 903-28
(2d ed. 1983) (discussing the historical authority, conceptual basis, and scope of the political ques-
tion doctrine-that some constitutional questions are, as a function of the separation of powers,
committed to nonjudicial agencies); L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 15-17, 34-35, 39, 67-68 (arguing that
courts are not equipped to address all constitutional issues).
134. "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts. shall hold their Offces during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Ofnce." U.S. CONST. art. Ill. 11.
135. Kurland, supra note 14, at 668.
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the greater weight of authority lies on the side of lack of [any existingpower, short of the amendment process] to establish a mode of trial otherthan by impeachment for the removal of federal judges"; and (3) "thatlegislative action spelling out the content of 'good behavior' for such tri-
als would also be invalid,. [because] those words are either [a] to be de-
rived from the definition of high crimes and misdemeanors, or [b] to beleft to the discretion of the Senate when sitting as a court of impeach-
ment." 3 6 When it comes to defining "high crimes and misdemeanors,"however, Kurland admits that "no one should claim certainty."37
Kurland's argument has two major flaws. First, Kurland's reliance
on Ziskind's study is misplaced. Even though both Berger and Ziskindpurport to follow original intent to resolve the issue whether impeach-
ment is the exclusive means for removing federal judges, Berger harshly
rejects Ziskind's reading of the relevant original intent.135 For instance,Ziskind believes the framers rejected the English practice of scirefacias,39 which allowed judges to remove other judges for misbehavior.Ziskind maintains that before the Constitutional Convention " 'in all but
a few states, judges held office during good behavior and could be re-
moved only by impeachment.' "140 According to Berger, however, Zis-kind's view lacks historical support.' 4t He criticizes her for ignoring thefact that:
136. Id. at 697.
137. Id.
138. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 141.
139. SeeR. BeGER. supra note i4. at 141-43. See generally Shartel, supra note 10. at 880-98.Professor Shandc makes several observations about whether the Constitution was nmeant to intcludehe Enghish practice of scire fpcias. Hei explains that., historicaliy, 'ludges . .. holding [offie)
'during good behavior' by patent from the King, were removable on scire facto: in the King'sBench." Id. at 882 (footnotes omitted). Persons holding lower offices or without patent from theking were subject to removal by a quo warranto type proceeding, which was in the nature of aforfeiture and required a directive of ouster. It is unclear whether the English Act of Settlement of1700 or later statutes abolished these means of removal. See id. at 882 n.33, 900 n.82; see also id. at887-89 (discussing use ofscirefocias as preeisting at common law and not ruled out by the Consti-itution), Note, Constiitutional Judicial Tenure Legislation?, spra note 12, at 855.60 (concluding thatthe framers intended impeachment to be the method of judicial removal based on a study of colonialpractice and the debates in the Constitutional Convention and the ratification campaign).
140. Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English and American Precedents,1969 Sup. Cr. REV. 135, 152. quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 145. There are lesser but stilltroublesome problems raised by the methodology of original intent, including () that because peopleborn in the United States automatically become citizens subject to our existing Constitution, no onetoday has had the opportunity to enter into a contractual relationship governed by the Constitutionin the same manner as the framers (and members of their generation) and (2) that we may need toabandon original intent to deal with forms of unimagined and unaddressed tyranny (particularlylegislative). See M. TusaNET, SUpra note 18, at 25-27.141. See R. BERGERt, supra note 14, at 142 (pointing out that because judicial appointments inthe colonies were terminable at the king's will, the absence of provisions for scire facias in colonialconstitutions should be viewed not as a rejection of that process, as Fiskind suggests. but as a simplereflection of colonial powerlessness to interfere with judicial tenure).
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[t]he States were pretty evenly divided between impeachment and
removal by Address [a variation of the English practice under
which both Houses of Parliament made a formal request that the
King perform a particular act]: four States provided for Address
and a fifth, Georgia, provided for a variant; six states provided for
impeachment and four of these supplied an alternative, removal for
misbehavior' or maladministration, which suggests that impeach-
ment may have been reserved for special cases. The Delaware and -
Maryland provisions for court removal upon misbehavior preclude
an inference that there was total ignorance of judicial forfeiture. If
the writ of scire facias was not expressly mentioned [in the Consti-
tution], it is not the function of a Constitution to detail the relevant
writs.14 2
Ziskind regards the framers' failure to expressly include scire facias as a
rejection of that practice, whereas Berger reaches the opposite conclusion
by interpreting the framers' failure to exclude the practice as an express
acceptahce.143 Although Berger maintains that the framers paid little
attention to the problem of how to remove judges, he insists their few
remarks on the subject indicate that the phrase "during good Behaviour"
grants life tenure to federal judges and provides a method for removal in
addition to impeachment. t" Thus, Ziskind's study is hardly as authori-
tative as Kurland suggests.
Second, both Ziskind's and Kurland's readings of history exclude
one major piece of legislation, the Act of 1790,141 which undermines
their singular view that original intent indicates impeachment was the
exclusive means for removing federal judges. Indeed, almost without ex-
ception, commentators arguing that impeachment is the exclusive means
for removing federal judges fail to discuss the incontrovertible fact that
the First Congress itself rejected any notion that impeachment was in-
tended as the sole means of removing federal judges.146 In the Act of
142. Id. at 145 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 145 n. 104 (noting that "tiln England an Address
was a formal request made by both Houses of Parliament to the King, asking him to perform some
act[, and that by) the Act of Settlement (1700). judges were made removable by the Crown only
upon an Address by both Houses").
143. See id. at 145-47.
144. See id. at 177-80.
145. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (1847). For a discussion of the Act's subsequent
history, see infra note 147.
146. See. e.g.. Broderick, supra note 116, at 205 (arguing that impeachment is the exclusive
means of removal and urging that citizens should become more involved in the political process,
including impeachment); Burbank, supra note 92, at 674-94 (noting that impeachment is the exclu-
sive means of removal of federal judges for misconduct, although not for disability, because of the
need to protect the independence of the judiciary); Catz, Removal of Federal Judges by Imprison-
ment, 18 RuTGERs L.J. 103, 112-14, 118 (1986) (arguing that imprisonment before impeachment is
de facto removal of a judge and is therefore unconstitutional); Fenton. The Scope of the Impeach-
ment Power, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 719, 745-47 (suggesting that impeachment is exclusive and only for
serious crimes); Kurland, supra note 14. at 668, 697-98 (noting that impeachment is exclusive and
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179'), the First Congress provided that upon conviction in federal court
for bribery, a judge shall "forever be disqualified to hold any office." 147
Berger himself relies on this Act as providing the strongest case for the
view that impeachment is.not the exclusive means for removing federaljudges. He argues that:
[s]ince the impeachment clause provides for disqualification uponimpeachment and conviction, the Act is unconstitutional if the
clause indeed provides the "exclusive" method of disqualification.The First Congress will scarcely be charged with misconstruing theConstitution; hence the 1790 statute must be regarded as a con-
struction that the impeachment clause does not constitute the
"only" means for the disqualification of judges. As with "disquali-fication" so with "removal," for the two stand on a par in the im-peachment provision. And the statute also illustrates the familiarproposition that broad dicta . . . respecting a situation notpresented for determination cannot be conclusive when the situa-tion is actually presented. What the First Congress did when ithad to deal with "disqualification" of judges thus speaks against
reliance upon some earlier utterances by a few of its members whenthe removal of judges was not involved.14
It is difficult to understand how Kurland and Ziskind can question the
relevance or authority of the Act of 1790 in light of the fact that interpre-
that any change in the procedure set forth in the Constitution requires a constitutional amendment);Stevens, Reflections on the RemovalofSitting Judges, 13 STETSON L. REv. 215, 215-20 (1984) (not-ing that impeachment of federal judges for high crimes and misdemeanors was the only means ofprotecting judicial independence); Stoltz, supra note 14. at 659-70 (calling impeachment exclusivebut also calling for improvements in the impeachment process); Ziskind, supra note 140, at 147-51(concluding that the framers intended to have the independence of the judiciary limited only throughthe impeachment process); Note, In Defense ofStandard, supra note 12, at 460-63 (arguing that theJudicial Disability Act of 1980 is unconstitutional because it allows the judiciary to strip judges oftheir office by refusing to assign them cases and that imprisonment prior to impeachment stripsjudges of their offices and is, therefore, unconstitutional). But see Ervin, supra note 21, at 114-27(rejecting&rgument of nonexclusivity of impeachment based on the Act of 1790 by noting that theAct was never enforced); Note, Unnecessary and Improper, supra note 21, at 1131 n.86 (rejectingargument of nonexclusivity of impeachment based on the Act of 1790, which provided for disqualifi-cation of judges upon conviction of bribery, because "the issue is removal and not disqualification").147. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9. § 21, I Stat. 112 (1845). Even though, in 1793, the preface tothe statute on crimes of the United States stated that the Act of April 30, 1790, was deemed re-pealed, the statutory language remained the same. In the 1878 codification and revision of theUnited States statutes, the language of the Act of 1790 remained essentially the same as it always hadbeen. but the fine for accepting a bribe was set at three times the amount of the bribe, and imprison-ment was limited to three years. Rev. Stat. § 5501 (2d ed. 1878). In 1909, Congress again amendedthe statute. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 32 1, § 117. 35 Stat. 1109-10 (1909). In 1948 Congress amended18 U.S.C. §§ 201-223 again to make the ine S20,000. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 207. 62 Stat.692-93 (1948). These provisions were amended again in 1962. Act of Oct. 23, 1962, P.L. 87-849, §201(e), 76 Stat. 1119 (1962). The current statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201. applies to all government offi-cials. Today the sanctions for violating the Act include "(ines ofl not more than three times themonetary equivalent of the thing of value, or imprisontment] for not more than fifteen years, or both,and (offenders] may be disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under theUnited States." 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(4) (Supp. V 1987).
148. R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 150 (footnotes omitted).
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tivists as well as the Supreme Court have expressed the view that actions
relating to constitutional decision making by the First Congress-many
of whose members attended the Constitutional Convention or partici-
pated in the ratification campaign-are highly probative of the framers'
intent. 149
Yet, Berger fails to address an important issue raised by the Act of
1790. The Act speaks explicitly only of "disqualification" not of "re-
moval." In light of the rule of interpretation that each and every word of
the Constitution and congressional enactments must be given meaning,
one commentator argues that the Act should not be cited as authority for
the proposition that the Congress provided for both removal and disqual-
ificatioi of federal judges upon their conviction for bribery, because the
Act expressly provides only for disqualification and, thus, says nothing
about whether impeachment is the exclusive means of removing federal
judges.s 0 This commentator argues that, at most, the Act indicates that
impeachment is not the sole means of disqualifying federal judges from
holding future offices.' 5t
What this commentator fails to do, however, is identify the practice
under that statute and the necessary implications of its language. First,
the Act was construed during the time of its operation as both removing
and disqualifying federal judges convicted of bribery. 52 Second, the Act,
which explicitly applies only to sitting federal judges, directs unambigu-
ously that once convicted, they are disqualified from ever holding office
in the future. 1" This directive implies that a federal judge, once con-
victed of bribery, is also necessarily removed from office. Giving mean-
ing to each word of a statute or the Constitution also requires not
interpreting the statute or Constitution to mandate absurd results. If
149. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 724 n.3 (1986) (listing 20 members of the First Con-
gress who were also delegates at the Constitutional Convention); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,790-91 (1983) (holding that legislative chaplaincy does not violate the establishment clause because
the First Congress appointed a chaplain for itself); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276U.S. 394, 411-12 (1928) (holding that the actions of the First Congress support the power of Con-
gress to lay import taxes for the purpose of protecting domestic industry); McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 424 (1819) (upholding the constitutionality of the national bank in partbecause the First Congress had carefully considered the issue prior to creating a national bank). But
see Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803) (holding unconstitutional a portion of
the Judiciary Act of 1789. passed by the First Congress, because it increased the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court beyond what was expressly provided by the Constitution).
150. See Note, Unnecessary and Improper, supra note 21, at 1131 n.86.
151, See id.
152. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 150; see also Note, supra note 10, at 1390, 1396 n.44
(arguing that the Act of 1790 proved impeachment is not the only means of removing federal judges
since disqualification necessarily includes removal). But see Ervin, supra note 21, at 118 & n.43(claiming that impeachment is the exclusive means of removing federal judges and dismissing theAct of 1790 because it was never invoked).
153. See supra note 147.
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someone is disqualified from ever holding office in the future, the plain
implication is that the person may no longer occupy the office presently
held; in short, the person is effectively removed.
B. Problems with Informalist Approacles to Impeachment
1. General Problems with Informalism.-Informalists have two
distinguishing characteristics as a group: (1) rejecting history as the pri-
mary guide to interpreting the impeachment clauses and (2) failing to
suggest any substitute arguably more legitimate or reliable than history
as a guide to interpreting the impeachment clauses.' 54 The one way in
which the informalists resemble the formalists, however, is that neither
group can reach any consensus on how its approach to constitutional
interpretation may be applied to the impeachment clauses.
The ad hoc analysis applied to the impeachment clauses by the in-
formalists has two interrelated problems. First, infolmalists articulate no
guiding or organizing principle for interpreting the impeachment clauses.
Such an approach runs contrary to the notion that constitutional inter-
pretation normally makes sense only if, in those circumstances in which
it must depart from the language or structure of the Constitution, it does
so with reference to something generally recognized or accepted as legiti-
mate or authoritative. As a general matter, theories of constitutional law
are helpful because they make constitutional interpretation predictable
through the systematic use of some guiding or organizing principle.ss
By failing to posit any point of reference other than the non-self-defining
language of the Constitution and by failing to articulate any guiding prin-
ciple for constitutional interpretation, informalists propose no standard
154. See. e.g., 1. BRANT, supra note 22, at 3-23 (selectively relying on history and structural
indications and personal preferences to conclude that impeachment is the only alternative); Fenton,
supra mtte 146, at 745-74 (using historical arguments without explaining their methodological
soundness to conclude that impeachment is the exclusive means of removal); Firmage & Mangrum,
supra note 22, at 1102-08 (applying informal method of analysis to impeachment of the President);
Franklin, supra note 22, at 339-41 (arguing that Berger's formalist approach is flawed); Havighurst,
supra note 10, at 223-37 (applying informalist arguments to support a parliamentary form of govern.
mcini is an alteriiaiive io impeachment); Linde, supra tiote 10. passimn (rejecting historical interpreta-
tion and applying informal arguments to support a joint congressional resolution as an alternative to
the present system of impeachment); Thompson & Polliti, supra note 23, at 118-21 (relying without
explanation on congressional practices to argue that impeachment is an effective tool); Note, supra
note 10, at 1391-407 (arguing that impeachment is ineffective and inefficient); Comment, supra note
10, passim (using informalist arguments to support the proposition that federal judges have the
power to remove other federal judges).
155. See Sandalow, Constitutional interpretation. 79 Micit. L. RtvY. 1033, 1068 (arguing that
constitutional law is "a process by which each generation gives formal expression to the values it
holds fundamental in the operations of government"); Simon. The Authority of the Constitution and
Its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 603, 630-36
(arguing that without normative theories about the source and nature of constitutional authority, we
have no justification for ascribing any particular set of meanings to the Constitution).
or theory by which to judge their own Work. Their studies provide no
helpful guide for making their interpretation of the impeachment clauses
or other constitutional provisions predictable or even understandable.
This lack of an organizing principle to govern their constitutional
interpretation includes a failure to articulate any systematic justification
for their limited use of history or other evidence in their analyses of the
impeachment clauses. Informalists fail to explain how their use-of a
patchwork of historical and other kinds of evidence to explain impeach-
ment, including their choices to give different pieces of evidence different
weight, is any more legitimate than the formalists' strict adherence to
history as a primary guide.'5 6 In addition, when informalists do turn to
history, their reading of history is often either incomplete or incorrect. '
Second, the unarticulated starting point for many informalists is
often the inconvenience of or dissatisfaction with the constitutional pro-
cedure they are analyzing.' 58 The problem with this approach is that, as
the Supreme Court once warned,
[clonvenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives--or the
hallmarks-of democratic government.
... [P]olicy arguments supporting even purposeful "political
inventions" are subject to the demands of the Constitution which
defines powers and . . . sets obt just how those powers are to be
exercised. 59
Part of the unarticulated disagreement between the formalists and
the informalists is the extent to which politics is or should be a part of
constitutional decision making. Informalists proceed as if there is no
problem with incorporating politics, either because of efficiency or con-
156. See. e.g., Havighurst, supra note 10, at 223-37 (arguing for parliamentary government as an
alternative to impeachment without legitimizing informalist arguments); Shartel, supra note 10. at
884-91 (concluding that, despite the fact that jurisdiction to oust federal judges for misconduct or
neglect of duty has never been exercised by any federal court or statutorily conferred by Congress on
any judicial tribunal, the supervisory nature and justiciable character of such a proceeding make it a
logical and necessary extension of the judicial power granted by the Constitution): Note, supra note
10, at 1397-98 (seeking to establish the propriety ofjudicial removal of federal judges by arguing that
such authority is implicit in the notions of due process and separation of powers).
157. See e.g.. Havighurst. supra note 10, at 229-33 (claiming that the framers were most con-
cerned with having a strong executive); Sharel, supra note 10, at 889-909 (arguing that there is no
limit to congressional ability to define what constitutes "good Behaviour"); see also Stevens. supra
note 146, at 215-17 (recounting that prior to the Constitution the King could simply remove any
judges who disagreed with him); Comment, supra note 10, at 1164-90 (stating that presidential re-
moval of impeachable officials violates the congressional power to impeach); cf Stoltz, supra note
14, at 662 (refuting Shartel's reading of the "good Behaviour" clause as a reminder that judges did
not serve simply at the king's pleasure, as they had done before the Act of Settlement in 1700).
I158. See, e.g.. Havighurst, supra note 10. at 224-29 (discussing the political difficulty of impeach.
ment); Linde, supra note 10, at 384 (discussing the difficulty of proof as a barrier to impeachment).
159. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919. 944 (1983); see also Note, Unnecessary and Improper, supra
note 21, at 1141 (applying the Court's admonition against convenience to the congressional short-cut
procedure for impeaching federal judges).
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veniencd, into their analysis of constitutional law. Formalists, on the
other hand, want to limit the role that politics may play in constitutional
decision making. Formalists implicitly view constitutional law as tran-
scending politics, which they understand as petty, self-serving, and, ulti-
mately, an illegitimate guide to constitutional interpretation.
Both the informalists and the formalists fail to recognize that consti-
tutional law is itself a peculiar form of politics. The Constitution is,
above all else, a political document that reflects the political choices the
framers elevated to the status of law. Contemporary debates about the
meaning of the Constitution are conducted, as they always have been, in
and through the political process. It is naive to separate politics artifi-
cially from constitutional law. As Justice Frankfurter observed, consti-
tutional law is not at all a science, but "applied politics, using the word in
its noblest sense."t1o Neither the informalists nor the formalists attempt
to answer the critical question: Where does constitutional mandate end
and political judgment begin?
No fine line exists between constitutional mandate and politics, pre-
cisely because constitutional law derives from and is shaped and in-
formed by politics, as that term is broadly understood. Certain
constitutional provisions blend the constitutional and the political more
clearly than others, and the impeachment clauses may be the clearest
example of a constitutional procedure structured to accommodate polit-
ical dialogue. Even though informalists may accept this proposition,
they fail to acknowledge that they are incorporating politics in the form
of either convenience or efficiency into their constitutional interpreta-
tions. Formalists may reject informalist interpretations because they
view convenience as hiving no relevance to or value in making determi-
nations of constitutionality, or they may reject convenience merely as an
unseemly basis for constitutional decision making. In other words, for-
malists may view as illegitimate the inclusion of anything smacking of the
political as a guide to constitutional interpretation. Formalists fail to un-
derstand, however, that convenience is not the equivalent of illegitimacy;
convenience is simply a less authoritative (less persuasive) basis for con-
stitutional decision making, a process that formalist political decision
inakers, including judges, prefer to ground in something that appears
more noble of more ennobling.161
This debate over convenience or something grander as a guide to
constitutional interpretation is central to constitutional law, because con-
160. Bickel, Applied Politics and the Science ofLaw: Writings of the Harvard Period, in FELIX
FRANKFURTER: A TRIBUTE 164. 166 (W. Mendelson ed. 1964).
16' See infra note 166.
stitutional interpretation frequently requires commentators to go beyond
the language, structure, or history of the Constitution to give meaning to
or to explain a particular constitutional issue.'6 1 Indeed, theory eiters
the picture at this juncture. Constitutional theory is most useful as a
guide to understanding a constitutional question not readily answered by
the language, structure, or history of the Constitution.
Modern theories of constitutional interpretation suffer, however,
from a variety of problems, including their implicit reinforcement of the
values or biases of the theorists employing them and the natural elusive-
ness and difficult interpretative problems of the Constitution's history
and language.163 Thecries are desirable because most provisions of the
Constitution are not self-defining; they require the interpreter to look
beyond the language of the Constitution for the key to their particular
meaning.'" Theories are also desirable because they impose limitations
on and provide guidance to both judges and legislatures in construing the
Constitution.' 6 5 Such uses of theory, however, are inevitably linked to
certain theorists' desires for constitutional interpretation to move in di-
rections dependent on the theorists' undisclosed political or personal
preferences.
Ultimately, the real test of the legitimacy and effectiveness of a the-
ory of constitutional interpretation is the degree to which it is method-
ologically sound and coherent. A viable theory must also be compatible
with the constitutional provisions to which it is applied. In addition, the
theory must be faithful to what society regards as legitimate and control-
ling, including the language, structure, purposes, and history of the Con-
stitution, as well as to public values for which there is general societal
consensus.'66
162. See Simon, supro note 155, at 603-04 (noting that although for some constitutional provi-
sions the meaning is clear, for others "the language . . . is so vague, ambiguous, and open-tcxtured
that they might be understood to mean almost anything").
163. See generally M. TUSHNET, supra note 18, at 179-80. 313 (discussing general problems with
liberal theories of constitutional law).
164. See supra note 162; see also George & Porth, Trimming the Ivy: A Bicentennial Re-Exami.
nation ofthe Establishment Clause. 90 W. VA. L. REv. 109, 120 (1987) (recognizing that "the mean-
ings of various elements of the Constitution are not immediately plain and that. . . courts arc
required to make authoritative choices").
165. See George & Porth, supra note 164 (noting that "certain constitutional theories usefully
guide the choice and action of the constitutional interpreter").
166. See Fiss, supra note 20, at 10-13 (conceiving of the judicial function as an attempt to reveal
or elaborate the meaning of constitutional values through the dialogue of adjudication); Michelman.
supra note 19, at 18-19 (characterizing proponents of republicanism as favoring participatory politics
wherein "civic virtue" develops from citizen dialogue in pursuit of values that should control public
and private life); Michelman, supra note 18, at 509 (regarding politics as an indispensable process by
which social beings choose the terms of coexistence-both the rules of social cooperation and the
"moral ambience" of the social world); Monaghan. Third Party Standing, 84 COLum. L. REV. 277,
279-80 (1984) (observing that "the process of constitutional adjudication now operates as one in
34
Texas Law Review
35
Vol. 68:1, 1989 Impeachment and Its Alternatives
Constitutional theories are nothing more than points of reference
that theorists use to resolve ambiguities, gaps, or conflicts in constitu-
tional language or history. The legitimacy of these points of reference,
however, ultimately depends on the degree to which they are themselves
derived from other legititilate points of reference.' 6' While legitimacy
may be a malleable concept, dependent more often than not on the pref-
erences and values of the decision maker, it may nevertheless be reflected
for the purposes of constitutional law either in the values or freedoms
protected by the Constitution or in the public values defining a
community.' 68
2 Specific Problems with Informalism.-A critical analysis of spe-
cific informalist attempts to interpret the impeachment clauses illustrates
the problems of informalism. For example, Irving Brant, an informalist,
rejects 'the history of impeachment in England and original intent as
guides to defining impeachable offenses and to determining the permissi-
bility of judicial review of impeachments.169 Brant construes the phrase
"high crimes and misdemeanors" as making criminality a requirement
for an impeachable offense, but concludes, somewhat confusingly, that
indictable offenses as well as violations of the oath of office constitute
impeachable offenses.o
Brant's reading of "high crimes and misdemeanors" is problematic
for three reasons. First, making the oath of office a standard limiting
impeachable conduct is an invention out of whole cloth. There simply is
which courts discharge a special function: declaring and enforcing public norms"); Seidman, PublicPrinciple and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006. 1007 (1987) (commenting that "instead ofoffering reconciliation, constitu-
tional law allows us to live with contradiction by establishing a shifting, uncertain, and contestedboundary between distinct public and private spheres within which conflicting values can be sepa-
rately nujtred"); Sunstein. Public Values. Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982Sup. Cr.' Rsv. 127, 165 (concluding that, according to the Supreme Court, the equal protection
clause aiins at the evil of classifying groups of people for disparate treatment without a view topromoting a public value).
167. See Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Mo. L. REV. 363, 581 (1982)(arguing that the pervasive presence of "gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities" in contract and tort law
enable practitioners and judges to manipulate those areas according to personal, political, or eco-
nomic preference). As Professor Kennedy well knows, the presence of "gaps, conflicts, and ambigui-
tics" is not restricted to contract and tort law, but extends throughout other areas of law, including
constitutional law, whose "gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities" practitioners, judges, and commentators
may manipulate to further their own personal or political preferences. The critical point is that in
constitutional law the "gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities" should be resolved in terms of public values.See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 166; see also Sandalow, supra note 155, at 1054-55 (remarking that constitu-
tional law "emerges not as exegesis, but as a process by which each generation gives formal expres-
sion to the values it holds fundamental in the operations of government").
169. See I. BRANT, supra note 22, at 21-23.
170. See id. at 180-81.
no support in the structure, language, or history of the impeachment
clauses for Brant's inclusion of violations of oaths as impeachable of-
fenses. Like Berger, Brant is concerned that a broad definition of im-
peachable offenses would enable Congress to abuse the impeachment
process to invade judicial independence. Consequently, Brant substitutes
his own partisan preferences for a narrow range of impeachable offenses
instead of interpreting the impeachment clauses. In addition, the- lan-
guage of the oath taken by the civil officers of the United States is so
broad that "limiting" impeachable offenses to violations of the oath
neither clarifies nor effectively narrows the range of impeachable
offenses.' 7'
Second, the language in the Constitution regarding impeachable of-
fenses is not as clear as Brant believes. Based on the language setting
forth the impeachment procedure, Berger rejects Brant's inference that
the Constitution makes impeachment a criminal process. 72 Unlike
Brant, Berger acknowledges that only some of the impeachment proce-
dure set forth in the Constitution resembles actual criminal process. For
example, the absence of criminal penalties as punishment for impeach-
ment undermines Brant's assertion that impeachment is essentially a
criminal procedure. 73
Third, Brant ignores a great deal of relevant history, particularly
when it undermines his view of impeachment. Brant bases his under-
standing of the scope of impeachable offenses solely on the structure of
the Constitution. In doing so, Brant not only summarily rejects the Eng-
lish precedents but also ignores the colonial experiences with impeach-
ment, the Constitutional Convention, and the ratification campaign." 4
For example, Brant agrees with Berger that impeachment was a criminal
process in England, yet ignores the fact that in England people could be
impeached for noncriminal acts. Although Brant rejects the history of
171. See id. at 181 (Brant asked, with respect to identifying possible violations of oath of office,
"what is 'serious dereliction from public duty' unconnected with office, as presented in (Congress-
man] Ford's concept? It is anything that can be conjured up, imagined, or falsely charged, or any-
thing that conflicts with prevailing ideas of decorum.").
172. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 78*85.
173. See. e.g., U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6-7 (referring to the ability of the Senate "to try"
impeachments and that "no Person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the
Members present"); id. at art. II. § 2. cl. I (providing that the President shall have the power to
pardon except in the case of impeachment); id. at art. II, § 4 (providing that "the President, Vice
President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment
for, and Conviction of Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors"); id. at art. Ill,
§ 2. cl. 3 (referring to "[t]he trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachments"). Brant argues
that the Constitution's repeated use of words most often used in the criminal context to describe or
to refer to impeachment indicates that impeachment was intended to be used only for criminal of-
fenses. See t. BRANT, supra note 22, at 23.
174. I. BRANT, supra note 22, at 11-13; see also Book Note. supra note 116, at 916.
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impeachment in England as a relevant or meaningful inquiry, he substi-
tutesnothing for it other than his own personal preference to protect the
federal judiciary by "criminalizing" impeachable offenses.
Brant fails to acknowledge even the critical historical fact that, dur-
ing the Constitutional Convention and the ratification campaign, the
framers did not limit their comments regarding acts they considered im-
peachable to acts that would have been criminal under existing stat-
utes.' Brant's preference for characterizing impeachment proceedings
as criminal can be traced not to history or even to the language or struc-
ture of the impeachment clauses in the Constitution but rather to Brant's
personal concern that the federal judiciary needs heightened protection
against the possibility that Congress may overzealously exercise the im-
peachment process against federal judges.176 That the Constitution's im-
peachment process has only some characteristics resembling criminal
trials and that the delegates at the Constitutional Convention cited non-
criminal examples as impeachable offenses plainly suggest that impeach-
ment is not strictly a criminal proceeding. Instead, it is a unique hybrid
of civil and criminal proceedings for use against certain political officials.
Brant's analysis of the propriety of the judicial review of impeach-
ment fares no better than his reading of "high crimes and misdemean-
ors." His primary argument for judicial review of impeachment is that of
the defenders of President Andrew Johnson during his impeachment:
when impeachment exceeds its constitutional bounds, it becomes a bill of
attainder 77 and at that point, just as with a bill of attainder, it should be
subject to judicial nullification.' 78 This analysis has two flaws. First,
Brant's characterization of an unconstitutional impeachment as a bill of
attainder confuses the natures of the two procedures. Bills of attainder
are enactments by a legislature passed for the purpose of punishing one
individual;" they are expressly prohibited because they deprive the tar-
get of a fair hearing.s 0 By their nature, impeachments are directed only
175. See notes 44-50 and accompanying text. Further, Madison indicated that the President
would render himself impeachable if he summoned only a few Senators to ratify a treaty. See R.BERGER, supra note 14, at 89. Moreover, bribery, a specifically enumerated impeachable offense,
was not made a statutory offense until 1790, two years after the Constitution's ratification. See id. at76 n. 118 (citing Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 21, 1 Stat. 112 (1845)).
176. Brant feared that the judiciary may be subject to legislative tyranny through congressionalpower to impeach. See I. BRANT, supra note 22. at 11-23. He also feared congressional attempts topass bills of attainder under the guise of impeachment. See id. at 188-200; infra notes 177-78.
177. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 provides that "No bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shallbe passed."
178. See I. BRANT. supra note 22. at 133-54. 181-200; see also U.S. CoNsT. art. 1. § 9, cl. 3.
179. See United States v. Lovett. 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946) (noting that bills of attainder apply
either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group).
180. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442, 445 (1965); Lovett, 328 U.S. at 315.
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at a certain class of individuals and have only some of the characteristics
of trials. The fact that an impeachment may exceed its constitutional
boundaries does not, by itself, transform it into a bill of attainder. Once
an impeachment exceeds its bounds, it becomes neither more nor less
than an unconstitutional impeachment. Second, Brant confuses the de-
termination of constitutionality with the determination of reviewability.
The Constitution sets forth impeachment as a political procedure for re-
moving certain federal officials. Although impeachment has its constitu-
tional boundaries, it is a mistake to assume that any movement beyond
those boundaries transforms impeachment into a judicially reviewable
question of political decision making.
Former Representative Frank Thompson and Professor Dan Pollitt,
also informalists, rely exclusively on congressional practices to define im-
peachable offenses. 8' They argue that only indictable offenses constitute
impeachable offenses, basing their conclusion solely on the observation
that, as of the date of their study, the only examples of successful im-
peachment and removal' from federal office involved indictable of-
fenses.18 2  Thompson and Pollitt never explain why congressional
practices should dominate our understanding of impeachable offenses,
even though their methodology is at least consistent with the view once
espoused by Justice Brandeis that a "persistent legislative practice which
involves a delimitation of the respective powers of Congress and the Pres-
ident, and which has been so established and maintained, should be
deemed tantamount to judicial construction, in the absence of any deci-
sion by any court to the contrary."' 83
Accepting past congressional practice as authoritative is problem-
atic because there is no sound reason to equate what Congress consist-
ently does with what is constitutional. Simply because Congress
consistently does something does not, in and of itself, mean that the prac-
tice is constitutional. Thompson and Pollitt fail to understand that the
most past congressional impeachment practices indicate is that it is easier
to obtain a conviction from the Senate in a removal trial if the offense
was indictable. The recent impeachment proceedings against Judge Al-
cee Hastings confirm that it is easier to impeach a person for committing
an indictable offense even though he has been acquitted of the underlying
crime for which the impeachment has been brought. 84
181. See Thompson & Pollitt, supra note 23, at 107-08. 117-18.
182. See id. at 106, 117-18.
183. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 283 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing United
States v. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459, 469 (1915)).
184. Interestingly, the House overwhelmingly voted to impeach Judge Hastings for conduct un-
derlying the misconduct for which he was previously acquitted in federal court. Although Judge
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Professors Edwin Firmage and R. Collin Mangrum are also in-
formalists who propose applying general notions of due process to im-
peachment trials.taa Even though they acknowledge that the fifth
amendment's guarantee of due process applies only to court and agency
adjudications, Firmage and Mangrum argue that a general notion of due
process inherent in the American system of justice should pervade all
trial-like proceedings, including impeachments." These commentators
undoubtedly want fairness to be part of an impeachment proceeding, but
they lack any constitutional authorization for its inclusion. Although the
Constitution does require that Senators participate in impeachment pro-
ceedings only upon "oath or affirmation," 87 this provision requires at
most that individual Senators be prepared to deliberate carefully during
an impeachment trial. The "oath or affirmation" requirement is a safe-
guard included in the Constitution to encourage Senators to take removal
proceedings seriously and to prevent the Senate from acting hastily or
intemperately.' 88 Careful consideration of an issue is an element of fair-
ness, but it is not the sole component.
Although Firmage and Mangrum acknowledge that impeachments
are essentially political proceedings with few constitutional constraints,
they fail to confine their own constitutional interpretation within these
constraints.' t 9 They fail to understand that while the Constitution does
not require fairness to be part of impeachment proceedings, prudent poli-
tics cautions Senators to conduct impeachments as fairly as possible. In-
deed, the Senate's accountability to the people (through the seventeenth
amendment' 90 ) constrains the Senate, as a matter of politics but not con-
Hastings argued that general notions of fairness should have led the House and the Senate to give
some deference to the jury's decision not to convict him on some of the same evidence presented
against him during his impeachment proceedings, the Senate appointed a special trial committee to
receive evidence pertaining to Judge Hastings' removal and consider any evidence it deemed relevant
to the charges against Judge Hastings in his removal proceedings. See Edwards, Regulating Judicial
Misconduct and Divining "Good Behavior"for Federal Judges, 87 Micti. L. Rev. 765. 768-69 (1989)
(noting that "Hastings was impeached by the House of Representatives on seventeen articles of
impeachment, covering, among other things, the bribery and perjury charges of which he was acquit-
ted in 1983").
185. See Firmage & Mangrum, supra note 22. at 1073, 1076.
186. See id. at 1073-75.
187. "The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that
Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation." U.S. CoNsT. art. I. § 3, cl. 6.
188. See Rotunda, supra note 13, at 730.
189. See Firmage & Mangrum, supra note 22, at 1051 (acknowledging that "[oln balance ...
American precedent reflects the basic understanding that the impeachment process is fundamentally
political").
190. The seventeenth amendment provides in pertinent part that "(tlhe Senate of the United
States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six
years. . . ." U.S. CONsT., amend. XVl, cl. 1. Prior to the enactment of the seventeenth amendment,
Senators were selected by their respective state legislatures.
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stitutional law, to make impeachment proceedings as fair as possible.
C. Beyond Formalism and Informalism
Very few constitutional interpretation cases are easy,' 9' and many
fear that unprincipled constitutional interpretation-particularly by
courts-leads to unprincipled results. The central problem with consti-
tutional interpretation is a need for systematic approaches, which are not
themselves inherently flawed or politically motivated.'9 2 The impeach-
ment clauses, however, make systematic analysis difficult. The first step
in sound analysis is to identify the particular characteristics that make a
certain constitutional provision difficult to interpret and apply. For ex-
ample, the constitutional provision designating impeachable offenses as
including "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" 193 is not self-defining,
nor does it indisputably invoke, imply, or trigger any contemporary con-
cepts. The delegates at the Constitutional Convention debated the inclu-
sion of this phrase in the Constitution but failed to categorize the offenses
that it would include. Only after isolating those characteristics making
interpretation of a particular provision difficult is it appropriate to assess
the compatibility of that provision with a particular theory of constitu-
tional law.
A useful goal is to find a middle ground between historical and ad
hoc interpretation of the impeachment clauses. A more sensible and less
manipulative approach to impeachment than either formalism or in-
formalism consists of three steps: (1) identifying the linguistic and his-
torical limits of the impeachment clauses, (2) understanding how the
Constitution may accommodate innovations and deviations from the al-
location of powers within the Constitution, and (3) understanding what
the interpretation of the impeachment clauses suggests about constitu-
tional interpretation in general.
The first step in interpreting the impeachment clauses is to identify
the limits of what logically defines the contexts of those clauses-lan-
guage and history. Unfortunately, the Constitution offers very few self-
191. Compare M. TUSHNET, sUpra note 18, at 52-56, 68-69 (on the difficulty of avoiding judicial
over-involvement) with Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. Rev. 399, 408-10, 427 (1985) (on distin-
guishing hard and easy cases).
192. Professor Tushnet argues that:
the liberal tradition makes constitutional theory both necessary and impossible. It is neces-
sary because it provides the restraints that the liberal tradition requires us to place on those
in power, legislators and judges as well. It is impossible because no available approach to
constitutional law can effectively restrain both legislators and judges: It we restrain the
judges we leave legislators unconstrained; if we restrain the legislators we let the judges do
what they want.
M. TUSHNET, supra note 18, at 313.
193. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
41
Texas Law Review
Impeachment and Its Alternatives
Texas Law Review
defining clauses. The language in the Constitution often raises but fails
t.' answer questions about the scope of a provision.' 9 4  Consequently,
commentators frequently face the formidable task of resolving ambigui-
ties, gaps, or conflicts in constitutional language or structure.'95 Com-
mentators may not be confined by particular constitutional language, but
they are confined to the language. For example, interpreting the consti-
tutional language "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" requires look-
ing outside the Constitution itself for definition, but that search is limited
to the clarification of those particular terms. To identify which concepts
are consistent or compatible with particular constitutional language,
commentators may turn to history, which, within certain limits, provides
a perspective to aid in understanding constitutional provisions-such as
the impeachment clauses-that do not explain themselves to the modern
commentator. Although the meaning of "other high Crimes and Misde-
meanors" is not readily apparent, history helps provide a frame of refer-
ence that gives the phrase meaning. The goal is to use history not as an
end in itself but only as an additional guide in the search for the meaning
of an ambiguous constitutional provision.
The first step also requires identifying the limits to our knowledge of
t e meaning of the impeachment clauses. On the one hand, certain as-
pects of impeachment are beyond reasonable dispute. For example, the
language of the impeachment clauses suggests that impeachment is a hy-
brid of both civil and criminal proceedings: the House and the Senate
have separate responsibilities regarding impeachment, there are unique
punishments for impeachments, only certain officials in the federal gov-
ernment are impeachable, and there is a set of offenses that are not self-
defining but may nevertheless serve as the bases for impeachments. In
addition, it is undisputed that the First Congress sought to automatically
disqualify, through the Act of 1790, any federal judges convicted of brib-
ery.. Such an enactment suggests that at least under certain circum-
194. See, e.g., id. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2 ("No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have
attained to the Age of twenty-live Years. and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and
who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen."); id. art. 1,
§ 3, cl. 3 ("No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and
been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of
that State for which he shall be chosen."); id. art. II, § I1, cl. I ("[The President) shall hold his Office
during the Term of four Years .... "). But see id. art. IV, § 2, cl. I ("The Citizens of each State shall
be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of citizens in the several States."); id. art. I. § g, cl. 18
("The Congress shall have Power [:] . . . To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."). Compare M.
TusNtivr, supra note 18, at 68-69 (on the defects of textualisni) with Schauer.supra note 191. at 408.
10 (on finding an "easy case").
195. See supro note 167.
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stances'96 the First Congress did not regard impeachment as the sole
means of removing federal judges. It is also largely undisputed that Con-
stitutional Convention delegates, primarily concerned with removal of
the President through impeachment as opposed to removal of any other
officers of the United States, proceeded as if impeachable offenses were
not limited to indictable offenses. Further, the delegates regarded the
Senate as the appropriate body to conduct removal trials because of its
purportedly unique capabilities to appreciate the political implications of
impeachments and to deliberate carefully on important political issues.
On the other hand, the impeachmeit clauses virtually defy system-
atic analysis, because the framers designed impeachment primarily as a
political proceeding but did not address all the issues now raised under
these clauses. Neither the delegates at the Constitutional Convention nor
th-ratifiers definitively addressed whether impeachment is the exclusive
means of removing federal judges, which specific procedures should be
followed during impeachment hearings and trials, whether nonindictable
offenses should be included as impeachable offenses, whether impeach-
ments of federal judges must precede their prosecutions and imprison-
ment, and whether an official may be impeached even after resignation
from office. The interpretive problem that remains is to determine what
to do once language and history have been exhausted or demonstrated as
inconclusive.
The second step in interpreting the impeachment clauses is to under-
stand how the Constitution may accommodate innovations to or devia-
tions from the Constitution's allocation of powers. This step consists of
two parts. First, commentators should identify those aspects of our con-
stitutional separation of powers scheme that are immutable in the ab-
sence of constitutional amendments. Second, commentators should
define and explain how the three branches of government may deal with
the mutable aspects of separation of powers.
In defining the immutable aspects of separation of powers, one
should remember that separation of powers is a subset of checks and
balances, a system that limits the three branches to their assigned respon-
sibilities so that no branch may grow too powerful or infringe on individ-
ual liberties.'97 The actual scheme of checks and balances in the
196. It may be constitutional for Congress to combine its powers under the necessary and proper
clause and the impeachment clauses to disqualify federal judges once they have been convicted of
bribery. See R. BERGER. supra note 14, at 150-53.
197. See. e.g., Ervin, supro note 21, at 13-19 (claiming that the essence of the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers is a part of the framers' plan for balanced government); Shartel, supra note 10. at 893-
94 (arguing that the framers intended impeachment to be a legislative check on other branches of the
government).
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Constitution, however, is incomplete. History reveals that the framers
defined the checks and balances for each branch of government only at
its apex. The framers left the task of structuring the lower parts of
branches to subsequent generations because they understood that the de-
-nands on government would change over time and realized that an im-
mutable structure of government from top to bottom would hinder
progress. 198
Any deviations from the immutable allocation of powers within the
Constitution are plainly unconstitutional. Not surprisingly, the major
debates in separation of powers cases are over the scope of the so-called
immutable allocation of powers within the Constitution.99 The three
branches may, however, tinker with the mutable aspects of separation of
powers. Any deviations from the Constitution's mutable allocation of
power are not unconstitutional per se; they do, however, raise the ques-
tion whether they should be treated with a presumption of constitutional-
ity by the other branches.
Congressional innovation with constitutionally mutable allocation
of power is not boundless, because innovation may still violate values or
principles that the original allocation of powers was structured to protect
and preserve. For example, assuming arguendo that impeachment is not
the sole constitutional means for removing federal judges, any other
means for such removal must still preserve both individual and collective
198. See Koukoutchos. Constitutional Kinetics: The Independent Counsel Case and the Separa.
tion ofPowers, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 635, 666-67 (1988).
199. When the Supreme Court finds that the Constitution forbids an encroachment by onebranch on the powers of another, it does not hesitate to forbid the encroachment. See. e.g.. Bowsher
v. Synar. 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986) (holding that Congress could not hold the power of removal
except by impeachment over an officer exercising purely executive functions); INS v. Chadha, 462U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding that Congress violated the presentment and veto clauses of the Consti.tution in enacting a one house veto over the decision of an executive officer); Northern PipelineConstr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76 (1982) (holding that Congress could not
assign article III powers in the Bankruptcy Act to judges who did not have life tenure and protection
against salry diminution); Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. I. 143 (1976) (holding that Congress violatedthe appointments clause when it retained the power to appoint members of the Federal ElectionCommission); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (holding that Congress could not
condition the removal of a purely executive officer without violating the appointments clause).However, when actions are not specifically forbidden in the Constitution or do not impinge upon the
ability of a branch to carry out its constitutionally assigned functions, the Court will uphold the
constitutionality of the action. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ci. 2597, 2611 (1988) (holdingthat Congress could delegate appointment of an independent counsel to the judiciary since the coun-sel as a minor official and the removal pow er remained to a significati degree within the executivebranch, thereby not seriously impinging upon the power or the President to carry out his constitu-tionally assigned functions); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974) (holding that thePresident could not claim executive privilege over nonmilitary and nondiplomatic documents with-
out impinging upon the powers of the judiciary under article Ill and criminal defendants under the
sixth amendment); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626 (1935) (holding that Con-gress tuld place conditions on the removal power of the President when the officer performedquasi-egislative and quasi-judicial functions).
judicial independence-the goals of the constitutional guarantees of life
tenure and undiminished compensation for federal judges.20 Conse-
quently, congressional innovations with the Constitution's mutable allo-
cation of powers should be entitled to a presumption of constitutionality.
This presumption may be rebutted only when the congressional deviation
from the mutable checks and balances contravenes values or principles
that the original structure was erected to protect.20 This approach al-
lows for deference by the President and the judiciary to the constitutional
interpretations of Congress and for experimentation in government pre-
cisely where the innovation does not undermine values or principles that
the original checks and balances were erected to protect. A rebuttable
presumption of constitutionality avoids constitutional inertia by prevent-
ing the structure at the top from blinding constitutional interpretation to
the realities of government and to the possibilities of change not envi-
sioned or addressed by the framers but still consistent with their handi-
work. Finally, the presumption avoids unbounded congressional
deviations by delineating the outer limits of permissible tinkering with
the structure of government short of the amendment process.
The third step in interpreting the impeachment clauses is to under-
stand what, if anything, such interpretation suggests about constitutional
interpretation in general. Interpreting the impeachment clauses demon-
strates the limits of superimposing certain theories on particular constitu-
tional provisions. Common sense suggests that before manipulating a
particular constitutional provision to fit a particular theory of constitu-
tional interpretation, it is better first to assess whether a particular con-
stitutional provision is compatible with any preexisting theory of
constitutional interpretation. If a theory does not fit or cannot explain
the nuances of a particular constitutional provision, then that theory
should not be used to explain that particular provision. Commentators
should interpret each constitutional provision on its own terms, recogniz-
ing the provision's particular historical and structural contexts. Such
contextual interpretation requires the use of different techniques to inter-
pret different constitutional provisions.202 Although this methodology
200. See infra notes 274-91 and accompanying text.
201. See generally Strauss. Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Ques-
tions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488. 492, 499 (1987) (focusing on the overall
framework of relationships between branches of govcrnment, rather than on particular relationships,
because administrative agencies perform all three constitutional functions); Strauss. The Place of
Agencies in Government, Separation ofPowers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUm. L. REV. 573, 667
(1984) (same).
202. See, e.g.. C. BLACK. DECiSioN ACCORDING TO LAw 65-66, 71-76 (1981) (arguing that
originalism will work for first amendment analysis but that something more is needed for privacy
and gender discrimination); J. ELY, supra note 100, at 76 (arguing that "interpretivism is iicomplete:
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will not make constitutional interpretation as predictable or as easy as it
is under a theory attempting to organize the entirety of constitutional
law, the virtue of this approach is that it reduces the possibilities of dis-
tortion or manipulation through constitutional interpretation by treating
constitutional provisions on ,their own 'terms as opposed to the terms of
an unrelated or inappropriate theory. Thus, the important thing to ask
with respect to each provision of the Constitution, including the im-
peachment clauses, is whether there is an appropriate guiding principle
for its particular interpretation.
IV. Making Sense of Impeachment
A. The Nonexclusive Nature of Impeachment as a Means of Removal
Perhaps the single most troublesome question under the impeach-
ment clauses is whether impeachment is the exclusive means for remov-
ing "all Civil Officers of the United States," 203 including federal judges.
This question raises a series of interrelated problems. First, which fed-
eral officials may be impeached? While it is clear that the constitutional
provision that "all Civil Officers of the United States" includes the Presi-
dent and federal judges, commentators split on whether this provision
also includes legislators. 204
The second problem is to determine the extent to which other
branches' powers to discipline and remove their members should influ-
ence whether the judiciary should be able to discipline and remove its
own members. To answer this question, one must determine whether the
basis for allowing the other branches to discipline and remove their of-
ficers is equally applicable to the judiciary. This inquiry should help to
illuminate the constitutionally permissible ways for removing impeacha-
there are provisions in the Constitution that call for more"); Shiffrin, The First Amendment and
Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REV.
1212, 1251-53 (1984) (defending balancing methodology in first amendment cases); Shiffrin. Liber-
alism. Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1103, 1211 (1983) (arguing that the
"wisdom" of judicial balancing requires that legal scholars expose complexity and "clarify intu-
itions" in advocating accommodation of diverse values). But see M. TUSHNET, supra note 19, at
182-87 (criticizing balancing as failing to restrain judicial tyranny, as providing no criteria by which
to evaluate judicial decisions, and as allowing the worst political decisions to be validated).
203. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
204. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 215 n.10, 220-23 (arguing that legislators may be
impeached but not for their legislative acts); Rotunda, supra note 13, at 715-16 (arguing that the
term "all civil Officers" excludes only military officers and, therefore, that "judges. . . . legislators
and all executive officials, whether in 'the highest or in the lowest departments' of the national
government, are subject to impeachments" (quoting J. STORY, supra note 72, § 402, at 285-86)). But
see L. TRIBE, supro note 13, at 290 (concluding without any supporting citation that members of
Congress are not civil officers of the United States).
ble officials, particularly with respect to the exclusivity of impeachment
as a means of removing federal judges.
Interestingly, the judiciary has the least power of any of the three
branches to discipline and remove its own members. 20 The Constitution
expressly grants Congress the power to expel its own members.206
Although the Constitution provides for impeachment and removal of
certain federal officials by Congress, there is little doubt that officers
without life tenure may be removed in other ways. For example, under
the doctrine of Myers v. United States207 and Humphrey's Executor v.
United States,20s the President, incident to his power to appoint and to
his constitutional duty to faithfully execute' the laws, may remove
subordinate officers who perform executive functions and who are also
subject to impeachment. Other executive or quasi-executive officers who
are not appointed[by the President are removable by the person or
agency 20s entrusted with their appointment, subject to the regulations of
Congress.210
The third problem is whether any deviation from the Constitution's
explicit procedure for removing federal judges by impeachment violates
the principles or values the procedure was erected to protect. This prob-
lem underscores the system of checks and balances as the context for
discussions regarding removal of federal judges. To evaluate the permis-
sibility of deviation, one must understand how the allocation of removal
power within and between certain branches relates to the protections that
the allocation was intended or structured to achieve. The constitutional
allocation of removal power is a critical element of the structural rela-
tionships established by the Constitution to protect certain values or
functions; therefore, any deviation from the structure erected by the Con-
stitution, including a deviation in the removal power, implicates what the
structure was designed to protect.
The fourth problem is explaining the proper relationship between
205. See Note, The Exclusiveness of the Impeachment Power Under the Constitution, 51 HARV.
L. REV. 330, 332 (1937).
206. "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disor-
derly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member." U.S. CoNST. art. 1, § 5.
cl. 2.
207. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
208. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
209.
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme
Court, and all other Oncers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law.
U.S. CoNsT. art. II, 2, cl. 2.
210. See Hlumphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. 602, 629; Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 425 (1901);
United States v. Perkins. 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886).
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the constitutional provisions governing the impeachment process and the
constitutional clause concerning judges' good behavior.21 The question
is whether the provision that federal judges "shall hold their Offices dur-
ing good Behaviour"2t2 merely defines the length of their tenure or cre-
ates an additional basis for removal. Analyzing the good behavior clause
also leads to an evaluation of the constitutionality of the Judicial Disabil-
ity Act, which empowers judges to monitor other judges for possible im-
peachable offenses and, thereby, raises questions about whether such
innovations in the impeachment procedure violate separation of powers.
If impeachment is the exclusive means for removing federal judges,
then a fifth problem arises: whether indictment, prosecution, and impris-
onment of sitting federal judges may precede an impeachment, even
though such practices may be tantamount to removal. This problem re-
quires determining whether federal judges are entitled to special immu-
nity from criminal prosecution unless and until they are removed from
office by impeachment.
1. The Limits of Analogizing Legislative and Executive Removal
Power to Judicial Removal Power.-In determining whether impeach-
ment is the exclusive means for removing federal judges, one must first
understand whether impeachment serves different purposes, depending
upon the officials against whom the power is exercised. The first step in
this analysis is to determine which officials are subject to impeachment.
The major difficulty presented by the constitutional provision making
"all Civil Officers of the United States" subject to impeachment is
whether it includes legislators as well as the President and all federal
judges. This interpretive problem, however, rarely receives serious atten-
tion from scholars. For example, Professor Ronald Rotunda relies on an
isnexplained citation to Justice Story to support his otherwise bald asser-
tion that all executive officials, federal judges, and legislators are im-
peachable, 2t 3 whereas Professor Laurence Tribe makes the contrary
assertion without any explanation or support.2t4
Three clauses of the Constitution suggest that legislators are not of-
ficers of the United States and are, therefore, not subject to removal by
211. See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1.
212. Id.
213. See Rotunda, supra note 13. at 716 & nn.39 -40 (suggesting that only military officers are
excluded from the term "civil officers" and, therefore, that legislators may also be impeached (citing
J. STORY, supra note 72)); see also R. BERGER, Supra note 14, at 215 n.10 (suggesting that the use of
"civil Office" in article 1, section 6 was intended not to exclude members of Congress from the scope
of that phrase but to draw a line that would bar members of other governmental branches from
membership in Congress).
214. See L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 290.
impeachment. First, article II, section 3 provides that the President is to
commission "all the officers"; and members of Congress are obviously
not so commissioned. 215 Second, article I, section 6-the incompatibility
clause-provides that "no Person holding any Office under the United
States, shall also be a Member of either House during his Continuance in
Office." 2 16 This clause suggests that legislators and officers of the United
States are mutually exclusive for constitutional purposes. Third, article
I, section 5 provides that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elec-
tions, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members .... Each House
may . . . punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the
Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member."217 It would have been il-
logical for the framers to have given Congress two separate methods to
expel its own members.218 Therefore, the expulsion power given to Con-
gress seems to be the congressional analogue to impeachment for the pur-
pose of removing its own -members.
The expulsion power of Congress over its own members also pro-
vides important insights into the limits of relying on an analogy to con-
gressional or presidential power to remove members within a branch as
the basis for arguing for judicial power to remove judges. First, if legisla-
tors are not impeachable officers, then the fact that Congress has the
power to expel its own members sheds no light on the propriety of al-
lowing judges to remove other judges. The Constitution grants the fed-
cral government only one method for the removal of legislators.
Therefore, the relevant inquiry, addressed in the next section, is whether
the reasons for granting the President power to remove impeachable offi-
cials within the executive branch apply to the federal judiciary.
Second, one may infer that if the framers intended members of one
branch to have the power to remove other similarly situated or equally
powerful members within the same branch, then the framers would have
made this desire explicit. The most that the power of Congress to expel
its own members suggests is that Congress may discipline its members
through a procedure analogous (but not identical) to impeachment. Ex-
215. In pertinent part, the President "shall Commission all the Officers of the United States."
U.S. CONST. art. II. § 3.
216. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
217. Id. art. I, § 5.
218. But see Rotunda, supra note 13, at 717 (discussing the impeachment proceeding against
former Senator William Blount in 1797). Senator Blount's lawyer argued that no jurisdiction ex-
isted, because the Senate had already expelled Blount for "having been guilty of a high misdemeanor,
entirely inconsistent with his public trust and duty as a Senator.- Id. Nevertheless, the House still
impeached him. Although the Senate ultimately dismissed the charges against Blount, it is unclear
whether dismissal occurred because there was no jurisdiction or because no impeachable offense
existed even if jurisdiction had existed. See id.
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plicitly granting Congress expulsion power further suggests Congress
n -'ld not have this power absent a constitutional grant. Similarly, the
absence of any grant of expulsion power to the judiciary at least raises
the inference that federal judges do not have an impeachment-like power
to remove each other because the Constitution fails to grant this power.
The President's removal power extends to subordinates, who help the
President to discharge constitutional duties;219 however, in a branch
without unified power, each official-wields the same power as every other
member of the branch. In such nonunified branches, the Constitution
appears to grant monitoring power only explicitly. In short, the framers
may have felt that a grant of such removal power to some members of
Congress over equally powerful members of the same branch was so unu-
sual and potentially divisive that it required explicit language.
Third, judges differ from the President, Congress, and other mem-
bers of their respective branches, because only the judiciary has life ten-
ure. Of course, life tenure alone does not suggest that federal judges are
removable only by impeachment. It does suggest, however, that federal
officials with radically different tenure from the President and members
of Congress may well have to be treated differently for removal purposes.
The question is whether popularly elected and life-tenured officials
should be treated the same under the Constitution for purposes of re-
moval. In other words, do the differences in selection and tenure of
popularly elected and life-tenured officials support exclusivity of im-
peachment as a means of removing federal judges? The answer, spelled
out in the next section, suggests that allowing federal judges to remove
themselves or even to participate formally in the process of removal
would most likely undermine the Constitution's attempts to make judi-
cial status unique.
J 2. Separation of Powers, Removal, and the Exclusivity of Impeach-
ment as a Means of Removing Executive Officials.-Understanding re-
moval power, wherever it may be located, requires an understanding that
it may be the most critical element of the separation of powers. Whoever
exercises the power to remove may also have control over the actions of
the officials subject to that power. The impeachment power of Congress
arguably enables it to exercise extraordinary influence over the President,
federal judges, and certain other officials. Similarly, the President's abil-
ity to remove executive officials enables the President alone to direct
them in the exercise of their executive functions. The specter raised by
219. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119 (1926).
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allowing federal judges to remove other federal judges is that such re-
moval power may include the potential to control the exercise of article
III judicial power.
From a separation of powers standpoint, a major difficulty with al-
lowing the federal judiciary to remove its own members is fashioning a
principled approach to innovations or deviations in the allocation of the
removal powers, including impeachment, set forth in the Constitution. 
If
congressionally enacted deviations from the Constitution's explicit struc-
ture are treated with a presumption of constitutionality, rebuttable only
if the deviation violates the value or principle the structure was erected to
protect, then removal as well as the role ofimpeachment within the con-
text of separation of powers makes surprising sense.
The presumption in favor of constitutionality serves two purposes.
First, the presumption is not a device to undermine the Constitution by
making it easier for Congress to aggrandize itself at the expense of the
other branches or, more particularly, to gain an undue advantage over
the other branches on questions regarding the separation 
of powers.22 0
Rather, the presumption allows Congress some flexibility in interpreting
the Constitution as an inevitable aspect of the discharge of its own consti-
tutional duties. The authority and competence of Congress to engage in
constitutional interpretation is supported by the constitutional require-
ment that members of Congress take the same oath as the judiciary,
2
and by the ability of Congress to engage in fact-finding central to consti-
tutional decision making and determinations of judicially unreviewable
political questions, and the special resources available to congressional
committees and individual congressmen.
2 2 2  Whether Congress is profi-
cient at constitutional interpretation is a separate question from whether
Congress must, at least occasionally, render an interpretation
223
220. The argument is that the presumption makes it too easy for Congress and the 
federal courts
to manipulate and undermine the Constitution's original allocation of powers.
221. In pertinent part, article VI states: "The Senators and Representatives . .
. and the Mem-
bers of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United
States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this 
Constitution
" U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 3. As specified by statute, members of Congress
solemnly swear. . [to] support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all
enemies, foreign and domestic; (to) bear true faith and allegiance to the same; [to] take this
obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and (to] well andfaithfully discharge the duties of [their] office.
$ U.S.C. § 3331 (1982). See also Fisher, Constituional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63
N.C.L. REv. 707. 718-722 (1985) (arguing that the oath of office members of Congrcss must take is
partial evidence of the authority and competence of members of Congress 
to interpret the
Constitution).
222. See Fisher, supra note 221, at 718-22.
223. See Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?. 61 
N.C.L. REv.
587, 590 (s983) (arguing that Congress does not have the institutional and political capacity 
to
engage in the same kind of intensive and thorough constitutional deiiberation as 
federal courts).
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,Second, the presumption preserves judicial review, which is the judi-
ciary's power to measure the consistency and compatibility of congres-
sional enactments with the language, spirit, and structure of theConstitution. The major difficulty with judicial review is concedingChief Justice John Marshall's pronouncement in Marbury v. Madison 224
that federal judges have a broad eonstitutional power to interpret theConstitution,225 and that the other two branches are also charged as apractical matter with interpreting the Constitution in discharging their
own particular constitutional duties. Members of the judiciary are not
necessarily any more qualified, gifted, or knowledgeable than Congress
or the President to say what the Constitution means.21 6  History sug-gests, contrary to Justice Jackson's assertion that Supreme Court justices
"are not final because [they] are infallible, but [they) are infallible onlybecause [they] are final,"227 that no one branch has any final say regard-ing the meaning of the Constitution.a28 As a practical matter, the threebranches frequently engage in dialogues regarding constitutional inter-pretation.2 29  As this dialogue unfolds, each branch inevitably tries to
eggrandize itself at the expense of the other branches. An effective way
to guard against judicial aggrandizement (or judicial tyranny) and to pro-tect judicial review is the use of a presumption that requires the judiciary
to respect congressional innovations in the allocation of powers unlessthose innovations violate what the structure was erected to protect. 230
The political question doctrine may serve the same ends by requiring theSupreme Court to abstain from interfering with or answering questions
entrusted to the sole discretion of some other branch.
The Supreme Court most recently explored the relationship betweeninpeachment and presidential removal power in Morrison v. O/son.231 In
224. 5 U.S. (Cranch) 137 (1803)
22i. See id. at 162-68.
226. See M. TUSHNET, supro note 18, at 112, 147, 160, 164-66. James Madison stated:ITIhe great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the samedepartment consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary con-stitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. . .. Ambitionmust be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with theconstitutional rights of the place.
TiE FiDERALtST No. 51, at 321-22 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).227. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443. 540 (1953) (Jackson. I., concurring).228. See Fisher, supra note 221, at 746.
229. See id.
230. See supro note 200 and accompanying text.
231. 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2599 (1988). Morrison involved an investigation of Theodore Olson, byIndependent Counsel Alexisa Morrison, former head of the Office of Legal Counsel in PresidentReagan's Justice Department. Ms. Morrison had been duly appointed Independent Counsel pursu-ant to the Independent Counsel Act to investigate whether Olson had perjured himself before aHouse subcommittee investigating the Justice Department's role in a decision by the Administratorof the Environmental Protection Agency to withhold certain documents regarding the Agency's
52
upholding the constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Act, 23 2 the
Supreme Court did not adhere to a notion of unalterable, strict separa-
tion of powers that arguably dominated the Court's decisions in certain
significant separation of powers and removal cases from the early twenti-
eth century through the 1980s.2 3 3 Instead, demonstrating deference to
congressional deviations from the separation of powers set forth in the
Constitution, the Court balanced the important purposes underlying the
Independent Counsel Act against what the Court perceived as the incon-
sequential inroads the Act made on presidential control over
prosecutions.
Morrison is significant for at least two ieasons. 234 First, it gave the
enforcement of the Superfund statute (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. J 9601-9675) (establishing complex legislation authorizing the fed-
cral government to investigate, enforce, and supervise the cleanup of the most dangerous toxic waste
sites in the United States) on the basis of executive privilege. During Independent Counsel Morri-
son's investigation, Olson refused to comply with certain subpoenas from the Independent Counsel
partly on the basis that the Independent Counsel Act itself was unconstitutional.
232. Ethics in Government Act. 28 U.S.C. 1 591-599 (Supp. V 1987). The Act was first enacted
in 1978 and has been reenacted twice, most recently in 1987. See Independent Counsel Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 1987, P.L. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293 (1987).
The constitutional challenges to the Independent Counsel Act turned on the Act's operation.
Passed in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, Congress designed the act to allow an independent
counsel to prosecute certain high-level executive branch officials. The act is triggered "whenever the
Attorney General receives information sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate whether any
person described in subsection (b) may have violated any Federal criminal law." 28 U.S.C. § 591(a)
(Supp. V 1987). The enumerated officials include the President, the Vice President, the AttorneyGeneral, assistant attorneys general, various people working in the Executive Office of the President,
the director and deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue. See id. § 591(b).
If the Attorney General finds "no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is
warranted," id. § $92(b)(1), the matter is terminated. If the Attorney General conducts such an
investigation and linds "reasoniable grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted." id.
J 592(c)(1)(A), then the Attorney General must apply to a special district court to appoint a special
prosecutor. The special court is also authorized to define the prosecutorial jurisdiction of the special
prosecutor. The special prosecutor in turn has "with respect to all matters" in his or her
"prosecutorial jurisdiction . . . , full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative
functions and powers of the Department of Justice land] the Attorney General." Id. § 594(a). The
special prosecutor may be removed by impeachment or by the Attorney General "only for good
cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs the
performance of such independent counsel's duties." Id. J 596(a)(1).
233. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (holding that "Congress cannot reserve for
itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeach-
ment"); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948-51 (1983) (holding that Congress could not bypass the
constitutional requirement of a bicameral veto by reserving a unicameral veto over the decisions of
an agency of the executive branch); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602. 624 (1935)(holding that Congress could limit for good cause the President's power of removal of an official of a
quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative agency); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52. 107 (1926) (holding
that Congress could not participate in the removal of a postmaster, an executive official).
234. Aforrison is also significant for other reasons, including but not limited to its discussion of
"inferior officers" for purposes of appointments pursuant to the appointment clause. The Court held
that Morrison was an "inferior" officer because (1) she was subject to removal by a higher executive
branch official (the Attorney General), (2) she was confined to limited duties (the investigation and
prosecution of a certain executive branch official), (3) her office was limited in jurisdiction (only to
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Court a rare opportunity to comment on the role of impeachment. Since
no court has permitted judicial review of an impeachment, the Supreme
Court has had few opportunities to interpret the impeachment clauses. 35
Second, and even more iniportant, the Court adopted an informal ap-
proach to the separation of powers'cases that may simplify and clarify
the analysis applicable to future disputes between the branches regarding
congressional innovations in separation of powers.
The Court in Morrison addressed impeachment because the Solicitor
General argued, inter alia, that the Independent Counsel Act is unconsti-
tutional because it enables Congress to assert pressure on the President-
pressure that the Constitution permits only through the impeachment
power.236 According to the Solicitor General, the Act was a congres-
certain officers and as specifically instructed by the special court). and (4) her office was limited in
duration (only as long as the investigation and prosecution necessitated). Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at
2608-11.
235. See, e.g., Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293. 300 (1936). cert. denied, 300 U.S. 668
(1937) (dismissing suit of a judge who contended that the Senate had tried him for nonimpeachable
offenses: "the Senate was the sole tribunal that could take jurisdiction of the articles of impeach.
ment presented to that body against the plaintiff and its decision is final").
236. In fact, Olson, the Reagan Justice Department, and several amici directed live major argu-
ments against the Independent Counsel Act. First, they argued, the Act deprived the President of
supervisory authority over inherently executive functions. They argued that prosecution is a core
element of the President's constitutional duty to enforce the laws faithfully. Without the ability to
control all prosecutions, the President is essentially stripped of critical article 11 powers and hindered
in discharging his constitutional duty. They argued further that this defect was not eliminated by
the Act's grant of authority to the Attorney General to conduct an investigation and to request
appointment of a special prosecutor assuming the existence of a reasonable ground for further inves-
tigation.
Second, Olson and others argued that the Act impermissibly interjected the judiciary into the
performance of executive functions. According to the Act's critics, the case-or-controversy require-
ment of article III necessarily excludes any general judicial authority to supervise the execution of
the laws. Olson and others argued that the Act itself contravened this limiting principle by assigning
to the special court the power to demand from an independent counsel an accounting of his conduct
in offick, to determine whether the counsel has completed the assigned duties, and, most impor-
tantly. to assign the special prosecutor duties in the first place through the nonjudicial acts of defin-
ing or redefining the jurisdiction or of assigning new matters to investigate.
Third. those challenging the Act argued that the Act impermissibly granted supervisory author-
ity over executive functions to the legislative branch. Given that the Constitution, with few explicit
exceptions, grants Congress only the authority to legislate upon specified subjects, they argued that
the Act's provisions granting the House and the Senate Judiciary Committee a role in the initiation
of the independent counsel process, as well as requiring independent counsel to report to Congress
and to cooperate with congressional oversight, impermissibly assigned an executive role to Congress.
Fourth, Olson and others argued Ihat the appointment of an independent counsel by a court
violated both the appointments clause and the separation-of-powers principles it embodies. On the
one hand, they argued that the Act's appointment procedure violated the appointments clause be-
c jse the court's appointment of the independent counsel is permissible only if the counsels are
"nferior officers," which, they argued, they are not. The major reason counsels are not inferior
officers is that they have no superior. On the other hand, those opposing the Act argued that even if
independent counsels could be classified as inferior officers it would not necessarily follow that their
appointment properly could be vested in a court. They referred to the Court's earlier decision in Ex
Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879), suggesting that congressional decision to vest the appointment
power in the courts would be improper if there were some "incongruity" between the functions
normally performed by courts and the performance of their duty to appoint. See id. at 398. They
sional attempt " 'to bypass the impeachment process that the Framers
designed to [ensure] that high officers of government could be investi-
gated and removed from power.' "23 In the same vein, Justice Scalia
remarked "[h]ow much easier for Congress, instead of accepting the
political damage attendant to the commencement of the impeachment
proceedings against the President on trivial grounds ... simply to trigger
a debilitating criminal investigation of the Chief Executive under- this
law." 238
Characterizing the Act as an illegitimate bypass of the impeachment
process, however, is inaccurate for three reasons. First, Congress has no
power under the Act to "trigger" an investigation by a special prosecu-
tor.239 The Act gives the Attorney General unreviewable discretion to
deny any request by Congress to initiate an investigation. 240 Indeed,
Congress has the same power under the Act to request an investigation
by the Attorney General as it would have in the absence of the statute to
informally pressure the Attorney General to commence an investigation.
In addition, although the Act requires that the special prosecutor turn
over evidence that Congress could then use as grounds for an impeach-
ment, the Act is not an expansion of congressional power to impeach
because it is merely a reporting device rather than a substitute for an
impeachment proceeding.
Second, the provisions in the Act authorizing investigation and
prosecution of impeachable executive officials are neither novel nor
unique. Federal prosecution of impeachable officials within the execu-
argued that the appointment clause's proviso that the appointment of inferior officers be vested "in
the Courts of Law" should not be construed to contradict the framers' admonition that the separa-
tion of powers would be compromised if the other branches could appoint executive officers. See id.
at 397-98.
Lastly. Olson and others argued that the statutory provisions concerning the removal of in-
dependent counsels impermissibly interfered with executive prerogatives. First, the opponents ar-
gued that the Act unconstitutionally restricted the President's removal power, reasoning that an
unfettered removal power is the essential trump card that enables the President to maintain sway
over those executing the laws. Myers. 272 U.S. at 122. Second, the opponents argued that the Act
vested the judicial branch with unprecedented removal powers over an executive officer, reasoning
that legislation placing removal power over executive officials outside the executive branch creates
subservience to the court making the appointment and, thus, creates a serious separation of powers
problems. One such problem is that the independence of the executive branch is seriously under-
mined by allowing another branch to have the potential of using removal power to thwart the execu-
tion of executive powers.
237. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appeliees 47. Morrison. 108 S. Ct.
at 2597 (No. 87-1279). quoted in Koukoutchos. supra note 198. at 710.
238. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
239. The Judiciary Committee of the House or Senate. a majority of the majority party members
of either House. or a majority of all majority party members of either such committee. may request
(but not require) in writing that the Attorney General apply for the appointment of an independent
counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(g) (Supp. V 1987).
240. See id. § 592(b)(1).
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tive branch did not begin with the Independent Counsel Act. Federal
prosecutors in the Department of Justice have prosecuted impeachable
officials for years. In addition, prior to enactment of the Independent
Counsel Act, the President and the-Attorney General frequently named
special prosecutors pursuant to regulations or statutes that put con-
straints on the President's removal powers.2 4 ' In short, the Independent
Counsel Act does not interfere with the impeachment process any more
than "these more mundane law enforcement regimes,"142 whose consti-
tutionality has never been seriously challenged.
Third, the Independent Counsel Act and impeachment are not di-
rected at the same class of individuals. The class subject to independent
counsel investigation is both broader and narrower than the class of of-
ficers subject to impeachment. The Act covers a broader range of offi-
cials than the range of officials subject to impeachment because the Act
requires the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate former
senior administration officials, senior officials of the President's political
campaign, and any other person with respect to whom the Department
of Justice has a conflict of interest. Conversely, only certain high-rank-
ing executive officials are impeachable. The scope of the Act is narrower
in the sense that, absent an extraordinary finding of a conflict of interest,
it does not apply to the vast majority of government officers, including
those in the executive branch, whereas the impeachment power by its
terms applies to "all Civil Officers of the United States," including fed-
eral judges.
In addressing the separation of powers, the Court in Morrison used a
balancing test to resolve the dispute between Congress and the President
over the Act's usurpation of certain executive power from the Presi-
dent.UJ The Court focused on whether the Act's restrictions on the At-
241. See Koukoutchos, supra note 198, at 711 & nn.430-31 (noting prosecutions of two formerAttorneys General, federal judges, and the ABSCAM prosecution of legislators); see also Govern-
ment and Gen. Research Div., Congressional Research Serv., Library of Congress, Historical Usesof a Special Prosecution: The Administrations of Presidents Grant, Coolidge and Truman (Nov. 23.1973) (D. Logan) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Texas Law Review) (discussing the St.Louis Whiskey Ring and Teapot Dome prosecutions and the scandal-induced prosecutions of vari.
ous officers of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Internal Revenue Bureau).
242. Koukoutchos, supra note 198. at 711.
243. Significantly, the Court rejected two important constitutional challenges to the IndependentCounsel Act. First, the Court rejected the argument that the special prosecutors were not inferior
officers and that even if they were inferior officers there was an incongruity between the court's
appointment power and the functions of a court. Without explaining the differences between supe-
rior and inferior officers. the Court found that the special prosecutors are inferior officers because (1)they are subject to removal by a higher executive official (the Attorney General, except in casesinvolving the investigation of the Attorney General); (2) special prosecutors have only limited duties
under the Act, consisting primarily of investigating alleged violations of federal laws; (3) the office of
special prosecutors is limited in jurisdiction; and (4) the special prosecutor's "office is limited in
56
torney General's ability to remove the independent counsel undulyinterfered with the President's exercise of his constitutionally designatedduties and on whether the Act violated the separation of powers by limit-
ing the President's control over the independent counsel's prosecution
powers.
The Court gave three reasons why the restrictions on the AttorneyGeneral's ability to remove the independent counsel did not unduly inter-fere with the-President's ability to discharge his constitutional duties.2"First, the Court observed that the constitutionality of limitations on thePresident's removal power depends on the extent to which the limitationsinterfere with the President's ability to perform his constitutional duties
rather than on the particular functions performed by the official subjectto the removal power.245 Second, the Court "d[id] not see how the Presi-dent's need to control the exercise of [the special prosecutor's] discretionis so central to the functioning of the Executive Branch as to require as a
matter of constitutional law that the counsel be terminable at will by thePresident."246 Third, the Court found that the Act permitted the Presi-dent to retain sufficient authority over the special prosecutor's perform-
ance by being able to. remove her for "good cause."247
The Court also cited two reasons for rejecting the argument that theAct as a whole violated separation of powers by unduly interfering withthe constitutional role of the executive branch. First, the Court did notread the Act as aggrandizing either Congress or the judiciary at the ex-pense of the President.248 Second, the Court found that, in light of thePresident's ability to discharge the independent counsel for "good
tenure." Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2608-09. On the other hand, the Court found that even if thespecial prosecutor were an inferior officer there was no incongruity in the interbranch appointmentin light of the Court's earlier decision, in Young v. United States exe rel. Vuttton, 481 U.S. 787, 793(1987), allowing appointment of private attorneys by courts to investigate contempt charges and inlight of congressional objective to eliminate conflicts of interest from certain investigations.Second. the Court refused to find that article III absolutely prevented Congress from vesting
certain powers of a nonjudicial nature to the courts of law. In particular, the Court observed thatmost of the powers given to the courts under the Act were "ministerial" in nature and did notinclude any superisry power over the special prosecutor's investigation. See Morrison, 108 . Ct.at 2612.13. The Court also found that the special court'a ability to terminate the special prosecutordid not constitute an impetmissible encroachment by the courts on executive power, because thepower to terminate would only be triggered when the special prosecutors completed their duties. Seeid. at 2614-1 S. The Court further found that the special court's powers did not seriously threaten thetraditional function of the courts to adjudicate fairly and impartially any claims arising from theinvestigation because the Act not only failed to give the special court jurisdiction for judicial rcview,but specifically prohibited the special court from exercising any power to review legal questionsarising from an investigation. See id. at 2615.
244. See Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2619-20.245. See id. at 2619.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 2620-21.
57
Texas Law Review Vol. 68:1, 1989
Impeachment and Its Alternatives
Texas Law Review
cause,"'the Act did not significantly interfere with the President's gen-
cral constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws or with the Presi-
dent's control over prosecutions.2 4 9
The major thrust of Justice Scalia's lone dissent, as summarized by
one commentator, was that he preferred that separation of powers issues
be
resolve[d not through the majority's balancing test but rather] by
identifying particular acts or duties as partaking of no more than
one of the three characteristic powers-legislative, executive, or ju-
dicial-and then denouncing any blending of these powers as a
corruption, not necessarily of any particular express provision of
the Constitution or even the text considered as a whole, but of the
spirit of the separation of powers that [he and others] perceive as
animating the structure created by that document. 25 0
Relying on a construction of article II, section 1, clause I of the Constitu-
tion2s5 as vesting all executive power in the President, Justice Scalia ar-
gued that the lower court's opinion striking down the Act must be
upheld only if criminal prosecutions constitute the exercise of purely ex-
ecutive power and if the Act deprives the President of exclusive control
over criminal prosecutions. Justice Scalia answered each of these ques-
tions in the affirmative: he described a criminal prosecution as a
"quintessentially executive activity" and found that the entire purpose of
the Act was to take exclusive control over certain criminal prosecutions
from the President, that is, to usurp certain purely executive power.25 2
After demonstrating that the Act violated strict separation of pow-
erd, Justice Scalia turned to a critique of the Court's methodology, which
he viewed as striking at the heart of the President's removal power and
thereby seriously undermining the President's ability to perform his con-
stitutional duties. Unlike the majority, he read the Court's earlier deci-
sions iq Myers v. United States and Humphrey's Executor v. United States
as establishing that the President has the power to remove federal officers
performing purely executive functions. According to Justice Scalia, the
doctrine set forth in these cases is consistent with the framers' attempt to
allow " 'ambition [to] counteract ambition' " through the allocation of
separate powers to each of three distinct branches.253  He characterized
the majority's decision-allowing Congress to deprive the President of
249. See id. at 2621.
250. Koukoutchos, supra note 198, at 640-41.
251. "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." U.S.
CONST. art. 11, § I, cl. 1.
252. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2626-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
253. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting THL FEDERALtST No. 5I, at
322 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)).
some executive powfer as long as the President still retained sufficient
ability to perform his constitutional duties-as failing to identify the lim-
its of judicial or congressional interferences with the President's removal
powers and, more important as failing to appreciate "what the separation
of powers ... is all about."
2 5 4
According to Justice Scalia, the framers constructed strict separa-
tion of powers and unified executive power within the President tt en-
sure "efficient government" and to protect "individual freedom." 255
Justice Scalia explained that the strict allocation of powers streamlines
governmental exercise of power by ensuring that each branch knows with
absolute certainty the scope of its particular responsibilities and by re-
quiring as a matter of practice that each branch perform one primary
function. Justice Scalia explained that a unified executive ensures that
there is uniform application of all laws and that the President, as the
unified executive, is accountable for executing the laws under the Consti-
tution. For Justice Scalia, the appropriate check on execution of the laws
is not through special enforcement of the criminal law but rather through
the political process, so that the President remains responsible for all
decisions regarding prosecution or nonprosecution. Based on his view of
separation of powers, Justice Scalia rejected the balancing test the major-
ity used to uphold the Act as an exercise of its own ad hoc judgment.
According to Justice Scalia, the majority's unpardonable and unjustifi-
able error was its rejection of the framers' judgments to vest all executive
power in the President and to allocate powers among the branches in a
strict, unalterable fashion that would protect individual liberties and en-
sure efficient government.
Justice Scalia's criticisms of the majority's separation of powers
methodology are misplaced. 256 First, Justice Scalia overstated the nov-
254. Morrison. 108 5. Ct. at 2637 (Scalia, J.. dissenting).
255. Id.
256. Justice Scalia leveled two criticisms at the majority that do have merit. First, the justices
failed to stress a primary aim of the Act. In particular, the Act addressed "a fundamental, institu-
tional conflict of interest that would otherwise undermine even the most incorruptible (Presidents]
enforcement of the law." Koukoutchos, supra note 198. at 677. The Act sought to eliminate the
appearance and the reality of conflicts of interest both motivating and hindering certain prosecu-
tions. Such conflicts are inevitable as long as the President controls the removal of the very officers
deciding whether to investigate. Unfortunately, the majority mentioned the conflicts problem only
once, Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2611, and even Justice Scalia "shunned both the phrase and the prob-
lem. so that he might praise a regime wherein a presidential aide suspected of breaking the law could
be assured that his conduct would be reviewed in a 'sympathetic forum . . . attuned to the interest
and policies of the Presidency.'" Koukoutchos. supro note 198, at 677 (quoting Morrison, 108 S. Ct.
at 2611 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). As one commentator observed, the Act was designed to eliminate
"conflicts of interest before they tainted the [presidency]" and, by doing so, facilitate rather than
hinder the President's ability to execute the law. Id. at 678.
Second. the majority failed to articulate a standard for determining "inferior officers." The
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elty of the majority's use of a balancing test to address the Act's asserted
threat to the presidency. The Court has applied a balancing test in a long
line of separation of powers decisions,, including the steel seizure case,
Youngstown Sheet &'Tube Co. v. Sawyer,"' and continuing 
through more
recent decisions upholding limitations on both presidential and judicial
authority.258 Moreover, within one year of Morrison, the Court used the
same balancing test in another separation of powers decision, United
States v. Mistretta,259 to uphold the constitutionality of a congressional
delegation of authority to draft sentencing guidelines and to determine
the composition of and presidential removal power over the United
States Sentencing Commission.2 60
Second, Justice Scalia was mistaken in charging that the majority's
approach in Morrison represents an unauthorized departure from the
Court's arguably more rigid and formalistic approaches to separation of
powers issues in INS v. Chadha and Bowsher v. Synar. Those rulings
struck down statutes permitting Congress to interfere with executive
functions by vetoing administrative regulations
26
' or by participating in
the removal of executive officers.
2 Justice Scalia read those opinions as
majority's list of the special prosecutor's attributes making her inferior are Of little help to future
courts trying to distinguish superior from inferior officers. For example. the majority notes that the
special prosecutor's tenure is limited in duration; however, almost every argu ably superior 
federal
officer serves with limited duration. Thus, it is unclear how this attribute, among 
others, should be
used to distinguish superior from inferior officers.
Unfortunately, the majority missed the opportunity to adopt a bright line test for making the
distinction between superior and inferior officers: defining as "inferior" any federal officer 
not de.
fined in the Constitutioti as superior. See id. at 687. The only problem with this approach 
is that
Congress has the power under the Constitution to make new offices, but this 
problem may be re-
solved by simply analogizing the new office to those the Constitution already 
treats as superior.
257. 343 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1952).
25g. See. e.g.. CFTC v. Schur, 478 U.S. 833, 857 (1986) (limiting the jurisdiction of the Com
*modity Futures Trading Commission to counterclaims arising from violations of the 
CEA or CFTC
regulations). Nixon v. Administrator of General Services. 433 U.S. 425. 484 (1977) (placing limits on
the executive branch); United States v. Nixon. 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974) (placing limits on the exer-
cise of executive privilege).
259. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
260. See id. at 659. According to Justice Blackmun.
Justice Jackson summarized the pragmatic. flexible view of differentiated governmental
power to which we are heir: "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure
liberty, it also contemplates t hat practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a worka-
ble government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy
but reciprocity."
In adopting this flexible understanding of separation of powers, we simply have recog-
nized Madison's teaching that the greatest security against tyranny-the accumulation of
excessive authority in a single branch-lies not in a hermetic division between 
the
branches, but in a carefully crafted system of checked and balanced power 
within each
Branch.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J.. concurring)).
261. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
262. See Bowsher v. Synar. 478 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1986).
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indicating that the President retained near absolute authority over execu-
tive officers. The plain implication of this reading is that any legislation
conditioning presidential removal power over executive branch personnel
would be unconstitutional, including the Civil Service Act.
2 63 The Court,
however, seems to have rejected any such reading by reaffirming and
restating in Morrison the Court's earlier holding in Humphrey's Executor
that inroads on presidential control over executive officers are permissi-
ble so long as they do not unduly restrict presidential power and do not
involve the direct assumption of executive authority by Congress.
2
"
263. See 5 U.S.C. J§ 43114313 (1982) (establishing a special system for appraisal for persons in
the Senior Executive Service); id. § 7542 (setting forth the procedure for removal of executive branchemployees).
264. Not only is Justice Scalia mistaken about the compatibility of the Court's analysis in Morri-
son with the Court's prior analyses in separation of powers cases, but there are also four reasons that
support the majority's rejection of Justice Scalia's strict adherence to separation of powers cases, his
understanding of the purposes underlying the structure of the executive branch, and the connectionbetween the structure of the executive and the protection of civil liberties. First. Justice Scalia's view
of separation of powers is inconsistent with the eighteenth century understanding of separation of
powers. For example, Justice Scalia began his opinion by quoting article XXX of the Massachusetts
Constitution, which embodied the strict separation of powers that he believed the Congress violated
by taking the power to appoint a special prosecutor away from the President and giving it to the
courts. This quote is consistent with Justice Scalia's view "characteristic of the mystical tradition
[to] judge the manifestation (for example, the Independent Counsel Act) by the degree to which it
reflects the higher reality." Koukoutchos, supra note 198, at 650. Yet the more appropriate para-
digm for understanding the structure of the Constitution is the "mechanical tradition," id. at 641-42,
which envisioned machinery in general and human machinery in particular as "liberating." Id. at
651. The framers' real purpose in establishing a system of checks and balances was not, as viewed
by Justice Scalia, to create three hermetically scaled departments of government, but rather,
(to] devise[ a means by which the personalities of office-holders would be the very impetus
that would keep the entire apparatus moving, and . . . they left sufficient play in the joints
of the machine so that its substructures could be returned without resort to the amendment
process for a complete overhaul.
Id. at 653.
Justice Scalia failed, however, to acknowledge that the Constitution only reflects the framers'
design of the top of the new federal government. The framers left the substructures of government
to be shaped by subsequent generations so that "as times change, so must the understanding of the
congressionally-created institutions that are necessary and proper for 'carrying into Execution' the
powers ceded by the people to the government of the United States." Id. at 668 (footnote omitted);
see also C. BLACK, supra note 13, at 2 (observing that the framers "put in place only a very general
framework, leaving it to the future to fill in details, and leaving many questions open to honest
difference of opinion."). The point is not to assume, as Justice Scalia seems to do, that the Constitu-
tion sets forth the limits to both the top and the substructure for the entire federal government.
Rather,
the separation of powers established by the Constitution speaks primarily, if not exclu-
sively, to the President, not to the executive branch. The separation and equilibration of
powers may well be implicated by congressional tinkering with the organs of federal law
enforcement, but the interpretive rules and standards that apply to the President, whatever
they may be, do not necessarily apply with the same rigor to all the President's men.
Koukoutchos, supra note 198. at 669.
Second, there is little historical support for Justice Scalia's articulated understanding of the
unified executive. In fact, history points to a different understanding. Justice Scalia does not ac-
knowledge the large number and variety of congressional attempts prior to the Independent Counsel
Act to eliminate conflicts of interest in law enforcement. For example, the First Congress addressed
the problem of conflicting interests in federal law enforcement by vesting power to appoint certain
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Those criticizing Morrison by relying on Bowsher and Chadha also
miss an important principle that unifies the Court's removal decisions
from Myers through Morrison and Mistretta. Those cases may each be
explained by the principle that congressional innovations are presumed
constitutional unless they violate what the structure was erected to
"executive" officials in the courts of law. See id. at 681. Anticipating the problem of occasional
conflicts of interest on the part of United States marshals appointed with the advice and consent of
the Senate, the Judiciary Act of 1789 empowered the federal courts to "specially appoint" a tempo-
rary marshal whenever "the marshal or his deputy is not an indifferent person or is interested in the
event of the cause." Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789. ch. 20, § 29, 1 Stat. 88 (1789).
Similarly, there is little, if any, historical support for Justice Scalia's view that all executive
power should be under the complete control of the President. See Koukoutchos, supro note 198, at
681. The long history of congressional control over the appointment of inferior officers also indi-
cates that it has not at all been uncommon to find shared exercises of power below the apex of
government. See id. at 692-93.
Third, there is little, if any, support for Justice Scalia's view that there should not be any pre-
sumptions of constitutionality for congressional enactments affecting presidential powers. Accord-
ing to Justice Scalia, Congress is not entitled to the "benefit of the doubt" in separation of powers
cases because Congress is no less interested than the President in the constitutionality of its intru-
sions on presidential power. Justice Scalia's view on this point is wrong for two reasons. First, there
is an explicit commitment in the Constitution to Congress to delegate, if it so chooses, appointment
power of inferior officers to the courts of law. At the very least, this language suggests that a court
of law should show some deference to congressional delegations of such appointments to the courts.
Second, the Court has long operated with the understanding that congressional enactments even in
the area of separation of powers should be treated with a presumption of constitutionality. See
United States v. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. 647, 661 (1989) (describing the flexible approach the Court has
frequently used in separation of powers cases). Justice Scalia stands alone without any precedents to
support his attempt to aggrandize the judiciary at the expense of Congress in a matter in which
Congress itself has nothing less than explicit authority to operate under the Constitution.
Lastly, there is an odd contradiction between Justice Scalia's strict adherence to original intent
in Morrison and other constitutional cases. see Mistretta. 109 S. Ct. at 682-83 (Scalia. J.. dissenting).
and his critique of strict adherence to conventional legislative history in statutory interpretation
cases. Cf. Edwards v. Aguillard. 472 U.S. 578, 625-26 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Interestingly,
Justice Scalia has argued elsewhere that it is futile to identify any definitive legislative history on a
particular enactment because, for exanple, it is unctear how many legistators must agree oil the
purpose of an enactment in order to make that consensus controlling, many enactments are the
product of compromise, legislators may often make statements about an enactment that are self-
serving and do not necessarily reflect their real intent, and it may be difficult to distinguish real from
apparent purpose. Cf id. at 625-26. Justice Scalia has urged statutory construction should be re-
stricted to the language, structure, and purpose of particular legislation, even though this inquiry
requires some search into the history of legislation and, at the same time, aggrandizes the judiciary at
the expense of the legislature by freeing the judiciary from confining its statutory construction to the
historical context of particular legislation. Yet he never has explained how these and other problems
with conventional legislative history, see id. at 619, are avoided in constitutional cases in which he
inconsistently advocates strict adherence to the understanding of the framers as well as the language,
structure, and purpose of the Constitution. See, e.g., Mistretta, 109 S. Ci. at 683 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that Madison "would be aghast" to discover that the Supreme Court has disregarded
the "carefully designed structure" of the three branches of the federal government); Morrison, 108 S.
Ci. 2597, at 2622-23, 2637-38, 2641 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the purpose of the
framers and advocating reliance on the "judgment of the wise men who constructed our system"). It
seems likely that the same problems plague both legislative and constitutional historiography; Justice
Scalia, however, is content to denounce them in legislative history but to ignore (or discount) them
in constitutional interpretation.
protect.2 65
For example, in Morrison, the Independent Council Act did not vio-
late what Justice Scalia argued the unified executive was originally struc-
tured to protect.266 First, the Act does not undermine the Executive's
central responsibility to enforce the laws uniformly. Justice Scalia failed
to acknowledge the principal reason for the Act: Congress established
the Act to ensure uniform application of the laws by eliminating certain
conflicts of interest arising in investigations or prosecutions of-high level
executive officials-conflicts that prevented the executive branch from
uniformly applying the laws in those investigations or prosecutions. 67
Congress passed the Act in large part to ensure uniform application of
the laws even in those sensitive situations in which high level executive
personnel are investigated by their own branch.
Second, the Attorney General's power under the Act to remove a
special prosecutor for "good cause" 268 protects the individual liberties of
those being investigated by an independent counsel. Surely there is no
better cause for removal than prosecutorial misconduct that seriously
threatens individual liberties. Those being investigated by an independ-
ent counsel also have their individual liberties protected under the Act in
the same way as any criminal defendant: they may challenge in court the
decisions of the prosecutor.
Third, the Act does not threaten the individual liberties of the gen-
eral citizenry. These liberties remain protected through the President's
constitutional duties to apply the laws uniformly and to enforce the laws
faithfully and through access to the courts for vindication.269
265. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980); Rostker v. Goldberg. 453 U.S. 57, 64
(1981).
266. See Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the unitary Executive
was designed to preserve individual freedom). There are, however, two reasons undermining Justice
Scalia's understanding of the structure of the executive branch, including what it was intended to
protect. First, there is little historical support for Justice Scalia's view that all executive power was
intended to be unified only in the President. From the beginning of the Republic, there has been
considerable shared power among the substructures of the three branches. See Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at
300-08 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Second, Justice Scalia overstated the extent to which the
structure or the presidency was designed to protect civil liberties. As a matter of fact, courts have
historically been the principal forum under the Constitution for the vindication of civil liberties. See
L. BAUM. THE SUPREME COURT 167. 180-83 (1985).
267. See Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2621-22.
268. 28 U.S.C. § 396(a)(1).
269. Chadha and Bowsher may be analyzed in the same fashion. For example, in Chadha. the
Court specifically held that Congress may not bypass constitutional requirements for lawmaking in
order to make laws that strike down executive actions. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944-45. The main
problem with the legislative veto was that in bypassing the requirements of the bicameral and pre-
sentment clauses, both of which must be satisfied in order for a congressional act to become law,
Congress aggrandized itself at the expense of the President and the people. See id. at 951, 954-55.
The reason this aggrandizement is unconstitutional is that by bypassing the constitutional structure
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In summary, Morrison suggests several important lessons for 
the in-
terpretation of the Constitution in general and of the impeachment
clauses in particular. First, it is not a bypass of the impeachment process
to establish a mechanism for special enforcement of certain criminal 
laws
against otherwise impeachable officials as long as the mechanism 
is not
designed to be nor operates as a substitute for impeachment and as long
as Congress has no meaningful opportunity to control the prosecution
process.
Second, Morrison demonstrates the limitations of constitutional his-
toriography. Both the majority and the dissenting opinions rely on state-
ments by the framers to support their understanding of the
constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Act,2"
0 but such statements
only take the Justices so far. The majority reaches beyond such state-
ments to rely on its readings of prior Court decisions and the structure of
the Constitution,27' while Justice Scalia tries to confine his analysis to 
the
views of the framers and to his own reading of constitutional structure
and purposes.212 Neither opinion adequately explains the limits 
of the
other's historiography. In addition, Justice Scalia never explains in his
dissent why he does not apply his own criticisms of conventional legisla-
tive history to constitutional historiography as well."
3
Third, the decision demonstrates that the rationale for presidential
removal of otherwise impeachable officers in the executive branch does
erected for making laws, the Congress-considered the most dangerous branch-did not make itself
accountable to either the President or the people for its actions. See id. at 95758. The presentment
and bicameral clauses ultimately protect the people because compliace with lawmaking procedure
signtals to the people when laws have been nmade and when the pecople may bcgitt 
to hold their elected
representatives accountable for lawmaking attons. See C60dha.. 462 U.S. at 957 (noting that the
prcsentmcnt and bicameral clauses were intended to protect the people by "mandating 
certain pre-
scrtbed steps"). If Congress may act outside constitutionally prescribed legislative procedures then
the people correspondingly have less protection from the proliferation of laws made 
without proper
deliberation and consensus.
Similarly, in Bowsheru the Court specifically held that Congress may not delegate eecuttve
functions to an o64ictal over which Congress itself has removal power. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726-27.
Through the Gra nm.Rudman bill. Congress once again aggrandized itself at the 
expense of the
President despite constituttonal provisions making the President accountable to the 
people when he
makes certain budgetary decisions. Congress simply took executive power for 
itself, thereby en-
crouching upon and arrogating to itself particular matters for which the Constitution 
makes the
President accountable. The danger of such encroachment is that it violates the 
carefully desigtted
pi cedure set forth in the Constitution for the resolution of budgetary matters. One 
central purpose
of the new Constitution waa to finance a national government, and the framers 
atructured the Con-
stitution to ensure that neither Congress nor the President have disproportionate 
power over budget-
ary decisions. See Buckley v. Valeo. 424 U.S. 1. 122 (1976) (describing the checks and balances
created by the Constitution as "a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment 
or aggrandize-
ment of one branch at the expense of the other").
270. See. e.g.. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. as 2610-11, 2622-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
271. See id. at 2608. 2620.
272. See id. at 2637-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
273. See supra note 264.
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not apply to judicial removal of judges. Although the President needs
removal power to ensure uniform application of the laws, to protect the
civil liberties of all citizens, and to ensure the laws are faithfully exe-
cuted, the judiciary does not need removal power to discipline its own
members or to discharge its particular constitutional duties.
Fourth, Morrison suggests that a balancing test may resolve disputes
between Congress and the President regarding possible inroads by Con-
gress on the President's prosecution power. This balancing test reflects
deference to congressional innovations with the mutable allocation of
powers set forth in the Constitution.
Finally, the decision indicates that the constitutionality of congres-
sional innovations with mutable allocation of powers within the Consti-
tution may be judged by whether they violate what the original allocation
was structured to protect. Ultimately, it is possible to determine the ex-
tent to which impeachment is the exclusive means for removing federal
judges only by determining whether allowing the federal judiciary to dis-
cipline and remove its own members in addition to or as an alternative to
the impeachment procedure violates any of the fundamental principles or
values the third branch was structured to protect.
3. Reading the "Good Behaviour" and the Impeachment Clauses
Together.
(a) The meaning of hfe tenure.-The first step in determining
what the judiciary was specifically structured to protect is determining
how to read the impeachment clauses in conjunction with the constitu-
tional provision that federal judges "shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour."2 4 Constitutional commentators have read these clauses two
ways. First, some commentators maintain that the good behavior clause
does not create a basis for removal other than those specified in the im-
peachment clauses.27s To these commentators, the good behavior clause
simply provides federal judges with the special status of life tenure."
6
These commentators then read the impeachment clauses as adding that
the life tenure of a federal judge may be prematurely interrupted or
ended only by removal for an impeachable offense, not misbehavior. Sec-
274. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § I. The phrase "during good Behaviour" appeared in various state
constitutions as well as the first draft of the federal constitution. See R. BERGER, Supra note 14, at
147-49, 152 n.137.
275. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 159-65.
276. See id. at 161; cf. Kramer & Barron, The Constitutionality of Removal and Mandatory
Retirement Procedures for the Federal Judiciary: The Meaning of "During Good Behavior." 35 GEO.
wASH. L. REv. 455, 458.59 (1967) (summarizing the opinions of several commentators that
"[ilmpeachment is the only means by which a Federal judge can be got rid of").
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ond, other commentators argue that the good behavior and impeachment
clauses make sense only if they are collectively read as providing that
federal judges may serve for life subject to removal for an impeachable
offense or for having engaged in misbehavior. " Essentially, these com-
mentators maintain that federal judges are subject to a loose impeach-
ment standard because they are removable for misbehavior while all
other impeachable officials are removable-by impeachment--only for
"Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."2 7 8
The major problem with the second reading of the good behavior
and impeachment clauses is that it is inconsistent with the historical and
structural contexts of these clauses. First, history indicates that the
framers included the phrase "during good Behaviour" in the Constitu-
tion to contrast the unlimited term of federal judges with the fixed terms
of the President, Vice President, and members of Congress. 279 Under the
more historically accurate view of the good behavior clause, both federal
judges with unfixed terms and high-level officials with fixed terms may
have their terms of office ended prematurely if there is a Senate convic-
tion for "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."
As one commentator explains, "no evidence exists that the framers de-
sired to compromise the independence of federal judges by making it eas-
ier to remove them."no
Second, there was never any serious dispute before, during, or after
the Constitutional Convention about whether federal judges would have
life tenure or whether life tenure was crucial to the independence of the
federal judiciary.28 I At the Constitutional Convention, the framers never
277. See. e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 11913 (1970) (statement of then-Congressman Gerald Ford, in
connection with the attempted impeachment of Justice Douglas, that "an impeachable offense is
whtever a majority of the House of Representatives considers [it) to be at a given moment in his-
toy"); M. OTts. A PROPOSED TRIBUNAL: IS IT CONSTITUTIONAL? 37 (1939) (asserting that "[a)
judge may be impeached for any misbehavior or misconduct which terminates his right to continue
in office").
278. For example, the President and other executive officers may not be removed simply for
misconduct or misbehavior; they may only be removed for having committed one of the serious
impeachable offenses specified in the Constitution. See U.S. CONsT. art. I1. § 4.
279. Although the Constitution provides that federal judges may serve during good behavior, the
Constitution puts limits on the terms of the President and the Vice President and members of Con-
grcss: the President may serve no more than two terms of four years each and must be elected
separately for each term he serves. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, I 1; id. amend. XXII. The Vice Presi-
dent serves for only four year terms at the pleasure of the President who chooses him. See id.
Members of the House of Representatives must run for re-election every two years, see id. art. I, § 2.
and members of the Senate must run for re-election every six years, see id. art. 1, § 3. In contrast to
all of these, federal judges, once they are confirmed by the Senate. are allowed to serve for life. See
id. at art. III, § I.
280. Rotunda, supra note 13, at 720.
281. See U.S. CONsT. art. Ill. § 1. See also Garvey, Foreword: Judicial Discipline and Inpeach-
ment, 76 Ky. L.J. 633, 637 (1988) (observing that "judicial independence is first and foremost an
wavered from their desire to eliminate the problem they had experienced
in the colonies of having judges who simply did what the king told them
to do and who lacked the courage or latitude to do what was right or
just. In article III, the framers solved this problem by giving federal
judges life tenure and a guarantee of undiminished compensation, meas-
ures that the framers considered integral to preserving the judiciary's
place in the new government's system of checks and balances? 2" The
framers recognized that life tenure and irreducible compensation were
necessary if federal judges were to have the freedom and power to exer-
cise judicial review as intended. As Alexander Hamilton later explained,
the federal judiciary should serve as a necessary bulwark against legisla-
tive aggrandizement and majoritarian tyranny. 283 The framers envi-
sioned the federal courts as a safe haven for people trying to protect their
civil liberties against actions by either the President or Congress. In
short, there was never any serious question at, during, or after the Con-
stitutional Convention that the federal judiciary's role in the new system
of checks and balances was to protect the people from the excesses of
other branches.
The relevance of article III's guarantees of an independent judiciary
and the impeachment clauses to the judiciary's removal of its members
for misconduct has been vigorously debated for years.284 The key to iden-
tifying the relevance is determining (1) whether the constitutional guar-
antees of life tenure and undiminished compensation protect the
independence of federal judges both individually and collectively and (2)
if the constitutional guarantee of independence was meant to protect
judges individually, whether protecting federal judges from discipline or
removal by their peers is necessary for judicial independence. The con-
stitutional guarantees of life tenure and undiminished compensation
plainly pertain to individual judges. Judicial independence must be pro-
tected from internal as well as external attack; otherwise, the external
protections the judiciary enjoys could be easily undermined from within.
As Judge Harry Edwards has observed, "it seems obvious that judicial
independence may 'just as easily be eroded by powerful hierarchies
within the judiciary itself as by outside pressures from the legislative and
aspect of separation of powers. The tenure and compensation provisions of Article Ill protect fed-
eral judges against Congress and the President, because that is where the danger lies.").
282. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 464-72 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiler ed. 1961).
283. See id. at 467-70.
284. See Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 770 F.2d 1093, 1106 & n. 10 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (Edwards, J., concurring) (discussing arguments for and against the proposition that the
judiciary may constitutionally discipline its own members).
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executive branches of the government.' "25
Even though the language, structure, and history of the impeach-
ment clauses arguably support the view that impeachment is the sole
means for removing federal judges, this conclusion must somehow be
squared with the Act of 1790, which automatically disqualified any fed-
eral judge convicted of bribery. The Act of 1790 aimed to achieve at
least three objectives. First, it sought to streamline the Constitution's
impeachment procedure by automatically disqualifying from office a
judge convicted of a listed impeachable offense-bribery. In effect, Con-
gress tried to save itself the time and trouble of conducting impeachment
trials and removal proceedings for federal judges convicted of bribery
when Congress was convinced that it would have removed and disquali-
fied such judges. Congress may streamline impeachment in this manner
by combining its powers under the necessary and proper clause 286 and
the impeachment clauses.287
Second, in the Act, Congress partially delegated its impeachment
authority to criminal juries. This delegation, however, actually worked
to the advantage of federal judges. The framers took great pains to dis-
tinguish impeachment proceedings from criminal trials,288 and Congress
declared through the Act of 1790 that only federal judges found beyond a
reasonable doubt to have violated the bribery laws would be automati-
cally removed and disqualified from office. In a typical impeachment
proceeding, there is no reason to believe that impeachable officials are
entitled to a standard of proof as high as beyond a reasonable doubt and
to a unanimous fact-finder.289
Third, the Act's delegation of impeachment authority is constitu-
tional because it rests on the notion that judges are not immune from and
must comply with the criminal law. The Act of 1790 did not threaten
205. Id. at 1107 (Edwards, J., concurring) (quoting Ervin, supra note 21, at 125).
286. The necessary and proper clause provides that the Congress shall have the power "to make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. 1. § 8 (18).
287. See L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 301. Professor Tribe observed that the necessary and proper
clause
remains important as an explicit incorporation within the language of the Constitution of
the doctrine of implied power: The exercise by Congress ofpower ancillary to an enumer-
ated source of national authority is constitutionally valid. so long as the ancillary power does
not conflict with external limitations such as those of the Bill of Rights and of federalism.
Id.
288. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 3.
289. The Constitution provides for no specific burden of proof applicable to impeachment pro-
ceedings; the unusual nature of an impeachment proceeding, however, combining characteristics of
both criminal and civil trials suggests that the burden of persuasion in a typical impeachment pro-
ceeding should be less than beyond a reasonable doubt. See C. BLACK, supra note 13, at 16-19.
judicial independence because the Act was not directed at any essential
judicial activity. Rather, the Act focused on specific criminal miscon-
duct by federal judges. The Act did not threaten judicial independence,
because it did not punish or prohibit any conduct central to the perform-
ance of a judge's constitutional obligations. The constitutional duties
and responsibilities of a federal judge neither require nor necessitate any
criminal misconduct. In short, the Act of 1790 demonstrated that care-
fully tailored legislation passed pursuant to the constitutional authority
of Congress, directed at no essential judicial conduct, and preserving the
independence of federal judges individually and collectively is an addi-
tional method of removing federal judges. Thus, impeachment is the
traditional but not the only means for removing federal judges.
The good behavior clause meant to guarantee that federal judges
receive life tenure, that they may not be removed from office under a
looser standard than the President or other impeachable officials, and
that they may not be removed simply for "misbehavior." Federal judges,
however, may be removed from office on a different basis from other
impeachable officials. The different responsibilities of various officials
under the Constitution justify different reasons or bases for the impeach-
ment and removal of those officials.29 Impeachable offenses involve
abuses against the state, but abuses against the state or serious miscon-
duct in office are not necessarily the same for all impeachable officials.
For example, a federal judge might be impeached and removed for lying
about his law school performance, but an executive official probably
would not be.291 Although such behavior in a judge undermines respect
for the office and the authority of the judge, the lie about law school
performance does not have as serious an effect on an executive official.
The differences in the officials' responsibilities and the degree to which
290. See Book Note, supra note 116. at 913-14.
291. In 1803, District Judge John Pickering was removed from office for drunkenness and blas-
phemy, which the Congress found to be inappropriate for a federal judge. However, Congress has
never impeached, much less removed, any executive official for such behavior. The difference may
possibly be explained by the fact that such behavior (which included insanity in Judge Pickering's
case) is particularly unseemly for a federal judge, who may be disciplined primarily through im-
pcachment, while the executive oficial may be disciplined either by the President (who may fire
him), the head of his departinent (if the person is not himself the head of a department), or impeach-
ment, which is the most cumbersome of all the methods. The Senate's recent rejection of Senator
John Tower as President Bush's Secretary of Defense was. no doubt, based in part on his prior
history of drunkenness. See Church, Is This Goodbye? A Senate Committee Stuns Bush by Rcjecuing
Tower's Nomination. TIME. Mar. 6, 1989. at 18. However, the Senate has an easier standard to meet
for rejecting nominees than for removing officials after confirmation. Rejecting a nominee requires
only a simple majority vote, whereas removing an executive official requires at least two-thirds of the
members present. It is likely that had such behavior continued or manifested itself after Senator
Tower had been confirmed he would have been subjected to considerable public (if not presidential)
pressure to reform and remove himself that would have made use of the impeachment process
unnecessary.
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the offensive conduct reflects a violation of those responsibilities explain
the different results.
(b) The constitutionality of alternatives to impeachment for re-
moving federal judges
(i) Chandler.-Even though the Act of 1790 suggested
that impeachment is not the exclusive means for removing federal judges,
it is unclear what other methods are available to remove federal judges.
The answer depends entirely on whether the alternative means for re-
moval threatens or violates the independence of the federal judiciary in-
di idually or collectively. With respect to judges disciplining or
removing other judges, the question virtually suggests the answer: there
is little doubt that giving judges this power threatens federal judges' inde-
pendence not only from other branches but also from other federal
judges.
Over the years, Congress has made many attempts to involve judges
in monitoring, disciplining, and sometimes removing their peers.
92
More often than not, these attempts have involved the judicial councils,
groups of sitting judges originally established by Congress to deal with
administrative problems within the court system, which the judges prop-
erly administer.293 The two major constitutional questions that have
emerged regarding the judicial councils are, first, whether they constitu-
tionally may monitor caseloads and discipline poor judicial performance
as an administrative matter,29 4 and second, whether they constitutionally
may investigate, discipline, and make recommendations to Congress re-
garding impeachment for certain judicial misconduct.29 5
One of the first.and most heated debates about the constitutionality
of allowing judges to discipline other judges arose in Chandler v. Judicial
Council of the Tenth Circuit.296 Acting pursuant to a 1948 law empower-
292. See. e.g., S. 1506. 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969) (attempting to create a five-judge commission
that would remove a judge after a formal hearing subject to Supreme Court review), noted in Kur-
land, supra note 14. at 665; Act of Feb. 13. 1801, ch. 4. 2 Stat. 89 (1850) (repealed by Act of Mar. 8.
1802, Ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132 (1850)) (creating an alternate means of removing a judge but raising ques-
tions of constitutionality that eventually led to repeal), noted in Kurland, supra note 14, at 670.
293. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 902 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1982))
(setting forth the procedure to be followed in each circuit for the establishment and organization of a
judicial council to make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the
courts within each circuit).
294. See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit. 398 U.S. 74, 85 (1970) (asserting that
"if one judge in any system refuses to abide by such reasonable procedures (for conducting judicial
business] it can hardly be that the extraordinary machinery of impeachment is the only recourse").
295. See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1982).
296. 398 U.S. 74, 88 (1970) (dismissing second appeal for lack of jurisdiction in light of the fact
that Judge Chandler may have still had other avenues of relief available to him); see also Chandler v.
Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 382 U.S. 1003, 1003 (1966) (miscellaneous order) (characteriz-
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ing it to make appropriate rules for tle proper administration of its court
business,2 97 the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit determined that
Judge Stephen Chandler, then Chief Judge of the Western District of
Oklahoma, was "unable or unwilling to discharge efficiently the duties of
his office."298 The Council ordered him to take no further action in any
pending case, distributed his caseload to the remaining judges of the dis-
trict, and directed that no new cases be assigned to him until further
notice. 9 9 Judge Chandler challenged the Council's actions, but the
Supreme Court denied his application for a stay of the Council's order,
characterizing the Council's action as "entirely interlocutory in charac-
ter" pending prompt inquiry by the Council into the administration of
judicial business in the Tenth Circuit.3 After a hearing, the Council
ordered that Judge Chandler could retain some of his original caseload.
On a second appeal, the Supreme Court decided that because Judge
Chandler might have had other avenues of relief left open to him, the
Court was relieved from having to review the merits of the Council's
order.A0
Dissenting, Justices Black and Douglas asserted that the Constitu-
tion established Congress, "acting under its limited power of impeach-
ment," as the sole agency of government that may hold a federal judge
accountable for the administration of his court and effectively deprive
him of his office, even temporarily. 302 Providing only marginal support
for their assertion, Justices Black and Douglas argued that full judicial
independence could be maintained only by recognizing impeachment as
the exclusive means of removing or disciplining individual federal
judges.303
The problem with the Chandler dissent is that claiming impeach-
ment, with the exception of the Act of 1790 or like measures, to be the
exclusive means for removing federal judges is not inconsistent with al-
lowing the judicial councils broad power to deal with administrative mat-
ters within their jurisdictions.304 No doubt, the judicial councils could
ing the Judicial Council's initial order to suspend Judge Chandler temporarily until a full hearing as
interlocutory and a basis for dismissing his first appeal).
297. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 332, 62 Stat. 902 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 332
(1982)).
298. Chandler, 382 U.S. at 1004 (miscellaneous order) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting the judi-
cial council of the Tenth Circuit in its order directing that Judge Chandler take no action in any case
or proceeding now or hereafter pending).
299. See id.
300. Id. at 1003.
301. See Chandler. 398 U.S. at 86.
302. Chandler, 382 U.S. at 1006 (miscellaneous order) (Black, J., dissenting).
303. See Chandler, 398 U.S. at 136, 140 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
304. See id. at 89, 119 (Harlan, J., concurring).
71
70
Impeachment and Its AlternativesTexas Law Review
rearrange or even reschedule much of a judge's caseload if the judge were
either slow or critically ill. As a matter of American common law, as
well as English common law-which the framers never evidenced any
intent to abrogate-judges have historically had the power to make ad-
ministrative decisions regqrding the operation of the courts that they su-
pervise.30 It logically follows that if a judge suffers from some infirmity
such as a heart attack, then the appropriate judicial council has the
power to transfer that judge's caseload, at least temporarily, to someone
else. For all practical purposes, the Judicial Council for the Tenth Cir-
cuit did just this by temporarily depriving Judge Chandler of his caseload
because of his persistent failure to diminish his backlog.
The key for reconciling Chandler with the Act of 1790 and for find-
ing what the Judicial Council did in Chandler constitutional is to recog-
nize what removal means. Removal results in the permanent loss of the
judge's power to decide cases or controversies and the forfeiture of any
pension, benefits, and opportunity to serve on judicially related panels
such as the Judicial Council.3 06 Removing a caseload because of illness
or a backlog is not the same as permanent removal and disqualification
as the result of a successful impeachment and conviction. Acknowledg-
ing that judicial councils have the ability to make administrative deci-
sions curtailing a judge's responsibilities does not mean that judges either
lose their titles or have been rendered permanently disabled from dis-
charging their constitutional duties as judges. Judicial councils simply
have administrative responsibility for the smooth functioning of a court
system, and the councils' administrative responsibilities must necessarily
include the power to move caseloads and occasionally diminish them for
the sake of orderly administration. Although it may be difficult to draw
the line between administrative convenience and outright removal, it is
clear that removal through impeachment has a precise meaning and that
w' at;happened to Judge Chandler was not, in intent or effect, removal
through impeachment.
Equally important, the administrative power wielded by the judicial
councils does not threaten or violate judicial independence. Although
the framers seemed to explicitly discuss only the problem of judicial inde-
pendence from the other branches, real judicial independence also rests
on freedom from coercion or intimidation by one's fellow judges. Unde-
sirable coercion can come as easily from within as from without. Grant-
ing sitting judges the power to evaluate the suitability of allowing other
judges to retain their offices injects an element of intimidation that, no
305. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 174-80.
306. See U.S. CONsT. art. Ill, § 1.
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doubt, would threaten not only collegiality among judges but also in-
dependent judicial decision making itself.30' The point is that the power
to remove or even the power to initiate a removal injects insecurity
among those targeted by such power, and once those targeted feel com-
promised by the exercise of removal power, judicial independence is chil-
led, if not directly violated.
An appellate court's power to review lower court rulings is quite
different from an appellate court's power to make decisions about
whether a lower court judge can remain in office. The appellate court's
review of lower court rulings merely directs lower courts on the proper
application or interpretation of the law, but the appellate court's removal
power inevitably suggests that it can retaliate for anything arguably im-
proper the lower court judge has personally or professionally done. Con-
sequently, the administrative action undertaken by the Tenth Circuit
Judicial Council in Chandler was constitutional because the power
wielded by the Council did not send a signal to other judges in the Cir-
cuit that personal animosity or disagreements might lead to disciplinary
actions. The Council's action merely indicated that sometimes a drastic
but temporary action must be taken to ensure the speedy, efficient, and
timely disposition of a district's caseload.
(ii) The Judicial Disability Act.-The passage of the Judi-
cial Disability Act sparked considerable controversy over the constitu-
tionally permissible role of the federal judiciary in investigating and
disciplining its own members. The Act provides that anyone can file a
complaint against a judge with the clerk of the appropriate court of ap-
peals. 3 0 8 A special committee investigates complaints that cannot be re-
solved by the chief judge. 30 When the special committee concludes
there is merit to a complaint, the judicial council 3lo is then directed to
take appropriate action, which may include censure, reprimand, tempo-
rary suspension, and transfer of cases, but not removal from office.3'' If
the judicial council believes that it has uncovered grounds for impeach-
ment, the council is empowered to report its findings to the Judicial Con-
307. Collegiality should not be underestimated as something important to the orderly process of
judicial decision making. After all, circuit judges and Supreme Court justices must serve together on
the same respective panels, presumably for many years. Even federal district judges are aided by
collegiality because they occasionally sit as designated judges on appellate panels and must work
with other district judges either in conferences or in administering the affairs of their particular
districts. See generally Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681. 716 (1979)
(arguing that "{tlhe only way to protect judicial independence is to provide judges secure tenure").
308. See 28 U.S.C. *372 (c)(1) (1982).
309. See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(4)-(5) (1982).
310. See 28 U.S.C 5 372(c)(6) (1982).
31I. See 28 U.S.C. I 372 (c)(6) (1982).
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ference of the United States, which after an investigation, 
may report its
findings to the House of Representatives. 
3 12
Opponents of the Act maintain that its primary constitutional defect
is that it seriously threatens individual judicial independence. 3di The
critics maintain that the judicial council's powers to investigate and disci-
pline threaten independent decision making, which may 
only occur in an
atmosphere in which the decision maker may act without fear of reprisal,
coercion, or intimidation. d4
Critics also believe there are serious separation of powers and im-
peachment clause issues arising from the legislative attempt to authorize
the judiciary to invoke disciplinary suspensions against individual mem-
bers found guilty of "misconduct." In addition, critics suggest that there
may be serious due process questions raised by the Act's preclusion 
of
judicial review of actions by the judicial councils and the Judicial Confer-
enc of the United States."' First, the critics maintain that the separa-
tion of powers doctrine and article III's guarantee 
of judicial
independence preclude Congress from empowering judicial councils to
temporarily suspend any judge "whose conduct is the subject of a com-
plaint." 3t 6 The separation of powers problem arises, they 
assert, when
Congress "imposes its preferences on the judiciary's governance of its
internal affairs." 3t 7 Furthermore, the critics argue that 
the judiciary's
inherent powers of self-regulation do not extend beyond purely adminis-
trative matters and that Congress exceeded its authority by telling the
judicial branch how to deal with its own internal ethical problems. These
critics equate a long suspension with removal.
3
Second, the critics maintain that the Act does not provide for judi-
cial review of bias on the part of the judicial councils' investigators or
decision makers.3 19 The critics point out that judicial councils have the
authority to investigate and to discipline, but consolidation 
of such pow-
erg 'within the judicial councils may preclude fair and impartial decisions.
312. See 28 U.S.C. I 372(c)(7)-(c)(8) (1982).
313. See. e.g.. Halstings v. Judicial Conference of the United 
States, 770 F.2d 1093, 1105-1l
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Edwards, J., concurring) (expressing concern that the 
Act "might be misused to
pressure or intimidate the nonconformist"); Kaufman. The Essence of 
Judicial Intdependence, 80
COLUm. L. REV. 671, 700 (1980); Kaufman. supra note 307. at 713.
314. See Kaufman, sup~ra note 307.
315. See, e.g., Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United 
States. 829 F.2d 91. 103-08 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (dismissing facial and as applied due process claims); United States 
v. Claiborne, 765 F.2d
784, 790-96 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding Judge Claiborne's conviction against 
attacks on grand jury
procedure).
3 16. 28 U.S.C. § 372 (c)(6)(B)(iv) (1982).
317. Hastings, 770 F.2d at 1108 (Edwards, J., concurring).
318. See id. at 1108-09.
319. See supro note 315.
Without judicial review, the target pf an investigation must hope that the
judicial council is not motivated by prejudice or personal animosity.
Those who defend the Act argue that, because the judicial councils
lack the power to remove the target of an investigation, the Act provides
at most "a method of controlling judicial ethics without curbing judicial
independence in a way that threatens judicial review." 320 They argue
that, as far as impeachment and removal are concerned, the Act does not
provide for anything that would not exist in the absence of the Act. Even
if there were no Act, judges still would have the power available to any
citizen to complain to the House of Representatives that there are
grounds for impeachment against a partibular judge. Thus, the defenders
argue, if the Act merely codifies something that would otherwise exist
without constitutional infringement, then the Act in no way violates the
Constitution. Moreover, they maintain that the Constitution does not
require that the House alone perform all investigatory work regarding an
impeachment.32 1 As with the Independent Counsel Act's provisions, the
Judicial Disability Act simply provides a reporting mechanism rather
than a substitute for impeachment.
Defenders also dismiss the particular constitutional challenges
against the Act. For example, they argue that the investigatory tasks
given to the judges under the Act, including the subpoena power, are
administrative-not executive-in nature; therefore, Chandler controls
disposition of any constitutional claims against the Act's delegation of
investigatory power to the judiciary.32 Defenders also dismiss the claim
that the complaint procedure threatens judicial independence because (1)
Congress could have reasonably determined that granting federal judges
the power to investigate complaints against fellow judges was in the pub-
lic interest and helped to maintain the independence of the judiciary, (2)
judges are likely to be particularly respectful of other judges' indepen-
dence because they are in a position to appreciate the meaning of judicial
independence, and (3) many of the actions under the Act depend upon
the voluntary compliance of the judge and do not, therefore, include or
promote coercion within the judiciary.323
Notwithstanding the arguments of the Act's defenders, by delegat-
320. Garvey, supra note 281. at 638.
321. See Tuttle & Russel, Preserving Judicial Integrity: Some Comments on the Role of the Judi-
ciary Under the "Blending" of Powers, 37 EMORY L.J. 586, 610 (1988) (arguing that judicial partici-
pation in investigation merely takes advantage of "the Framers' blending of governmental powers");
Note, Unnecessary and Improper, supra note 21, at 1140 (asserting that the impeachment process can
be greatly streamlined by having subcommittees perform preliminary functions subject to approval
by the full House or Senate).
322. See Hastings, 783 F.2d at 1504-05.
323. See id. at 1507-08.
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ing the.House's constitutional power to investigate impeachments to the
judiciary, the Act impermissibly threatens the independence of judges
both individually and collectively.' Article Ill's guarantees of life tenure
and undiminished compensation protect the independence of the federaljudiciary from the other branches. 24 At the same time, the guarantee of
independence runs to individual judges. As Judge Harry Edwards has
observed, the constitutional
assurances of life tenure and undiminished salaries pertain directly
to individual judges. . . [H]ow could the underlying purpose of
those assurances-to foster independent decisionmaking-be
achieved other than by protecting the independence of individual
decisionmakers? Even when judges sit in panels, our confidence in
their collective decisionmaking is predicated on the assumption
that each judge will make an independent and reasoned evaluation
of the issues. 325
In other words, to be meaningful, article III's guarantees must protectjudges not only collectively from other branches, but also individually
from harassment by other judges (even for misconduct that may arguably
be the basis for an impeachment). Absent protection for the indepen-
dence of individual federal judges from coercion from within as well as
from without the judiciary, judicial independence becomes highly un-
likely. By empowering federal judges to initiate complaints and investi-
gations against other federal judges and by formalizing the complaint
procedure, the Act increases the potential for some federal judges to in-
timidate and harass others. Indeed, many sitting judges have expressed
their concern "that the provisions of the Act might be subject to abuse-
that they might be misused to pressure or intimidate the nonconformist,
the judge whose judicial style or legal philosophy are [sic] repugnant to
the majority of his or her colleagues."326
The Act allows judges to initiate investigations against other judges
324. See. e.g.. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); id. No. 79,
at 472-74; see also 2 CONVENTION RECORDs. supra note 1. at 34 (noting the delegates' interest in
maintaining judicial independence). See generally Fratcher, The Independence of the JudiciaryUnder the Constitution of 1787. 53 Mo. L. REV. I (1988).
325. Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 770 F.2d 1093. 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(Edwards, J., concurring). But see Edwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining "GoodBehavior"for Federal Judges, 87 Mica. L. REv. 765. 785 (1989) (qualifying Judge Edwards' earlier
view to acknowledge his current "beliel[ that individual judges are subject to some measure of
control by their peers with respect to behavior or infirmity that adversely altects the work of the
court and that does not rise to the level of impeachable conduct."). The problem with Judge Ed-
wards' revised view that judges should monitor themselves with respect to misconduct falling short
of impeachable conduct is that there is no clear line between what constitutes impeachable conduct
and misbehavior falling short of it. The process of such line-drawing is beller left to the branch
entrusted by the Constitution to define impeachable conduct-Congress. See infra notes 361-397
and accompanying text.
326. Hastings, 770 F.2d at 1107 (Edwards, J., concurring).
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for misconduct that does not approach specific violations of laws. It
would be a different case if Congress had passed a law under which on its
own initiative Congress could delegate to judicial councils the authorityto investigate whether certain judges violated certain laws. This Act,however, rests on the unrealistic assumption that judges can complain
against, investigate, make disciplinary recommendations, and discipline
other judges without risking the independence each judge must have in
order to make decisions without fear of reprisal or harassment.27 TheAct, thus, impermissibly violates the independence guaranteed to individ-
ual federal judges by article III. Informal complaints by some federaljudges against others, however, do not run the risk of stigmatizing orlending the kind of prestige or aura of implirtiality that normally attaches
to formal, collective judicial decision making.
4. The Permissibility of Allowing Prosecution, Indictment, or Im-prisonment of Federal Judges Prior to Impeachment.-On three occa-
sions, federal appellate courts have rejected arguments that impeachment
of federal judges must precede their indictment,328 prosecution,29 or im-
prisonment.33o The unsuccessful arguments rest on the belief that indict-
ment, prosecution, or imprisonment of federal judges should be
prohibited prior to an impeachment because the targeted judges are effec-tively removed in violation of the constitutional principle that impeach-
ment is the exclusive means of removing federal judges.
United States v. Isaacs33' was the first case in which a defendant
asserted that indictment and prosecution prior to impeachment were tan-tamount to removal without an impeachment conviction. DenyingJudge Otto Kerner's application to stay his prosecution for conspiracy,tax evasion, and perjury, the Seventh Circuit in Isaacs held that federaljudges could be indicted and prosecuted before impeachment because theConstitution did not expressly forbid the criminal prosecution of federaljudges and because precedent established that Senators could be crimi-
nally prosecuted prior to their expulsion from the Senate. 3 2 The Sev-
enth Circuit found no justification for disparate treatment for Senators
327. See id. at 1105-11.
328. See United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1142 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 417 U.S. 976(1974).
329. See Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States 829 F.2d 91, 99-100 (D.C. Cir.
1987); United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842, 848-49 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984);Isaacs, 493 F.2di at 1124.330. See Claiborne, 727 F.2d at 842.
331. 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.). cer. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).332. Id. at 1143-44.
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and federal judges with respect to indictment and prosecution."'
In the more recent case of United States v. Claiborne,3 14 the Ninth
Circuit rejected Judge Harry Claiborne's claim that conviction and im-
pending imprisonment prior to his impeachment were unconstitutional
because they violated the constitutional prohibition against removal of
federal judges through any means other than impeachment.", Judge
Claiborne buttressed his claim with two major arguments. First, he re-
lied on article I, section 3, clause 7, which provides that "the Party con-
victed [by the Senate] shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
Indictment, Trial, Judgement and Punishment, according to law." 6
Judge Claiborne suggested that the "Party convicted" language presup-
poses that any disruption of an article III judge's life tenure should occur
first through impeachment and only subsequently through criminal pros-
ecution; otherwise, the past tense "convicted" has no meaning. 3 7
The problem with Judge Claiborne's first argument is that it ignores
both history and the plain meaning of the relevant constitutional lan-
guage. The Constitution suggests through unambiguous language and
structure that impeachment and criminal prosecution are separate pro-
ceedings and thus are not mutually exclusive.338 Constitutional language
and structure indicate that the framers included the "Party convicted"
language to preclude the argument that the doctrine of double jeopardy
saves the offender from an impeachment or removal trial.339 Nothing in
the Constitution mandates impeachment before criminal prosecution or
prohibits criminal prosecution prior to or after impeachment; rather, the
Constitution reflects the framers' vision of separate proceedings un-
folding in no particular order. As Professor Steven Burbank has
explained,
the impeachment process and the criminal process serve different
purpopes, albeit the jurisdictions sometimes overlap. In such a
schenie, principles of double jeopardy have no role to play. Just as
conduct need not be criminal to justify impeachment and removal,
so the fact that conduct does not justify impeachment and removal
does not mean that it is not criminal. It is inconceivable to me, as
it was to Justice Story, that the framers intended to bar the prose-
cution of one impeached but not convicted and thus inconceivable
that the Constitution should be read to require removal before
333. See id. at I144.
334. 765 F.2d 784 (9th Citr. 1985), appeal denied, 781 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir.), stay of execution
denied, 790 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1986).
335. United States v. Claiborne. 727 F.2d 842, 846 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 469 U.S. 829 (1984).
336. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3. cl. 7.
337. See Claiborne, 727 F.2d at 845-46.
338. See U.S. CONsT. art. 1. § 3, cl. 7; id. art. 111, § 2, cl. 3.
339. See Burbank, supra note 92, at 667-70.
prosecution.34 o3
Judge Claiborne's second, more powerful argument was that impris-
oning him while he was still an article III judge amounted to depriving
him of his office. 3 4  He argued that depriving him of his office before
impeachment not only skirted the constitutionally mandated procedural
safeguards for removal, but also created a "constitutional . . . collision
between two branches of our government" by compelling a sitting article
III judge "to surrender to the custody of the Attorney General, an officer
of the executive branch; . . . [and to] be confined outside his district,
disenabled from performing judicial functions '3P To Judge Claiborne,
life tenure meant that "a judge has judicial authority unless and until
that power is stripped by congressional impeachment."33 In his view,
the legislature, not the Executive, has been charged with removingjudges; therefore, the Attorney General's bypass of the impeachment
process violated separation of powers principles.34 Judge Claiborne con-
cluded that because criminal prosecution necessarily presupposes the po-
tential for imprisonment (a de facto removal from office), prosecution
before impeachment must be prohibited. 3"
The Ninth Circuit found an unusual basis on which to reject Judge
Claiborne's second argument that impeachment of federal judges must
precede their prosecution and imprisonment. Maintaining that "federaljudges (can] be removed from office only by impeachment," the court
reasoned that because the Supreme Court had ruled in Isaacs that crimi-
nal prosecution and conviction of a Senator does not ipso facto "vacate
the seat of the convicted Senator, nor compel the Senate to expel him or
to regard him as expelled by force alone of the judgment," neither werejudges automatically removed "by force alone of the judgment."346
Critics of Claiborne find this analogy unpersuasive because they do
not believe the analogy definitively answers the question whether impris-
onment (as opposed to conviction) prior to impeachment is constitution-
ally permissible.347 In addition, they argue, the analogy disregards thekey protections uniquely conferred upon the judiciary collectively andindividually. Claiborne critics contend that the protections accorded by
340. Id. at 669-70 (footnotes omitted); see also Claiborne, 727 F.2d at 846 (construing the rele-vant constitutional language as "assur[ing] that after impeachment a trial on criminal charges is notforeclosed by the principle of double jeopardy").
341. See Claiborne, 727 F.2d at 846.
342. Claiborne, 790 F.2d at 1360 (Kozinski. J., dissenting).
343. Calt, supra note 146, at 109.
344. See Claiborne, 727 F.2d at 846-47.
345. See id.
346. Id. at 846.
347. See, e.g., Note, In Defense of Standard, supra note 12, at 457.
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article Ili to ensure judicial independence require that judges must be
treated differently for purposes of criminal prosecution and imprison-
ment. In sum, these critics argue that in the area of criminal prosecution
and i nprisonment, Senators are not analogous to judges, because Sena-
tors lack an equivalent of judicial independence.
Both the Claiborne critics' understanding of the analogy to senato-
rial prosecution and their general argument that separation of powers
requires that federal judges be impeached prior to imprisonment are
flawed. First, just as judges are protected in their official capacity by
article III's guarantees of judicial independence, Senators enjoy the
broad protections of the speech and debate clause. 
4 8  Neither judicial
independence nor the speech and debate clause, however, protect judges
or Senators, respectively, from prosecutions for violations of the criminal
law. 4 9 In effect, the Claiborne critics maintain that judges are entitled to
a special immunity from criminal prosecution until they are impeached,
but there is no textual support for such an argument, and the concept of
judicial independence protects judges only as judges.3"0 Judges may have
the power to interpret the criminal law, but their official status does not
and should not ever immunize them from complying with it.351
Second, the Claiborne critics fail to understand the relationship be-
tween removal and impeachment. Assuming arguendo that, with the ex-
ception of measures such as the Act of 1790, impeachment is the
exclusive means for removing federal judges, imprisonment is not the
348. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, J 6, cl. I provides in pertinent part that
Itlhe Senators and Representatives shall . . . in all Cases. except Treason. Felony, and
Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at th e Session of
their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the samel and for any Speech
or Debate in either House. they shall not be questioned in any other Place.
349. $eW United States v. Lee, 106 1U.S. 196. 220 (1882) (holding that "[alit the officers of the
governent, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it");
Claiborne, 727 F.2d at 847 (holding that "Article III protections. though deserving utmost fidelity.
should not be expanded to insulate federal judges from punishment for their criminal wrongdoing").
350. See Burbank. sapro note 92, at 672.
351. However, Professor Alexander Bickel believed that the President should have 
a special im.
innity from certain criminal prosecutions, because otherwise it would be too easy to hinder through
harassing criminal prosecutions the P resident's ability to discharge his constitutional duties. See
Bickel, The Constitutional Tangle, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 6, 1973, at 14-15. The problem 
here is
that neither history nor general separation of powers principles favor making the President 
immune
from criminal prosecution. First, the framers never showed any intentiftn to allow any public off't-
cial, including the President, to be above the law. Second, there is the practical political reality that
only grave criminal actions would actually be allowed to proceed against a sitting President. Petty
criminal offenses would either be settled out of court or at least would not require 
the President's
personal involvement. More serious offenses might require the President's personal attention, in
which case there is a classic conflict between the impartial administration of criminal justice and the
need for the President to fulfill his constitutional duties. Since one of the President's constitutional
duties is to enforce the law, it would seem to make sense that a criminal prosecution is 
but one means
of ensuring that the President himself comply with some law he was otherwise 
obliged to enforce
even against himself
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same as removal. An imprisoned judge retains his title, salary, pension,
benefits, and, most important, the capacity to return to the bench with
full authority to decide cases and controversies. In fact, Judge Claiborne
continued to receive his salary as a federal judge during his incarcera-
tion.352 No doubt, imprisonment is an impediment to being a federal
judge, but it does not have the same effects as removal and disqualifica-
tion through impeachment conviction. As Professor Burbank has
observed,
[i]n the case of "removal from office," the framers had in mind the
formal termination of a commission or .9f tenure in office. Yes,
they were very concerned about judicial independence and yes, the
Constitution should be interpreted so as to accommodate situations
unforeseen and unforeseeable in 1787. But criminal proceedings
were not a threat to judicial independence unknown to the framers,
and . . . they were not a threat the framers deemed serious enough
to foreclose. 353
Third, the Claiborne critics ignore a particularly significant piece of
evidence undermining their view, the Act of 1790. That Act automati-
cally disqualified federal judges once they had been convicted of brib-
ery."3 4 It was obviously premised on the idea that a prosecution and
imprisonment might precede impeachment. Thus, the Act indicates that
the First Congress anticipated and accounted for criminal prosecutions
preceding impeachments as well as allowed for removal other than by
formal impeachment and conviction.
Finally, the inconvenience and unseemliness of having a federal
judge waiting for impeachment while sitting in prison may be resolved
without misinterpreting the Constitution as requiring that impeachment
of federal judges must precede their prosecution. For example, suitable
amendments to title 18 would allow postponing sentences in cases involv-
ing convicted impeachable officials until the official is impeached and
removed. 55 In addition, prosecution before impeachment can produce a
record that may be used to expedite an impeachment. As Professor Bur-
bank has suggested,
[i]f Congress did not view the conduct undergirding the conviction
as an impeachable offense, the judge could go free-as free as any-
one who escapes confinement but not the rigors of the process that
may lead to it-and prosecutors would know that not every con-
firmed peccadillo of a federal judge would result in an empty
352. See Claiborne, 765 F.2d at 788.
353. Burbank, supra note 92, at 671-72 (footnote omitted).
354. See supra text accompanying notes 285-91.
355. See id. at 670-71.
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bench, even temporarily. 5 6
Claiborne critics' analysis derives from two attitudes about impeach-
ment, neither of which has any place in constitutional interpretation.
First, the Claiborne critics are disturbed by the embarrassing picture of a
federal judge sitting in jail collecting his salary while Congress is trying
to speed up its impeachment procedure to keep pace with the criminal
justice system. Second, they are reacting to what they perceive as the
inefficient and cumbersome impeachment process. Ironically, the First
Congress suggested a solution to both these problems. Following the
lead of the First Congress in passing the Act of 1790, Congress could
pass a law automatically disqualifying federal judges convicted of im-
peachable offenses. Such a law, clearly constitutional, would not only
allow prosecution to precede impeachment, but would also permit con-
victions to facilitate removal by impeachment.
B. The Scope of Impeachable Offenses
In attempting to persuade the House of Representatives to impeach
Justice William 0. Douglas in April of 1970, then-Congressman Gerald
Ford observed that an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the
House of Representatives at any particular moment in time says it is.2"
Numerous commentators have taken issue with Ford's statement, which
candidly reveals that impeachments may be both motivated and resolved
by politics. 358 Ford's statement expresses the practical reality of im-
peachment far more closely than his critics' allegedly impartial analyses
of impeachable offenses; therefore, it is not surprising that his statement
spawned numerous attempts to circumscribe the scope of impeachable
offenses to reduce the influence of politics in initiating or propelling an
356. Id. at 671.
J 357. In April of 1970, then-Congressman Gerald Ford proposed initiating impeachment pro-
ceedings against Justice William o. Douglas. Ford catalogued various "offenses" Justice Douglas
allegedly committed, including associating with publishers of obscene publications and members of
the "new left." In addition. Ford suggested that Justice Douglas had failed to recuse himself in
several cases in which recusal would have been proper. 116 CONG. REc. 11.912 (1970). Ford
concluded
what then is an impeachable offense? The only honest answer is that impeachable offense
is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers 1it] to be at a given mo.
ment in history; conviction results from whatever offense or offenses two-thirds of the
other body considers to be sufliciently serious to require removal of the accused from
office.
Id. at 11.913.
358. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 14. at 159-65 (discussing the extent of misbehavior histori-
cally required as grounds for impeachment); Thompson & Pollitn, supra note 23, at 107 (criticizing
Ford's statements and showing a series of unsuccessful attempts at politically motivated impeach-
ment); Note, In Defense of Standards, supra note 12, at 444 n.135 (noting that the impeachment
proceedings called for by Ford were in retaliation for the rejection of two Nixon appointees to the
Supreme Court).
impeachment. But attempts to limit the scope of impeachable offenses
have.rarely proposed limiting impeachable offenses only to indictable of-fenses.359 Rather, the major disagreement among commentators hasbeen over the range of nonindictable offenses for which someone may be
impeached.360
The language and the history of the impeachment clauses provide
some useful insights into the scope of impeachable offenses. First, theConstitution offers a brief definition of the range of impeachable offenses
by providing that "all civil Officers of the United States, shall be re-
moved from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."3161 The Constitutiondefines treason as "consistfing] only in levying War against [the UnitedStates), or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Com-fort."162 "Bribery" has also been understood as encompassing an indict-
able crime, even though Congress did not make it an indictable crime
until 1790.363 The Constitution does not, however, define any of the
other impeachable offenses. Thus, the operative constitutional languageis subject to at least two different interpretations: one may argue eitherthat the term "high" modifies traditional categories of criminal offenses
or that the inclusion of some indictable crimes such as treason and brib-
ery as impeachable offenses does not limit impeachable offenses to indict-
able crimes.3"
Second, in the English experience impeachment was primarily apolitical proceeding, and impeachable offenses were political crimes. Forinstance, even though he ultimately shied away from the implications ofhis research, Raoul Berger observed that in the English experience
'[h]igh crimes and misdemeanors were a category of political crimes
against the state."36 Berger supports this observation with quotationsfrom relevant periods in which the speakers used terms equivalent to
"political" and "against the state" to identify the distinguishing charac-
359. See. e.g. R. ERGER. sapra note 14. at 70.73 (discussing the boundaries of impeachablemisconduct in eighteenth century England); 1. BRANT, stupra note 22. at I8O-SI1 (dividing impeacha-ble offenses into two categories: criminal conduct and dereliction of public duty). But see Thompson& Pollit. supra note 23. at 107, 18 (asserting that the House is reluctant to impeach unless anlofficial is accused of a serious crime).
360. Cf. R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 70.71 (discusaing the eighteenth century English politicalpractice of impeaching the king's favorites for giving him bad advice); Kurland, supra note 14. at 697(asserting the unconstitutionality of legislation aimed at defining the limits of good behavior).361. U.S. CONST. art. 11. § 4.362. Id. art. III, 3, cl. 1.
363. See id. art. 11, § 4; 1S U.S.C. ff 201-203 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); see also Act of Apr. 30,1790, ch. 9, § 21, 1 Stat. 42 (1845) (establishing bribery for the first time as a federal criminaloffense).
364. See R. BERGER, supra note 14. at 53-59.365. Id. at 61.
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teristics of an impeachable event. 366 In England, the criticalele ntoof
injury in an impeachable offense was injury to the state.
367 Blackstoe
traced this distinction to the ancient law of treason that distinguished
"high" treason, which was disloyalty against some superior, from "petit"
treason, which was disloyalty to an equal or an inferior.
36 Professor
Arthur Bestor has explained further that [tihis element of injury to the
commonwealththat is, to the state and to its constitution-was histori-
cally the criterion for distinguishing a 'high' crime or misdemeanor 
from
an ordinary one." 369 In summary, the English experience 
reveals that
there was a
difference of degree, not a difference of kind, separat[ing] E L high"
treason from other "high" crimes and misdemeanors [and that]
[t]he common element in English impeachment proceedings] was
obviously the injury done to the state and its constitution, whereas
among the particular offenses producing such injury some might
rank as treasons, some as felonies and some as misdemeanors,
among which might be included various offenses that in other con-
texts would fall short of actual criminality.
370
Third, both the delegates to, and the ratifiers of, the Constitutional
Convention understood impeachment as a political proceeding and im-
peachable offenses as essentially political crimes.
37 The delegates at the
Constitutional Convention were intimately familiar with impeachment 
in
colonial America, which, like impeachment in England, 
had basically
been a political proceeding. Although the debates at the Convention pri-
marily focused on the offenses for which the President could 
be both
impeached and removed, there was general agreement that 
the President
could be impeached only for so-called "great" offenses
3 72 Drawing in
366. Id. at 59-61.
367. See Bestor, supra n ote 13, at 264.
3611 See i d. (quoting C ar. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
75
(1765-1769)). Blackstonle commented that
[tlrcason . .. in it's [sic] very name (which is borrowed from the French) 
imports a be-
traying. treachery, or breach of faith. .. ITlreasofi is. ... a general 
appellation, made use of
by the law, to denote . .. that accumulation of guilt which 
arises whenever a superior
reposes a confidence in a subject or inferior, . . . and the inferior . .. so forgets 
the obliga-
tions of duty,' subjection.' and allegiance, as to destroy the life, of any 
such supertor or
lord. . .. [Tlherefore for a wife to kill her lord or husband, a servant 
his lord or master, and
an ecclesiastic his lord or ordinary; these, being breaches of the lower allegiance, 
of private
and domestic faith, are denominsated petit treasons. But when 
disloyalty so rears it's (sic]
crest, as to attack even majesty itself, it is called by way of eminent distinction 
high treason.
alto proditio; being equivalent to the rrimen laesoe mojestais of the Romatts.
Id.
369. Bestor, supra note 13, at 263-64.
370. Id. at 265.
371. See id. at 266.
372. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 88 (observing that "James Iredell, 
later a Supreme Court
Justice, told the North Carolina convention [during the rstification 
campaign] that the 'occasion for
i's exercise [impeachment] will arise from acts of great injury to the conimunlity* 
").
84
part upon their understanding of impeachable offenses in England, indi-
vidual delegates also gave examples of the types of conduct that they felt
justified impeachment. For instance, in an exchange at the Constitu-
tional Convention between George Mason and James Madison, Mason
objected to limiting impeachment to treason and bribery, because he
thought impeachment should reach "attempts to subvert the Constitu-
tion."ns He recommended that the delegates include "maladministra-
tion" as an impeachable offense. 74 Illustratively, Mason referred
approvingly to the contemporary English impeachment of Warren Has-
tings-formerly the Governor-General of India-as being based on an
attempt to "subvert the Constitution. "3  Madison responded that "mal-
administration" was "so vague a term [as to] be equivalent to tenure dur-
ing the pleasure of the Senate." 76 Madison preferred the phrase "high
Crimes and Misdemeanors" as an alternative177 that would encompass
attempts to subvert the Constitution and other similarly dangerous of-
fenses. The debates at the Convention confirmed that impeachable of-
fenses were not limited to indictable offenses, but included abuses against
the state. Neither the debates nor the Constitution's language, however,
identifies the specific offenses that constitute impeachable abuses against
the state.
The ratification campaign also supports the conclusion that "other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors" were not limited to indictable offenses,
but rather included great offenses against the federal government. For
example, delegates to state ratification conventions often referred to im-
peachable offenses as "great" offenses (but not necessarily as criminal),
and they frequently spoke of how impeachment should lie if the official
" 'deviates from his duty' "378 or if he " 'dare to abuse the powers vested
in him by the people.' "3"
Alexander Hamilton echoed such sentiments in The Federalist, ob-
serving that
[t]he subject (of the Senate's] jurisdiction [in an impeachment trial]
are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public
373. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 1, at $50.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. According to Blackstone, "high misdemeanors" in British usage included "mal-admin-
istration of such high officers, as are in public trust and employment." Rotunda, supra note 13, at
723 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 368, at 121).
378. Rotunda, supra note 13, at 723 (quoting 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 47 (J. Elliott ed. 1836) (quoting A. MacLaine of South
Carolina)).
379. Id. (quoting 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FLD-
ERAL CONSTITUTION 47 (J. Elliott ed. 1836) (quoting S. Stillman of Massachusetts)).
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men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public
trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be
denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done
immediately to the society itself.
380
Viewing it as unwise to submit the impeachment decision to the Supreme
Court because of "the nature of the proceeding,"3
8
' Hamilton argued
that the impeachment court could not be "tied down" by strict rules,
"either in the delineation of the offense by the prosecutors (the House of
Representatives] or in the construction of it by the judges [the Sen-
ate] ." 32 He added that "[tihe awful discretion which a court of im-
peachments must necessarily have to doom to honor or to infamy the
most confidential and the most distinguished characters of the commu-
nity forbids the commitment of the trust to a small number of
persons." 3 13
Justices James Wilson and Joseph Story agreed with Hamilton's un-
derstanding of impeachment as a political proceeding and impeachable
offenses as political crimes. Immediately after his appointment to the
Supreme Court, Justice Wilson provided a series of lectures on the new
Constitution, in which he commented that "[iun the United States ...
impeachments are confined to political characters, to political crimes and
misdemeanors, and to political punishments."
384 Justice Wilson essen-
tially understood the term "high" to mean "political." Similarly, Justice
Story recognized the political nature of impeachment:
The jurisdiction is to be exercised over offences, which are commit-
ted by public men in violation of their public trust and duties.
Those duties are, in many cases, political . . . . Strictly speaking,
then, the power partakes of a political character, as it respects inju-
ries to the society in its political character.
385
Justice Story also viewed the penalties of removal and disqualification as
"limitipg the punishment to such modes of redress, as are peculiarly fit
for a political tribunal to administer, and as will secure the public against
political injuries." 38 6 Justice Story understood "political injuries" to be
"[sluch kind of misdeeds . . . as peculiarly injure the commonwealth by
the abuse of high offices of trust."
387
In much the same manner as Hamilton, Justice Story understood
380. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 396 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
381. Id. at 398.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. 1 J. WILSON, WORKS, supra note 16, at 426.
385. J. STORY, supra note 72, § 385, at 272-73.
386. Id. at 290.
387. Bestor, supra note 13, at 263 (quoting 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES § 788, at 256 (Boston 1833)).
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that the framers proceeded as if there woqld be a federal common lav of
crimes from which future Congresses could draw a list of offenses for
which federal officials may be impeached and removed. Justice Story
explained that "no previous statute is necessary to authorize an impeach-
ment for any official misconduct.""*8 Nor, in Justice Story's view, could
such a statute ever be drafted because "political offenses are of so various
and complex a character, so utterly incapable of being defined, or classi-
fied, that the task of positive legislation would be impracticable, if it were
not almost absurd to attempt it.""' The implicit understanding sharedby both Hamilton and Justice Story was that subsequent generations
would have to define on a case-by-case basis the political crimes serving
as contemporary impeachable offenses to replace the federal commonlaw of crimes that never developed.
The remaining problem is how to identify those nonindictable of-fenses for which certain high-level government officials may be im-peached. Given that certain federal officials may be impeached and
removed for committing serious abuses against the state and that these
abuses are not confined to indictable offenses, the challenge is to find
contemporary analogues to the abuses against the state that authorities
such as Hamilton and Justices Wilson and Story viewed as suitablegrounds for impeachment. On the one hand, these abuses may be re-flected in certain statutory crimes. Violations of federal criminal stat-
utes, such as the bribery statute,390 represent abuses against the state
sufficient to subject the perpetrator to impeachment and removal, be-
cause bribery demonstrates serious lack of judgment and respect for thelaw and because bribery lowers respect for the office. In other words,
there are certain statutory crimes that, if committed by public officials,
reflect such lapses of judgment, such disregard for the welfare of the
state, and such lack of respect for the law and the office held that the
occupant may be impeached and removed for lacking the minimal level
of integrity and judgment sufficient to discharge the responsibilities of
the office. On the other hand, Congress needs to be prepared, as then-Congressman Ford pointed out, to explain what nonindictable offenses
may be impeachable offenses by defining contemporary political crimes.The boundaries of congressional power to define such political crimesdefy specification because they rest both on the circumstances underlying
a particular offense (including the actor, the forum, and the political
crime) and on the collective political judgment of Congress.
388. J. STORY, supra note 72, § 405, at 288.
389. Id. at 287 (citations omitted).
390. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1982).
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Nevertheless, constitutional safeguards apply to the impeachment
process and should circumscribe congressional efforts to define those
political crimes. The Constitution includes several safeguards to ensure
that Congress will deliberate carefully prior to making any judgments in
an impeachment proceeding: (1) when the Senate sits as a court of im-
peachment, "they shall be on Oath or Affirmation," 9t (2) at least two-
thirds of the Senators present must favor removal for the impeachment
to be successful, 92 and (3) in the special case of presidential removal, the
Chief Justice must preside so that the Vice President, who normally pre-
sides, is spared from presiding over the removal trial of the one person
who stands between him and the presidency.39 3 Two other safeguards
are political in nature. First, members of Congress seeking re-election
have a political incentive to avoid any abuse of impeachment power. The
knowledge that they may have to account to their constituency may
cause them to deliberate cautiously on impeachment questions. Second,
the cumbersome impeachment process makes it difficult for a faction
guided by base political motives to both impeach and remove. Thus,
these structural and political safeguards help ensure that the House and
the Senate conduct impeachment proceedings only if warranted: "[s]ome
type of wrongdoing must exist in order for an impeachment to lie-there
can be no impeachment for mere policy difference . . . ."39
The last problem in defining the scope of impeachable offenses is
determining whether an official may be impeached for conduct unrelated
to his office or committed before assuming office. Resolving this prob-
lem depends on understanding why political crimes or abuses against the
state are impeachable offenses. The answer seems to be that someone
who holds office also holds the people's trust, and an officeholder who
violates that trust effectively loses the confidence of the people and, con-
seqc9ently, must forfeit the office.3 9s Of course, the ways in which im-
peachable officials may violate the people's trust vary from case to
case. 9 6 For example, wrongdoing committed before a person assumes
office may relate to the person's capacity and worthiness to hold office,
and to that person's ability to protect and deserve the people's trust.
391. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6.
392. See id.
393. See id.
394. Rotunda, supra note 13, at 726.
395. See Bestor, supra note 13, at 263 (citing 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES § 810, at 278, § 788, at 256 (Boston 1833)) (commenting that the
penalties for impeachment were designed to "secure the public against political injuries," and defin-
ing political injuries as "such kind of misdeeds . . . as peculiarly injure the commonwealth by the
abuse of high offices of trust.").
396. See Book Note, supra note 116. at 913.
Similarly, conduct technically unrelated to the responsibilities of a partic-
ular office may still relate to an official's capacity to fulfill the functions
of that office and to hold the people's trust.
For example, ifthe people elected a President and the media later
revealed him to have been a Ku Klux Klan member who had committed
numerous civil rights violations in private life, then Congress could in
good faith determine that such conduct reflects the kind of disdain for
the law that no President should have.397 The same concept holds truefor a President who, during his term and for personal reasons, murders
someone. Even if such a crime were unrelated to the President's consti-
tutional duties, the President's commission of a murder considerably
cheapens the presidency and demonstrates disdain for the law, warrant-ing a congressional determination that the President is no longer fit topreserve the people's trust. The situation is more complicated if incrimi-
nating information relating to embarrassing or even illegal conduct has
already been made public prior to the election. As a matter of common
sense and good policy-but not constitutional law-Congress may wish
to take this circumstance into consideration during its deliberation onimpeachment, because its efforts to impeach the President for violation
of the public trust presume that Congress is acting in the best interests of
the people, who may already have indicated tacit approval of the Presi-dent's prior conduct.
C. The Proper Procedure for Impeachment
Impeachment raises four major procedural questions: (1) whether
an impeachment is a criminal or civil proceeding; (2) whether any presi-dential privilege is applicable; (3) what rules of evidence, if any, shouldbe applicable; and (4) whether the Senate may appoint special trial com-
mittees to receive evidence for removal proceedings."9* The debate over
397. Shortly after Justice Hugo Black had been confirmed to the Supreme Court, it was revealedthat during his younger days he had been a member of the Ku Klux Klan. Justice Black addressedthis issue only once in a short public statement after there was a public uproar over his earliermembership in the Klan. His statement consisted of a short acknowledgement that he had been amember of the Ku Klux Klan only for a short while during his youth. It took a while for the uproarto die down. Even though there were threats of impeachment leveled against Justice Black, nothingbecame of them. Se H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDNS: A POLITICAL ITORY O A'.POINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 47-48 (2d ed. 1985); V. HAMILTON, HUGO BLACK:; THEALABAMA YEARS 275, 278-79, 285, 291-92, 294-98 (1972). In all probability, reports of affiliation
with the Ku Klux Klan would not only defeat any future nominations to the federal bench butwould also bring forth retaliation in the form of impeachment proceedings against any sitting federaljudges or the President.
398. Less difficult questions include (1) whether the federal official being impeached has hadreasonable notice that the offense he allegedly committed was, in fact, an impeachable offense and(2) whether impeachment proceedings should be public. See C. BLACK. Supra note 13, at 18-20.First, the problems encountered in defining impeachable offenses may sometimes result in situations
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whether impeachment is a civil or criminal proceeding centers on the
burden of proof that should govern impeachment proceedings.)
99 If im-
peachment is considered a criminal proceeding, then those presenting the
charges must persuade the Senate beyond a reasonable doubt that the
charged official committed each impeachable offense. If impeachment is
considered only a civil proceeding, then the burden of proof for establish-
ing the guilt of the charged official is simply a preponderance of the
evidence.co
Both the language and the structure of the Constitution indicate
that impeachment is not strictly either a criminal or a civil proceeding.
The Constitution expressly limits the punishments for impeachment to
removal and disqualification from office, which are unavailable in any
other proceeding in our legal system.4' In addition, the target of an
impeachment has no right to a jury,4 2 the President may not pardon a
person convicted by impeachment,40 3 the federal rules of evidence do not
apply to an impeachment,4* and the Constitution does not require una-
nimity among any of the members sitting in judgment in an impeach-
ment or removal proceeding.40 But the impeachment clauses do include
at least two serious crimes, treason and bribery, as impeachable of-
in which the impeached official may not be aware or certain that a particular offense, if committed,
is, in fact, impeachable. Under such circumstances, "all we can say is that a conscientious senator
ought to insist upon being quite clearly convinced that the impeached official knew or should have
known the charged act was wrong, before he votes for conviction." Id. at 19. Second. it would seem
that an impeachment proceeding should typically be public, because, arter all, the public ls an
enormous concern about the removal of someone who has been duly elected or who otherwise holds
his office after satisfying constitutional appointment procedures. However, it is not hard to envision
an impeachment proceeding of a President in which serious and sensitive questions requiring confi-
dentiality arise. In such a case, it is reasonable for the House or the Senate to 
convene in executive
session, holding confidential hearings on the sensitive subject matter. Once it has conducted its
executive session, the House or the Senate may use its discretion to determine whethcr any of the
infor ation may be shared with the public. In all probability, the kind of information Congress
shoiT be reluctant to divulge should relate to national security or foreign relations interests, includ-
ing but not limited to the protection of American and allied military personnel. as opposed to issues
relating solely to the integrity or reputation of the official under impeachment. Other sensitive mat-
ters include, for example, attorney-client privileges, which are considered in the subsection on the
applicability of presidential privilege to impeachment proceedings.
399. Professor Black identifies the real question as what "things in the impeachment process ...
should be treated like the same things in a criminal trial, and what things need not be." Id. at 15.
400. See id. at 15. Interestingly, much of Professor Black's analysis is political advice. He fre-
quently speaks of what Senators "ought" to do or what would be a "reasonable" solution to a partic-
ular dilemma. See id. at 16-17. While his caution in constitutional interpretation should be both
commended and emulated, he never explains where the line between constitutional interpretation
and political advice should be drawn-where constitutional interpretation ends and political advice
or wise policy begins.
401. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
402. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (committing impeachments to the "sole Power" of the House); id.
art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (committing removal trials to the "sole Power" of the Senate).
403. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
404. See infro notes 417-19 and accompanying text.
405. See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 2, cl. 5 (implying impeachments by the House require at least a
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fenses." Further, impeachment is lumped together with other criminal
proceedings in other sections of the Constitution.407
If impeachment is, as the constitutional language and structure sug-
gest, a hybrid criminal and civil proceeding, then the burden of proof
required for an impeachment need not be the same as the criminal or
civil burden of proof. In addition, a hybrid of the criminal and- civil bur-
dens of proof may be desirable, because neither a "preponderance of the
evidence" standard nor a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard neatly
fits the impeachment setting. Too lenien; a proof standard would allow
the Senate to impose the serious punishments for impeachment "even
though substantial doubt of guilt remained." 40s Too rigid a standard
might allow an official to remain in office even though the entire Senate
was convinced she had committed an impeachable offense."0
The solution to this dilemma is to balance these concerns. Professor
Charles Black has recommended that:
[t]he essential thing is that no part whatever be played by the natu-
ral human tendency to think the worst of a person of whom one
generally disapproves, and the verbalization of a high standard of
proof may serve as a constant reminder of this. Weighing the fac-
tors, I would be sure that one ought not to be satisfied, or anything
near satisfied, with the mere "preponderance" of an ordinary civil
trial, but perhaps must be satisfied with something a little less than
the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of the ordinary criminal
trial, in the full literal meaning of that standard. "Overwhelming
preponderance of the evidence" comes perhaps as close as presentlegal language can to denoting the desired legal standard.410
In short, the standard of proof in an impeachment should be a hybrid of
the standards of proof in civil and criminal trials to accommodate the
hybrid nature of impeachment proceedings.
The debate over whether the President should be allowed to invoke
any special privileges in an impeachment proceeding typically turns on
whether a strong or weak President is desirable. For example, Professor
Black suggests that even in an impeachment proceeding the President
should enjoy an absolute "privilege of withholding from other branches
of government the tenor and content of his own conversations with his
close advisors in the White House." 4ll Professor Black explains that the
majority vote); id. art. 1. § 3, cl. 6 (requiring a vote of at least "two thirds of the Members present" inthe Senate for a removal conviction).
406. See id. art. II, § 4.
407. See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7; id, art. Ill. § 2, cl. 3.
408. C. BLACK, supra note 13, at 17.
409. See id. at 17.
410. Id
4 11. Id. at 20.
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President should have an absolute executive privilege applicable even to
an impeachment proceeding because "its upholding [is] essential to the
efficacious and dignified conduct of the presidency and to the free flow of
candid advice to the President."4 1 2 He explains further that such a privi-
lege would also allow the President to protect himself from overreaching
by either of the other two branchis.
Yet history and common sense suggest that an impeachment pro-
ceeding is precisely the context in which the President may not assert
superiority over Congress. The framers never evidenced any intent that
the President have the power to thwart an impeachment proceeding.
More importantly, meaningful separation of powers does not support an
absolute executive privilege in an impeachment proceeding. There is no
reason to suppose that executive privilege should operate differently in
congressional and judicial contexts. In United States v. Nixon,4 13 the
Supreme Court held that in a judicial proceeding the executive privilege
is qualified by the basis on which the President is asserting it.*'* The
privilege becomes stronger as the basis for the privilege becomes more
central to national security or the effective and efficient operation of the
executive branch. For example, as Professor Black concedes, a President
vill be on stronger ground in an impeachment proceeding resting his
claim for privilege on the imminent dangers that would result from the
disclosure of international or national security information rather than
on the possible impediment of uninhibited and energetic consultation
with the President.415
In an impeachment hearing, the critical question is often whether
the President has the capacity, integrity, or competency to continue to
occupy the office, and there is no harm in expecting the President to
facilitate disposition of the proceeding by sharing with Congress or the
Chief Justice even the most sensitive information regarding the executive
brisnch. The President's concerns for national security and excessive
congressional oversight of the presidency may be alleviated by requiring
a showing of relevance prior to the President's divulging certain informa-
tion. If the President declines to share information after Congress shows
relevance, he then risks being impeached for refusing to comply with a
congressional request or subpoena. If the President lacks confidence in
congressional procedures for maintaining the confidentiality of certain
information, he can ask Congress to adopt a different procedure. But the
412. Id. at 20-21.
413. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
414. Id. at 713.
415. See C. BLACK, supra note 13, at 22.
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President's lack of confidence in congressional ability to preserve confi-
dential information is not a compelling reason for withholding informa-
tion that Congress is entitled to consider in discharging its constitutional
duties to investigate and conduct impeachments.
By its very nature, the impeachment process is reserved for Con-
gress to demand an accounting from the President regarding alleged
abuses of his powers. Allowing the President to assert an unsubstanti-
ated claim of privilege is nonsense, particularly if Congress uses its best
efforts to maintain absolute secrecy. If the President is not above the
criminal law,"16 there is no sound reason for exempting him from ac-
countability, especially in the impeachment process. The American
Revolution and the Constitution mean nothing if the President retains
office without a meaningful accounting authorized by the Constitution.
The high stakes of any clash between executive privilege and congres-
sional impeachment power demand nothing less than the parties' work-
ing out a suitable arrangement regarding any assertedly sensitive
information.
There is no reason for making any particular rules of evidence appli-
cable to impeachment proceedings.4 17 Both state and federal courts re-
quire special rules of evidence to make trials more efficient and fair or to
keep certain evidence away from a jury, whose members might not un-
derstand or appreciate its reliability, credibility, or potentially prejudicial
effect.4 I8 The concerns leading to the use of special rules of evidence in
state and federal courts do not apply to impeachment proceedings. An
impeachment proceeding is not a typical trial, nor does it involve a typi-
cal jury. Rather, impeachment is an extraordinary hearing, whose suc-
cess and effectiveness depend on the wisdom and judgment of a
sophisticated and politically savvy body, the Congress of the United
States. As Professor Black suggests,
[b]oth the House and the Senate ought to hear and consider all
evidence which seems relevant, without regard to technical rules.
Senators are in any case continually exposed to "hearsay" evi-
dence; they cannot be sequestered and kept away from newspapers,
like a jury. If they cannot be trusted to weigh evidence, appropri-
ately discounting for all the factors of unreliability that have led to
our keeping some evidence away from juries, then they are not in
any way up to the job, and "rules of evidence" will not help.4 19
416. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 268-74 ("In general, there is no executive immu-
nity-common law or otherwise-from criminal prosecution.").
417. For example, the House or Senate might choose to follow the federal rules of evidence.
418. See C. BLACK, supra note 13. at 18.
419. Id.
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Finally, the recent impeachment and removal trials of Judges 
Alcee
Hastings and Walter Nixon have raised the issue whether 
it is constitu-
tional for the Senate to hear closing arguments and to vote on removal,
after appointing a special trial committee to receive evidence 
and to re-
port a neutral summary of the evidence to the full Senate, 
whose mem-
bers have had the opportunity to hear tape recordings of the hearings at
any time prior to the removal vote.
420 There is little doubt such a proce-
dure is constitutional. The Constitution specifies only a few 
details of
what is required for the removal trial, including (1) an oath or affirma-
tion,4 2  (2) a two-thirds vote,4 22 (3) the permissible punishments,
423 and
(4) the official who presides when the President is tried.
4 2 4 The gap that
is left as to the rest of the specifics of the Senate's trial is 
to be filled
according to the discretion of the Senate, as provided in article I, 
section
5 that "[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings."
4 2 5
Moreover, as Judge Gerhard Gesell pointed out in rejecting Judge Has-
tings' and Judge Nixon's challenges to the Senate's special trial 
commit-
tee, the Senate's use of such a committee is a settled practice 
in this
country and in England, and the framers had a more restrictive 
under-
standing of the term "try" than that dominating modern criminal 
due
process.426
D. The Possibility of Impeachment After Resignation
When read together, article II's inclusion of "all civil Officers" as
impeachable officials and article I's limitation of the punishments 
for im-
peachment to removal and disqualification raise the question whether 
the
resignation of an impeachable officer precludes either the 
initiation or
420. The Senate appointed a special trial committee to receive evidence for the removal 
proceed-
ingspf Judges Hastings and Nixon pursuant to Rule Xi or the Rules or Procedure and Practice
when Sitting on Impeachment Trials. Adopted by the Senate in 93m. Rule Xl authorizes the ap-
pointment of a special committee "to receive evidence and take testimony" and "to report to the
Senate in writing a certified copy of the transcript of the proceedings and testimony had and given
before such committee." . Doc. No. 101-3, 101st Cong., st Sess. i (1989); see also Symposium.
supra note 11. at 362-64 (comments by Michael Davidson describing the removal procedure author-
ized by Rule XI. including its provisions that the committee submit a neutral summary 
of the evi.
dence introduced rather than specific recommendattons to convict or acquit on each article, 
that the
entire committee hearing will be taped and broadcast to each Senator's office, that 
Senators may
replay the tape at any time ror any purpose, and that Senators have ample time to digest 
evidence
introduced to the committee prior to the Senate removal vote).
422. See U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 3, ci. 6.
422. See id.
423. See id. art. 1, § 3, cl. 7.
424. See id. art. 1. § 3, cl. 6.
425. Id. art. 1. § 5, cl. 2.
426. See Hastings and Nixon v. United States Senate, No. 89-1602, 716 F. Supp. 
38, 39-43
(D.D.C 1989) (rejecting, inter alia, arguments that the application 
of Rule XI in Judge Hastings'
and Judge Nixon's removal proceedings deprived them of due process).
continuation of an impeachment. Although Congress has never con-
ducted a successful impeachment against someone after resignation,'4 2
there is a surprising consensus among commentators that resignation
does not necessarily preclude impeachment and disqualification.4 28
Upon closer inspection, there are several reasons that the prevailing prac-
tice in Congress "has no substantial historical foundation and is not sup-
ported by a single authoritative and unequivocal decision of recent
times. "429
First, impeachment in the English experience was not limited to of-
ficials still in office. For example, several Constitutional Convention del-
egates, including George Mason, acknowledged that in April of 1787 the
House of Commons had voted articles of impeachment against Warren
Hastings, two years after he had resigned as the Governor-General of
India.430
Second, prior to the Constitutional Convention, several states al-
lowed impeachment of officials even after they left office. For example,
in 1776, Virginia and Delaware adopted constitutions that expressly al-
lowed impeachment against their governors after they left office.43I The
delegates at the Constitutional Convention indicated no intention to
abandon English practice or state constitutional provisions, which al-
lowed post resignation impeachments.
Third, the Constitution does not restrict the time at which an im-
peachment proceeding may be brought and includes language consistent
with impeachments after departure from office. Although article II of
the Constitution refers to all civil officers, that language means only that
those who are still civil officers when convicted of the impeachment must
be removed. Article I does not refer to all civil officers and provides a
limitation on only the penalty in an impeachment proceeding rather than
a limitation on jurisdiction.4 12  According to the conventional rule of
constitutional interpretation to give meaning to each word of the Consti-
tution, the inclusion of boih present removal and future disqualification
as penalties for impeachment suggests that they are two separate penal-
427. But see Bestor, supra note 13, at 280 (summarizing the Belknap case concerning the im-
peachment of the Secretary of War after his resignation); Rotunda, supra note 13, at 717 (describing
the Blount case concerning the impeachment of an expelled Senator).
428. Compare J. STORY, supra note 72, § 400, at 283-84 (arguing that officers subject to im-
peachment may not be impeached after resignation) with Rotunda. supra note 13. at 716-18 (arguing
that resignation does not preclude impeachment and disqualification) and Firmage & Mangrum,
supra note 22, at 1091-92 (same).
429. Bestor, supra note 13, at 277.
430. See id.
431. See id.
432. See Rotunda. supra note 13, at 716.
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ties, which may be separately applied. If the punishments may be levied
apart, 'there is no logical barrier for Congress in disqualifying, whenever
it chooses, someone who was a civil officer of the United States.
Fourth, the delegates at the Constitutional Convention understood
that impeachment may take place after departure from office. On the
only occasion when the'timing of impeachment was discussed at the
Convention, most delegates proceeded as if the President would be im-
peachable after leaving office. 4 " The question that preoccupied the dele-
gates was whether the President should also be impeachable while in
office. By a vote of eight to two, the Convention made the President
impeachable while in office, without giving the slightest indication that
this action constituted any grant of immunity after leaving office.434
Shortly after the Convention, two prominent commentators con-
firmed that resignation or departure from office did not preclude im-
peachment. In The Federalist No. 39, James Madison compared the
impeachment provisions of Virginia and Delaware with those in the new
Constitution, stressing that the latter extended rather than curtailed the
liability of the President by denying him immunity "during his continu-
ance in office."43  Similarly, in 1846, long after he had left the White
House, John Quincy Adams declared on the floor of Congress that "I
hold myself, so long as I have the breath of life in my body, amenable to
impeachment by this House for everything I did during the time I held
any public office."4 36
The critical element guiding the timing of impeachments is that the
checks on impeachment are political, not constitutional. No doubt, there
are numerous reasons not to move for impeachment of an official after
resignation, but none of these are mandated by the Constitution. For
example, Congress may barely have sufficient support to impeach and
remove an official in office, and after the person resigns, Congress may
decide it would be futile to pursue a postresignation disqualification.
Congress may also conclude that healing political divisions after a con-
troversial resignation is more important than its need for vindicating the
laws or principles violated by the resigned official.4 3 7
Justice Story made perhaps the best argument in favor of "confining
433. See Bestor, supra note 13, at 278-79.
434. See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 1, at 64-69.
435. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 242 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
436. CoNG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., Ist Sess. 641 (1846) (statement of J.Q. Adams), quoted in
Bestor, supra note 13, at 279.
437. See Rotunda, supra note 13, at 717 ("Congress ... may not wish to initiate or to complete
impeachment of an officer who has resigned, but that decision is more a matter of prosecutorial
discretion than a constitutional lack of jurisdiction").
the impeaching power to persons holding office,"438 but his argument
was misplaced. In context, Justice Story appeared to be concerned pri-
marily with distinguishing American impeachment practice from con-
temporary British impeachment practice, which allowed impeachment
against private citizens, including all peers and commoners. 43 9 More-
over, one can accommodate Justice Story's concern without going so far
as to argue that impeachment after resignation is impermissible. The
Constitution's language makes clear that the framers rejected impeach-
ment against private citizens for engaging in offenses against the federal
government,440 but accepted impeachment of private citizens for com-
mitting impeachable offenses while they-held office."'
E Judicial Review of Impeachments
Commentators generally agree that federal courts may not review
any aspect of impeachment proceedings because the proceedings present
political questions." 2 A significant minority of commentators, however,
persist in arguing that there should be judicial review of impeachments
because there is no historical basis for the political question doctrine and
because prevailing concepts such as due process and judicial indepen-
dence require judicial review of impeachment proceedings." 3
On balance, there are several reasons why the political question doc-
trine applies to the problem of impeachment. First, the Constitution's
language supports such a view. Article I states that the House "shall
have sole Power of Impeachment" and that the "Senate shall have the
sole power to try all Impeachments." 4 The speech or debate clause,"'
in another section of article I, has been interpreted by the Supreme Court
to protect from judicial review the legitimate activities of legislators act-
438. J. STORY, supra note 72, § 400, at 284 (explaining that the United States, unlike England,
confined impeachment to officeholders because citizens, who are relatively defenseless against the
government's impeachment power, should be secure from reprisal "for their conduct in exercising
their political rights and privileges").
439. See Rotunda, supra note 13, at 717.
440. Id.
441. See Franklin, supra note 22. at 313 (documenting that the framers wanted to reject im-
peachment infamy-impeachment primarily to raint someone's reputation-in favor of impeach-
ment triggered by misconduct either related to or committed while in office). In addition, there is no
sound basis for arguing that there should be a statute of limitations on impeaching someone after
resignation. The timing of an impeachment is simply not a problem turning on constitutional law.
The timing of an impeachment rests solely within the political judgment of the Congress.
442. See, e.g., Rotunda. supra note 13, at 728 (noting that impeachment raises issues that satisfy
each of the elements of a political question as defined in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
443. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 103-21; I. BRANT, supra note 22, at 183-87; Feerick.
Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional Provisions. 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 57(1970).
444. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 2, ci. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (emphasis added).
445. See supra note 348.
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ing within their prescribed functions, including impeachment.'"
Although Raoul Berger argues that none of this language in article I
forecloses the possibility of appeals from impeachment trials," 7 "[tihe
most natural reading of this language appears to be a 'textually demon-
strable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department.' "448
Second, treating impeachments as nonreviewable is consistent with
the explicit decision of the delegates at the Convention to exclude any
role for the courts in an impeachment other than providing that the
Chief Justice would preside at the impeachment trial of the President." 9
For a variety of reasons, the framers preferred some body other than thejudiciary to make impeachment and removal decisions.4s0 The framers
believed, for example, that the judiciary might be influenced by the diffi-
cult conflicts of interest of impeaching and removing either the person
who had appointed them or a fellow judge. In addition, allowing thejudiciary to sit both as part of the impeachment body and as the review-
ing body would be inefficient and counterproductive, particularly if the
controversy involved a federal judge. The framers also substituted the
Chief Justice for the Vice President in the impeachment proceeding
against a President to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest of the
Vice President presiding over the removal trial.
Justice Story explained that the framers regarded Congress better
equipped than the judiciary to deal with the difficult political issues
raised by an impeachment proceeding. In particular, he noted that the
framers rejected the judiciary as the impeachment body because they be-
lieved that impeachment required "a very large discretion [that] must
unavoidably be vested in the court of impeachments."4' According to
Justice Story, the framers understood the power of impeachment as polit-
ical in nature and vested the power solely with the House of Representa-
tives, "where it should be, in the possession and power of the immediate
repiesentatives of the people."452 Justice Story also regarded the sanc-
tions available to the Senate in impeachment proceedings as "peculiarly
fit[ting] for a political tribunal to administer, and as will secure the pub-
446. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund. 421 U.S. 491, 501-05 (1975); Gravel v.United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169. 180 (1966); In reRequest for Access to Grand Jury Materials, 833 F.2d 1438, 1446 (1Ith Cir. 1987).
447. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 116-21.
448. Rotunda, supra note 13, at 728 (luoting Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. 186. 217 (1962)).
449. See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS. supra note 1, at 500. 551.
450. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 65. at 398 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
451. J. STORY, supra note 72, § 396, at 280.
452. Id. § 407, at 290.
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lic against political injuries."4S3
Third, the decision to impeach involves issues that are not judicial;discoverable or that are difficult for judges to apply. For example, botthe House and the Senate eventually must agree, usually independentl
of each other, on what constitutes an impeachable offense. Yet, as Ju:
tice Story observed, impeachable offenses are "purely of a political nu
ture"45 4 and defy definition or classification by statute. No statutes c
common law doctrines set forth the impeachable offenses that court
may then interpret or apply. Thus, "[tihe very nature of an impeachabl
offense demonstrates that it fails another independent and alternative tes
to determine when a legal question is justiciable; there are 'a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving' the issue."45
Fourth, judicial review of impeachments might lead to embarrassin
conflicts between the Congress and the federal judiciary. Allowing theChief Justice to participate in the judicial review of a President's im
peachment after the Chief Justice had presided over it would be awk
ward. Moreover, it would be confusing and embarrassing if the Senat
voted to remove the President and then a federal court countermandec
that decision. In short, "[bjecause the framers placed the sole power of
impeachment in two political bodies-the House and the Senate-it
would certainly appear that such an issue remains a political
question."456
The Supreme Court's decision in Powell Y. McCormick4" also indi-
cates that there may be judicial review of any aspects of an impeachment
proceeding. In Powell, the Supreme Court held that whether the House
of Representatives followed the proper procedure in excluding AdamClayton Powell from taking his seat in the House was not a political
question.45 8 The Powell Court also held that although Congress has thedual powers to expel and to exclude its members, Congress is not em-
powered to apply expulsion standards in proceedings to exclude a
representative.S 9
The lesson of Powell is that the Supreme Court may use judicial
review to determine whether Congress followed the proper procedure for
making the political decision committed to it by the Constitution. Powelldoes not allow overly intrusive judicial review, but rather allows review
453. Id.
454. Id. § 406, at 289.
455. Rotunda, supra note 3, at 729 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).456. Rotunda, supra note 13, at 732.457. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
458. Id. at 549.
459. Id. at 511-12.
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solely to ensure that Congress made the particular kind of political deci-
sion entrusted to it by the Constitution. In Powell, the Court could not
have, interfered with the decision by Congress to expel Representative
Powell if Congress had followed the constitutional standards for an ex-
pulsion;" 0 however, the Court could step in where Congress used a pro-
cedure to accomplish impermissible ends. Powell indicates that while
Congress has full, complete, and sole power to exclude, it does not have
the power to change expulsion into exclusion-to turn one constitutional
procedure into another. Also, under Powell the federal courts may de-
cide whether Congress has chosen the correct procedure to accomplish
its asserted purposes. Thus, Powell indicates, first, that whether the mat-
ter is a political question depends on the fit between the actual procedure
chosen by Congress and the circumstances to which Congress attempts
to apply the procedure, and second, that the choice and application of a
procedure by Congress are reviewable by the federal courts to ensure that
Congress has done no more than the Constitution allows.
This interpretation of Powell clarifies at what points, if any, there
nay be judicial review of any part of an impeachment proceeding. For
example, Professor Rotunda has asked whether federal courts may inter-
vene if Senators violate the Constitution by participating in a removal
trial without being on oath or affirmation.46' This question turns on the
critical distinction, made in all political question cases, between the con-
stitutionality and the reviewability of an action. Although the Senate's
action in Professor Rotunda's hypothetical example is plainly unconsti-
tutional, that determination does not answer whether the action is alsojudicially reviewable. In the context of impeachment, which, by nature,
presents political questions, reviewability is limited to determining
whether Congress chose one procedure to accomplish something consti-
tutionally permissible only in some other proceeding. Obviously, Con-
gress made no such choice in Professor Rotunda's hypothetical. Instead,
Congress chose a procedure but did not follow all of its particular dic-
tates. Under Powell, the latter situation is a classic political question and,
as such, is not reviewable by any federal court. Instead, its remedy rests
460. The Court framed the issue as the scope of the House's powers under article 1, section 2, cl.
2. which describes the three qualifications that must be met by a Representative, and article I, sec-
tion 5, cl. 2, which provides that 'each House shall be the Judge of the . .. Qualifications of its own
Members." The Court essentially reviewed the merits of and ultimately rejected the House's argu-
ment that its power to judge the qualifications of its members included the power to "exclude [Pow-
ell] from its membership" on grounds of misconduct. Id. at 550. Although the Court saw itself as
merely deciding the parameters of the House's power to exclude, this Article proposes the decision
be viewed more precisely as upholding the Court's power to distinguish the scope of the House's
dual powers to exclude and to expel, the latter of which is set forth in U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 2.
461. See Rotunda, supra note 13, at 730-31.
with the Senate.462 By contrast, if the House tries to remove or if the
Senate tries to impeach, federal courts may review the procedure, be-
cause in this case either the Housq or the Senate is trying to transform
one constitutional procedure into another.
V. Conclusion: The Future of Impeachment
Impeachment is both awesome and perplexing. When Congress
conducts an impeachment hearing and trial, the Constitution's vitality is
reaffirmed, and when Congress exercises its removal powers, the high
stakes are apparent. Yet it is mystifying, given the volume of literature
on impeachment and the attention focused on Congress each time it tries
to exercise its impeachment power, that our understanding of impeach-
ment has not advanced much from the first days of the Constitutional
Convention. Scholarship on impeachment, with too few exceptions,
leaves much to be desired.
In the face of the inadequate scholarship on impeachment, this Arti-
cle argues that impeachment may be understood and may remain vital as
long as we recognize the real nature of impeachment and the limitations
of "grand" or formal theories of constitutional analysis. Impeachment
was conceived as a political proceeding involving certain political offi-
cials charged with political crimes and, if necessary, culminating in cer-
tain political punishments. Commentators often misunderstand or
ignore impeachment's political nature which makes the impeachment
clauses virtually immune to systematic analysis because politics itself is
difficult to analyze systematically.463 Nevertheless, impeachment may
make sense if we (1) use history only as the starting point for analysis, (2)
consider the structural role of impeachment in checking and balancing
the three branches, (3) appreciate the changes that have occurred within
the institutions responsible for impeachment, (4) presume the constitu-
tionality of additions to or deviations from the impeachment procedure
(so long as those additions do not violate the values or principles im-
peachment and the federal judiciary were intended to protect), and (5)
bar judicial review of political questions except for judicial determina-
tions of the contours of the political questions themselves.
As a solution to its current inefficiency, the impeachment process
462. See L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 97-98, 106-07 (discussing the rationale for the political
question doctrine's leaving the decision as to the constitutionality of certain governmental actions to
branches other than the judiciary); see also Marbury v. Madison, S U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 165-66
(1803) (expressly contemplating that some seemingly "constitutional" issues would be committed to
political discretion).
463. See M. TUSHNET, supra note 18. at 70-72, 94. 99-107 (discussing the "complexity of mod-
ern American politics").
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may be streamlined in at least three ways without requiring constitu-
tional amendment. First, the Act of 1790 demonstrated that Congress
could, if it combined its powers under the necessary and proper and the
impeachment clauses, provide for automatic removal and disqualification
of impeachable officials upon conviction for the specific offenses listed in
the impeachment clause. Such a law would not threaten judicial inde-
pendence. For example, Congress could, if it chooses, pass a law that
automatically disqualified federal judges or other impeachable officials
once they have been convicted of bribery or other crimes demonstrating
similar intent or culpability. However, Congress could also choose to
forego such legislation based on fairness, prudent political judgment, or
an interest in hearing all evidence relevant to impeachment or removal.
Second, both the Senate and the House could streamline fact-finding
procedures for impeachment, impeachment hearings, and impeachment
trials.** For example, the House and the Senate might agree that auto-
matic removal upon conviction may be constitutional but not desirable
for political reasons. They could give certain convictions preclusive 
ef-
fect in impeachment hearings by providing that once there has been a
conviction, both chambers would defer to the factual findings already
resolved under the high standard of proof necessary for conviction. The
convicted official would then have the opportunity to attack his convic-
tion collaterally during an impeachment proceeding, as he would on a
typical criminal appeal, or through the introduction of certain limited
evidence not introduced for good reason at trial, but he could not argue
for de novo review or claim a right to a new trial.4 6a By relying on prior
convictions as creating rebuttable presumptions, Congress could reduce
the possibility of any embarrassing situations and also shorten the time
and manpower necessary for its thorough deliberations on the impeach-
ment questions.
,Third, Congress could, as it does now, create committees for the
reception and distillation of information.
46 6 Nothing in the Constitution
precludes the House from relying on information gathered outside the
464. See Burbank, supra note 92, at 671-73 (arguing for adoption of House rules that accord
substantial preclusive effect to factual findings necessary to a criminal conviction once that convic-
tion is affirmed on appeal).
465o An impeachment tribunal could treat the fact-finding from a federal or state court 
convic-
tion with the same deference as state court findings are given in a federal habeas copus proceeding
see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982). or findings by administrative law judges are given on appeals in
federal court under 5 U .S.C. § 706(2)(A).
466. See Stoltz, jspra note 14. at 667 (arguing for an eatensive revision of the impeachment
process, including "(1) Icireation of a bipartisan House Committee on Judicial Fitness; (2) creation
of a permanent professional staff as an adjunct to the Committee; (3) use of a master 
or masters to
conduct formal evidetiary hearings for the Senate and to prepare proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law which would be the basis of argument and decision in the Senate"').
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impeachment process to initiate an,impeachment proceeding, as long as
the noncongressional investigation does not require the Congress to ac-
cept the facts or the findings of the investigation or force the investigat-
ing branch to go beyond its own constitutional limitations. No doubt,
Congress would stand on firmer constitutional ground if it at least ini-
tially directed some outside agency to investigate the alleged commis-
sions of particular impeachable offenses in certain limited circumstances.
The Senate has already demonstrated in the removal trials of Judges
Harry Claiborne and Alcee Hastings that it is possible to streamline re-
ceipt of evidence regarding removal through special trial committees that
provide the full Senate with tapes of hearings and neutral summaries of
submitted evidence.
467
In the final analysis, three important lessons regarding constitu-
tional interpretation can be learned from the debates on impeachment.
First, no simple theory of constitutional interpretation answers all the
problems regarding the meaning of each and every constitutional provi-
sion. Impeachment is not one of the few self-defining constitutional pro-
visions. With respect to ambiguous constitutional language or gaps in
the Constitution, constitutional theories may raise but do not definitively
answer important questions about the meaning of the Constitution.
Second, constitutional provisions grant each branch special power.
This power may include the responsibility to use creativity and common
sense to exercise the power-granting provision in the contemporary
world. Constitutional commentators should not forget that the judiciary
is not the only branch empowered to interpret the Constitution and that
the judiciary is no more capable or constitutionally compelled than the
other branches to give the Constitution meaning.
Third, constitutional law explicates what is permissible, but politics
dictates what should be done. We should recognize that simply because
some course of action is constitutional does not mean either that it is
prudent or that it must be pursued. Constitutional commentators spend
so much time debating the outer limits of constitutionally permissible
behavior by the different branches that they sometimes lose sight of the
important issues included within those limits-issues that must be re-
solved by making prudent political judgments. 68 Unless and until our
467. See supra note 420.
468. The point is that constitutional interpretation sets the outermost boundaries on the exercise
of federal power but sets a minimum standard or floor for states. For example, Congress may regard
a measure such as the Act of 1790 as constitutional, but choose to forego it out of a sense of fairness
or to avoid any political difficulties its use might entail. It is important not to confuse these limits
with prudent politics, which sometimes may suggest stretching a particular branch's power to its
outermost limits or perhaps even beyond. It is also important not to lose sight of the constitutional
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notions of politics are elevated, however, constitutional commentators
will continue to tell the different branches of government-as they have
in the area of impeachment-what they must do as opposed to what they
may do after careful and thorough deliberation.
interpretations branches other than the judiciary must make. Commentators spend far too little time
analyzing the constitutional interpretations other branches must make as a function of their own
constitutional responsibilities. One purpose of this Article is to indicate that the Congress must
interpret the impeachment clauses as pan of its impeachment power and that much of the constitu-
tional commentary on the meaning of the impeachment clauses is not so much constitutional inter-
pretation as it is recommendations to Congress on how to resolve the political problems endemic to
impeachment.
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